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The area of judicial activism in labour and industrial jurisprudence is not a widely 
undertaken or debated area of law in Malaysia. Judicial activism as opposed to 
conservatism often depends on decisions pronounced by competent courts dealing 
with labour and industrial matters. There are decisions which strictly abide by 
precedential authority and there are decisions which deal with more flexible 
intrusions into legislative authority. The research problem is that majority of the 
resolutions made at the labour court or industrial court in Malaysia are more prone 
towards conservatism rather than activism. The research objective is to inquire 
whether such decisions in turn affect an employer and employee relationship in a 
social justice context. It is to be noted that Malaysia is a signatory to the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) which sets minimum standards to be adhered by each 
country in governing its labour and industrial laws. The research was undertaken for 
a detailed study of statutes and law cases related to labour and industrial matters in 
Malaysia to determine whether the judiciary is indeed favourable to conservatism. To 
this end, analysing statutory provisions such as the Employment Act 1955 and 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 as interpreted through cases in the labour court, 
industrial court and civil court gave an end picture of the research objective. Neither 
could we deny nor be unaware of the influence of colonial laws of England on our 
jurisprudence which to date has remained more conservative compared to the 
American and Indian judicial systems. The importance of this research is to enable 
more just labour and industrial law practices for the ultimate good of social justice 
and perhaps a reformulation of these laws. The research findings indicated that there 
was a lack of judicial activism in Malaysia with an inclination towards conservatism. 
With this finding, recommendations were made in important areas of labour and 
industrial laws in order to encourage amendments, introduction of new legislations 
by the legislature and strengthening the judicial decisions by the judiciary. 
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Bidang aktivisme kehakiman di dalam jurispruden buruh dan perusahaan bukanlah 
merupakan suatu bidang yang terdapat pelaksanaan dan pendebatan yang meluas 
dalam undang-undang di Malaysia. Aktivisme kehakiman, bertentangan dengan 
konservatisme, seringkali bergantung kepada keputusan-keputusan yang dinyatakan 
oleh mahkamah berwibawa yang berurusan dengan perkara-perkara buruh dan 
perusahaan. Keputusan-keputusan ini ada yang secara tegas mengikut kuasa duluan 
mengikat dan ada juga keputusan-keputusan yang berkait dengan pencerobohan 
kuasa legislatif secara lebih fleksibel. Masalah kajian adalah kebanyakan resolusi 
yang dibuat di mahkamah buruh atau mahkamah perusahaan lebih cenderung kepada 
konservatisme daripada aktivisme. Objektif kajian adalah untuk mengkaji sama ada 
keputusan-keputusan sebegini mempengaruhi hubungan di antara majikan dan 
pekerja dalam konteks kesaksamaan sosial. Harus diambil kira bahawa Malaysia 
merupakan penandatangan kepada Pertubuhan Buruh Antarabangsa yang 
menetapkan piawaian-piawaian minimum yang harus dipatuhi oleh sesebuah negara 
yang menguruskan undang-undang buruh dan perusahaaan mereka. Kajian ini telah 
dibuat untuk pembelajaran secara terperinci peruntukan-peruntukan perundangan dan 
kes-kes yang berhubungkait dengan perkara-perkara buruh dan perusahaan untuk 
menentukan sama ada badan kehakiman menyokong aktivisme kehakiman atau 
konservatisme. Oleh yang demikian, menganalisis peruntukan-peruntukan 
perundangan seperti Akta Kerja 1955 dan Akta Perhubungan Perusahaan 1967 yang 
ditafsir melalui kes-kes di dalam mahkamah buruh, mahkamah perusahaan dan 
mahkamah sivil dapat memberi gambaran mutakhir kepada objektif kajian. Kita tidak 
harus menolak atau tidak peduli pengaruh undang-undang kolonial Inggeris ke atas 
perundangan kita yang sehingga kini masih lebih konservatif berbanding dengan 
sistem perundangan Amerika dan India. Kepentingan kajian ini adalah untuk 
membolehkan pengamalan undang-undang buruh dan perusahaan yang lebih 
saksama untuk kebaikan kesaksamaan sosial dan memulakan usaha pengubalan 
semula undang-undang ini. Keputusan kajian telah menunjukkan bahawa terdapat 
kekurangan aktivisme kehakiman di Malaysia dan kecenderungan adalah kepada 
konservatisme. Dengan penemuan ini, cadangan-cadangan telah dibuat dalam hal-hal 
penting dalam undang-undang buruh dan industri untuk membuat pindaan, 
pengenalan undang-undang baru oleh badan perundangan serta pengukuhan 
keputusan-keputusan kehakiman oleh badan kehakiman. 
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The study scope is a focus on the issue of legal protection under Labour and 
Industrial court jurisprudence in Malaysia. The research objective aims to understand 
the role of the judiciary, statutory provisions and common law decisions under labour 
and industrial causes and their impact on social justice. This is specially to 
understand the concept of judicial activism in comparison to conservative literal 
interpretation of statutes and precedential common law which has been popular in the 
jurisprudence of the English legal system, which have corollaries in the Malaysian 
legal system. Tun Dato’ Seri Zaki Tun Azmi, the former Chief Justice of Malaysia 
stated that: 
We in Malaysia are influenced to a large extent by the decisions of the House of Lords (now 
known as the UK Supreme Court) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, ... Yet we in 
our country give so much weight to their decisions, not because we are bound by them but 
because by our training in England (at least those among my contemporaries) we are 
unconsciously influenced by the English judges’ thinking as well.1  
 
The then honourable Chief Justice was of the opinion that the judiciary in Malaysia 
was largely influenced by the English judiciary whose decisions were based on 
conservative jurisprudential application of statutes and common law. This have led to 
a lack of judicial activism relating to this branch of the social justice jurisprudence 
                                                     
1 In his address to the 15th Malaysian Law Conference titled, “Judicial Activism or Judicial Interpretation,” delivered 




which is a prerequisite for this area of law, but not to the extent which causes judicial 
imperialism.2  
 
Adding to this, his Lordship also stated in the same address that the Malaysian 
judiciary may have been playing a conservative role in interpreting statutes and 
common law precedents. Further, it was stated by his Lordship that judges who 
incidentally inject their personal views into their judgements based on judicial 
activism are usually frowned upon and their decisions are overturned on appeal more 
often than not. 
  
 1.2 Problem Statement 
Labour and industrial jurisprudence in Malaysia favours the employers through a 
conservative interpretation of labour laws. Such favouritism has originated from the 
disability of the judicial institution in understanding conditions which affects the 
ordinary worker based on active judicial interpretation of statutes on labour and 
industrial laws in an impartial manner, preferring a sacredly held notion of 
conservative precedence.3  
 
It is common for judges to face situations where workers taking actions in courts 
over their dismissal come from a varied field of the workforce and with myriad 
skills. To be fair, the judge is not a Hercules (as a hypothetical character introduced 
by Ronald Dworkin in his book),4 that he is able to understand the fine nuances of 
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3 Rajesh Shukla, “The New Avatar of the Judiciary,” Infochange Agenda, March 2013, accessed July 31, 2013, 
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skills involved for every worker, nor can he be expected to fully grasp the different 
environments in which each worker is situated in a cent per cent manner.  
 
Therefore, a standard model of conservative judgement through established statutes 
and precedents are at times unsuitable for different cases originating from different 
backgrounds, where there can always be a penumbra in the laws allowing room for 
them to be decided afresh.5 Essentially, some cases call for a more active judicial role 
to ensure social justice to achieve the end result, and some should be left as they are 
where no controversy is observed. 
 
One may impose a query at this stage as to whether this is the development in 
Malaysia.  Is it even a problem? The researcher looks at a sample amendment to the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. A new section 30(6A) (a) was inserted (through The 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2007) which states, “Notwithstanding 
subsection (6), the Court in making an award in relation to a reference to it under 
subsection 20(3) shall take into consideration the factors specified in the Second 
Schedule.” The second schedule states, “any back wages to be awarded to a person 
who has been dismissed without just cause or excuse shall be limited to 24 months' 
back wages based on his last-drawn salary.” Previously under the act, to a person 
who is compensated for unlawful dismissal where a case goes on for 5 years, then 
that counts as 60 months’ worth of back wages.  
 
The above amendment was as a result of a decision in the case of Dr. James Alfred v. 
Koperasi Serbaguna Sanya Bhd. Sabah & Anor. [2001] 3 CLJ 541, where his 
                                                     




Lordship Steve Shim6 stated that the logic of the reduction of back wages was that 
there was the possibility that the dismissed employee may have become gainfully 
employed elsewhere, and may not be entitled to full back wages payment from the 
date of dismissal. 
 
However, in the Industrial Court Case number 10/4 – 341/10 between Encik Choong 
Khen Chew and Hiap Lee Clay Pavers and Brick Sdn Bhd [2011], the Industrial 
Court Chairman accepted the fact that at times, the 24 months statutory back wages 
rule may have to give way to the demands of ‘equity and good conscience’. 
Preferably, the Industrial Court judgement in this case seems to be more judicially 
active compared to the one pronounced by the apex courts.  
 
The above two case comparison shows the former may have been decided based on a 
literal conservative interpretation of the law later codified, and the latter shows that 
some form of flexible judicial activism is required in certain circumstances to 
achieve fairness and justice. This shows that there is an inclination towards 
conservatism and a lack of activism by the courts.  
 
Not only has the Industrial Relations Act 1967 reduced the compensation amount till 
reinstatement of the dismissed worker, in the case of Dreamland Corp Sdn Bhd v 
Choong Chin Sooi & Industrial Court of Malaysia [1988] 1 CLJ 1, it was made clear 
by the pronouncement of the Federal Court 7  that there is no requirement for a 
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company to hold a domestic inquiry8 before dismissal and that such omission on the 
part of the employer is not fatal to his case.9   
 
How these cases are compared and contrasted is an extremely difficult matter to 
analyse, as on the pretext of objectivity, at times a researcher may instead end up 
being subjective to establish the very notions that he has set out to confirm. 
However, though a research thesis must be free of subjective bias, it can never be a 
hundred per cent biased free.10 
 
The researcher refers to the Code of Conduct for Industrial Harmony 1975.  
Balakrishnan Parasuraman stated the following on the function of the Code that, 
“The aim of the code is to lay down principles and guidelines to employer and 
guidelines to employers and workers on the practice of industrial relations, for 
achieving greater industrial harmony.”11  
 
Also, according to the above consultation paper, it was initially held by the Industrial 
Court that failure to follow retrenchment rules would be mala fide. It was also stated 
that the Code should function as a directive to have a stronger legal implication.  
However, the Industrial Court have held lately that they are mere guidelines and not 
                                                     
8  An inquiry held by the company authority before dismissal of the worker where he is allowed to defend himself and 
to show cause why he should not be dismissed.  
9 This is a Federal Court decision and has yet to be overruled by the current Supreme Court. This is amply confirmed 
by the case of Ngeow Voon Yean v Sungei Wang Plaza Sdn Bhd [2004] 1 AMR 501 where it was stated by Richard Malanjum 
JCA that as a general rule, the proper course for an employee who doubts the lawfulness or reasonableness of an order of his 
superior would be to obey the order first and challenge it later.  
10  James Matthiesen and Mario Binder, How to Survive your Doctorate: What Others Don’t Tell You (Open 
University Press, 2009), 9. 
11 Balakrishnan Parasuraman, “Communcation and Consultation in Malaysia: Impact of the 1975 Code of Conduct,” 




mandatory,12 causing employers to ignore these guidelines altogether. Whether such 
codes are deemed through judicial activism as an aid to statutes or are in themselves 
legal and therefore is to be given equal value remains to be seen. It can however be 
construed that since these codes can be considered as secondary legislation and thus 
would have a legal status albeit less important than a primary legislation 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
Following were the research questions contemplated by the researcher which guided 
fact finding for this research. The important issues here relate to three matters and 
they are as follows: 
1. What is the development of industrial and labour jurisprudence in Malaysia 
relating to conservatism or activism in courts’ judgement? 
2. What is the inclination of the decisions of the courts in Malaysia? 
3. Is there a need for the application of conservatism or activism in courts? 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The following are the research objectives hoped to be achieved by the researcher in 
his research: 
1. To study the development of industrial and labour jurisprudence in Malaysia 
relating to conservatism or activism in courts’ judgement. 
2. To analyse the statutory rules and judgements in order to identify the courts’ 
inclination in giving judgement either towards conservatism of activism. 
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3. To establish recommendations for the application of conservatism or 
activism. 
1.5 Significance of Study 
To contribute in the understanding of the formulation of labour and industrial laws so 
that potential abuses of the labour force may be averted. This will essentially benefit 
the employees as well as legal practitioners in Malaysia in ensuring that there is a 
better protection for employees under labour and industrial laws. 
 
To redefine the labour and industrial relation judgements, which have focused too 
much on conservative judicial interpretation by not including judicial activism 
broadly. This was done through a proper analysis of statutes and judgements related 
to labour and industrial courts. This redefinition would aid in a better from of 
statutory interpretation of future decisions. 
 
To be a predictive model (judgements based on the application of judicial activism 
where necessary to achieve social justice) of labour and industrial laws in the future 
so that proactive actions can be taken to stop unwanted changes and abuses and 
introduce significant changes to the labour and industrial legislations. 
 
The study will benefit a few sectors of people. This study would enhance the 
knowledge of especially legal practitioners and judges in understanding better the 
concepts of judicial activism and conservatism and how they should be utilised to 
play a significant role in the development of labour and industrial laws. The study 
would also be advantageous to academicians who might wish to make a further study 





1.6 Operational Definition 
The operational definition for this research includes especially the concept of judicial 
activism, the dependent variable13 in this research, which may be used by judges to 
achieve possibly higher integrity judgements and a change in laws. Conservative 
judgements also is the operational definition, the independent variable 14  for the 
judiciary which was seen to lack the element of social justice in patterns of 
judgements. Therefore, there is a need for a new operational definition for 
judgements based on judicial activism. 
 
The operational definition for labour and industrial laws is the legislation and 
common law cases in the labour, industrial and civil courts in Malaysia and their 
usage under judicial interpretation and precedents. These are the dependent variables 
used by judges as they affect the decisions reached by judges. 
 
Judicial activism relates to the concept of social justice jurisprudence and is 
explained in Black’s Law Dictionary as “…philosophy of judicial decision-making 
whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy, among other factors, 
to guide their decisions.”15  
 
The view above is in tandem with the view of Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who according 
to Keenan Kmiec, first coined the modern context term of ‘judicial activism’ in 
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1947.16 Essentially it was Schlesinger’s opinion that law and politics go hand in hand 
in explaining judicial decisions. According to him, judicial decisions are result 
oriented.  
 
However, it is not Schlesinger who coined the term and usage of judicial activism. 
The actual origin of the term was born in 1804 when Chief Justice Marshall17 decided 
the case of Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 [1803]. Here the esteemed judge went on 
to expound on one of the greatest principle of English law, the questioning of the 
executive power through the process known today as judicial review. 
 
Judicial activism also has a close connection to social justice jurisprudence in 
upholding the rule of law in protecting the labour force. This view is echoed by AV 
Dicey who stated that, “There is no need for a bill of rights because the general 
principles of the constitution are the result of judicial decisions determining the 
rights of the private person.”18  
 
However, the concept of judicial activism itself has been a controversial principle. It 
has a tendency in going against the concept of separation of powers as stated by 
Montesquieu, where according to him, there is a need for separation of powers 
between the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the government.19  
 
                                                     
16 Keenan D Kmiec, “The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism,” Cal. L. Rev. 92 (2004): 1441, 1447  
17 Touted to be the greatest judge in the English-speaking world. 
18 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan,1959), 202-203.  
19 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, edited by Anne M Choler, Basia C Miller, Harold S Stone (University of 




Labour and industrial law jurisprudence on the other hand refers to statutory 
provisions and judgements of the courts affecting the employer and employee 
relations. Gagliardo has defined labour and industrial jurisprudence as some customs 
and rules by which relationships between employers and employees, or master and 
servant are governed.20 
 
However, such a definition has been criticised as being narrow by Dr HK Saharay, 
who defines it as “Industrial [and labour] law may thus be defined as a body of rules 
and customs recognised by the sovereign political authority to govern the 
relationship between the employers and the employees for the purpose of 
maintaining industrial peace and security and steady growth of production.”21 
 
The above definition by Dr Saharay gives an indication that labour and industrial 
laws relate to the political and economic nature of this discipline of jurisprudence. It 
explains the nature of the relationship between the employer and the employee. 
Further, it also explains the role played by labour and industrial laws and the 
respective courts in ensuring that a balance is achieved between the sovereign 
political authority, employers and employees in maintaining industrial harmony. 
 
Adding to this, it was further stated by Gagliardo 22 that the study of labour and 
industrial jurisprudence is based on the principles of social justice and was connected 
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to the ideas of constitutionalism, ensuring that fundamental human rights are 
protected and are not derogated.  
To this end, the relevant legislations that have developed and guided the course of 
labour and industrial laws in Malaysia can be found in acts such as the Employment 
Act 1955, Industrial Relations Act 1967 and Trade Unions Act 1959. Whether these 
acts and their interpretation by the courts preferring conservatism or judicial activism 
afford sufficient protection to the common labourer were analysed.   
 
Labour and industrial laws have developed on a piecemeal basis in Malaysia during 
the colonial period, and were considered repressive and continued through post-
colonial era. 23  The first labour legislation in Malaysia was the Industrial Court 
Enactment of 1940 which was considered as vague, and replaced later on by more 
comprehensive labour rules under the Industrial Court Ordinance 1948 and the Trade 
Disputes Ordinance 1949. These acts were later repealed by the Industrial Relations 
Act 1967. 
 
The research seeks to determine whether current labour and industrial laws in 
Malaysia favour the employer over and above the employee. Whether it has achieved 
the standards appropriate, and in accordance with the International Labour Code24  as 
laid down by the International Labour Organisation25  
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This is essential, as Malaysia has reaffirmed its commitment to labour and industrial 
standards in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 
adopted by the 174 member countries of the ILO at the International Labour 
Conference  in  1998,  and  in  the Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalisation adopted unanimously by the ILO in 2008.26 
 
It has also been a stated principle of labour and industrial jurisprudence that 
employers should produce convincing evidence as part of their burden of proof 
against the employee before any dismissal [can take place].27  
 
However, the following definition of insubordination given by BR Ghaiye gives an 
indication that this may sometimes be otherwise: 
When an employee challenges the authority of the superior it amounts to giving   formal 
notice to the officer   that   the employee will no longer act in the subordinate capacity and 
will not receive any orders or instructions from the superior officer. Challenging the 
authority is, therefore, contrary to the   basic   character   of   the   employer   and   
employee relationship. This will therefore, constitute insubordination.28  
 
The interesting portion of the quote is - “Challenging the authority is, therefore, 
contrary to the   basic   character   of   the   employer   and   employee relationship. 
This will therefore, constitute insubordination.” This case example shows that the 
employee is not allowed to challenge the employer in any circumstances, even if he 
is right and just to do so. 
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28  BR Ghaiye, Misconduct in Employment, In Public and Private Sectors, 2nd edn. (Lucknow: Eastern Book 




It can be observed that such a definition may have actually been implicitly endorsed 
in Malaysia in the case of Clarion (M) Sdn. Bhd., Penang & Kesavan Sivalingam 
Bukit Mertajam [1987] 1 ILR 288 - where it was stated by the court: 
The Claimant is supposed to be in a subordinate position and if he uses any disrespectful, 
insolent, impertinent or derogatory language towards his Managing Director, he has 
committed an act which is inconsistent with his fundamental assumption at which the 
employer-employee relationship is based. In short, he has committed misconduct for which 
he can be justifiably dismissed. 
 
The above may incline one to think that the employee may always be in a 
subordinate position and not as equal to the employer. The above examples give us a 
glimpse of judicial conservatism. 
 
Another pertinent example would be the case of Ngeow Voon Yean v. Sungei Wang 
Plaza Sdn Bhd/Landmarks Holding Bhd.  [2006] 3 ILR 1717, where the following 
was stated by her Ladyship Siti Norma Yaakob FCJ (as she then was): 
From the case law, it is clear that the duty of obedience is confined to compliance with the   
lawful   and reasonable orders of an employer and, as such, the concept of an order being 
manifestly wrong has no part in the doctrine of superior orders. To that extent the Court of 
Appeal erred when it made an exception to the general   rule   on   superior   orders   when   
stating   that   an employee   was   entitled   to   disobey   the   orders   of   his superiors   if   
he, the   employee, was   aware   that   such orders were manifestly wrong. The duty of an 
employee at common law is also similar in that he is to comply with   all   lawful   and   
reasonable   orders   given   by   his employer with his employment. That duty is one of the 
fundamental   obligations   which   is   deemed   to   be impliedly undertaken in every 
contract of hiring, and is subject to the qualification that the employer may not order his 
employee to do any-thing illegal or dangerous. 
 
Whether the above statement that “the concept of an order being manifestly wrong 
has no part in the doctrine of superior orders” indicates that the judiciary has taken a 
conservative position in their judgements, and lend favour to the cause embarked 
upon by the employers, rather than seeking true social justice through judicial 





It is to be noted that the researcher here is not aiming to discredit the judges and their 
cardinal role as arbitrators of law and justice, which is not the intention of this thesis. 
It is also not an aim of this thesis to state that individual judges are conservative in 
and by themselves alone. What is being opined by the researcher as being 
conservative with a capitalist aim, is possibly be the institution of the judiciary itself 
through their collective judgements which have been conservatively English in 
inclination through colonial influence. In order to determine whether such a situation 
exists in Malaysia, a full-scale research on the statutes and judgements in the Labour, 
Industrial and Civil courts was essential for a proper understanding before any 
corollaries were drawn or confirmed. It is pertinent to note that an institution is the 
totality of its constituent parts, and when and if the constituent parts act in a manner 
which may indicate a conservative form of human rights protection under labour and 
industrial laws, it becomes essential that such wrongs be righted under a more 
judicially active court system to reflect the changing realities of social, economic and 
political matters.29 
 
1.7 Limitation of Study 
Since the field of jurisprudence and its connection to labour and industrial laws have 
not been studied extensively in Malaysia (it is quite rare), there were limited number 
of authors in the legal field who have produced works related to this area of study.  
Therefore, the research became subjective30 to the author's opinions based on statutes 
and case analysis. This was however overcome by interpreting as far as possible the 
judgements of the labour, industrial and civil courts in a critical fashion. 
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However, the purpose of a research is precisely to study that which has yet to be 
studied and completed. If an area has an extensive research on it and the matter has 
been to a large extent been resolved, then the gaps that a researcher may try to fill 
would not serve a larger purpose of the study, that is, mainly, to propose a new 
paradigm through the research which the researcher introduces. As stated by NS Jain: 
It is naive to think that the task of a doctrinal researcher is merely mechanical - a simple 
application of a clear precedent or statutory provision to the problem in hand, or dry 
deductive logic to solve a new problem. He may look for his value premises in the statutory 
provisions, cases, history in his own rationality and meaning of justice. He knows that there 
are several alternative solutions to a problem (even this applies to a lawyer who is arguing 
a case before a court or an administrative authority) and that he has to adopt one which 
achieves the best interests of the society.31 
 
Hence, labour and industrial jurisprudence although can be stated as being strictly 
doctrinal, at times overlap with sociological elements.  Statutes and case laws 
become important tools for legal research which is almost always connected with 
sociological factors. The above statement also indicates that it is up to the researcher 
to choose the law paradigm which is suitable in solving a manifest legal problem.32 
Many a time this has not been understood by those who conduct research with a 
quantitative methodology as a tool to interpret and apply data, which basically deals 
with rigid scientific matters. Legal research in itself must never be detached from its 
constituent components - law, the courts and society. In breach of this, a legal 
research becomes a dry practice at mechanical33 manoeuvres and ends up in pure 
statistical speculations and nothing more. This point of importance has been readily 
understood by many legal researchers in the West, that when a legal research is 
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32 Thomas Eger, et al, eds., Internationalisation of the Law and its Economic Analysis (Wiesbaden: Gabler/ GWV 
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focused on the qualitative method, it would be considered as a pure legal research. 
However if it is a research on sociology, and law is only a corollary element, then it 
may relate to the quantitative method. Therefore, the researcher at the outset stress 
that it is no intention of the researcher that this thesis is a research on sociology with 
law as an appendage, but a pure legal research with sociology as an appendage.     
 
More so, legal research also has always been fraught with broad categories of studies 
which are interconnected with each other, and epitomises another limitation that a 
legal researcher would be faced with, which is - choices. With so many theories 
abounding, it is practically impossible for a researcher in the field of legal research to 
not touch on other areas of legal research by conducting research limited to his own 
as stated by NS Jain above. Therefore, the limitation here would relate more to 
precise choice of relevant literature rather than limitation on theory accentuation 
where there is a need to apply exploratory and theory finding methods in researching 
the patterns of judgements, and that there is a need of a new paradigm – here it 










The literature review basically focused on the question of judicial conservatism and 
judicial activism of judgements in the Malaysian labour, industrial and civil courts. 
Some historical background of the development of the Malaysian labour and 
industrial laws is given. What is judicial activism and conservatism is also briefly 
explained. Finally, the labour and industrial jurisprudence in Malaysia is briefly 
explained. 
 
2.2 Historical Development of Labour and Industrial Laws in Malaysia 
Post-colonial labour and industrial laws developed in Malaysia under compulsory 
arbitration in 1965 which came under the purview of the Industrial Court and the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 [which had correlation with the 
earlier Employment Act 1955].  However, even before this, the Industrial Court was 
set up as early as 1941 by the British, with a later guidance under the Industrial Court 
Ordinance 1948.
34
 Currently, under section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
where there arises a dispute between the employer and employee, the matter can be 
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referred to the Industrial Court by the Minister of Human Resources where there has 
been an incident of dismissal of an employee without just cause and excuse.35 
 
In 1988, Major amendments were brought forth to the Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
Trade Unions Act 1959 and Employment Act 1955. Jomo KS and Vijayakumari 
Kanapathy state that “Among other objectives, the amendments sought to promote 
industrial harmony, reduce wage rigidities and raise labour productivity to improve 
Malaysia's international competitiveness.”36  
 
The above shows that labour and industrial laws were basically developed to ensure 
that fairness is achieved between the employer and employee, and the creation of 
industrial harmony. These statutory provisions are important, as they are utilised by 
the labour, industrial and civil courts in determining, through interpretation, the 
rights of the workers.   
 
Further to this, there are a few developments which are of importance in ensuring 
protection to the labour force. On 1
st
 January 2012, the Minimum Wages Order 2012 
came into effect, ensuring a minimum wage be applied by employers employing 
more than 5 people. The Minimum Retirement Age Act also was passed in 2012, 
which extended the minimum retirement age from 55 to 60. Under the new Order 53 
of the Rules of Court 2012 which came into effect on 1
st
 August 2012, a question of 
law can now be referred to the High Court from the date of award by the Industrial 
Court. Time frame for the application has been extended from 40 days to 3 months. 
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2.3 Judicial Activism as Opposed to Conservatism in Judicial Interpretation 
Frank B Cross and Stephanie A Lindquist are of the opinion that judicial activism is 
a look at the institutional role of the judiciary rather than a focus on the merits of the 
decision based on conservative interpretations. This would mean that there is an 
essential role played by judges in a democratic state to ensure protection for the 
common citizens.37 Therefore, an analysis of judgements in any jurisdiction38 would 
be important to determine whether the judgements were or were not based on 
conservatism or judicial activism.  
 
As stated above in the Introduction part of this Thesis, the term judicial activism was 
first coined by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., as being judgements by the judiciary which 
goes outside the normal norm of conservative judicial interpretation. Lord Green MR 
stated that:  
The function of the legislature is to make the law, the function of the administration is to 
administer the law and the function of the judiciary is to interpret and enforce the law. The 
judiciary is not concerned with policy. It is not for the judiciary to decide what is in the 
public interest. These are the tasks of the legislature, which is put there for the purpose, 
and it is not right that it should shirk its responsibilities.39 
 
The above quote may give an indication that English judges are conservative in their 
interpretation of statutes and common law precedents. However, judges do not 
always make laws except in novel circumstances, where they would have to depart 
from legislative intentions. Lord Reid himself stated that the judiciary at times need 
to depart from legislative intentions when it does not cover the situation envisaged by 
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statutes and case laws to do justice to litigants.40 Noting that this may be true of 
American and Indian judges, its application in the English legal system may have 
been limited, and also the possibility of limited applicability of judicial activism in 
the Malaysian labour, industrial and civil courts. 
 
The situation in Malaysia may or may not be different from their counterpart 
judiciary in England. The then Lord President (Tun Suffian) in the case of Datuk 
Haji Harun bin Haji Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155, at p 165 stated 
that there must be a contrast drawn between an idealist (flexible) concept of equality 
and the legal (literal) concept. The former, which may not have been favoured by the 
Malaysian judiciary, would give a reason as to why judgements may have been 
conservative in nature. However, such beliefs that the situation may be prominent 
under labour and industrial matters in Malaysia, requires a study on the interpretation 
by the judiciary of labour and industrial laws, whether statutes or common, and this 
may be achieved by analysing the case judgements in this area of law. 
 
2.4 The Labour and Industrial Jurisprudence (statute and judicial 
precedents) in Malaysia – conservatism or judicial activism? 
The indication of the problem 
The Employment Act 1955, Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the Trade Unions Act 
1957 are modelled after the Indian acts with similar titles, and therefore bear an 
uncanny resemblance with their jurisprudence and precedents, with variation as to 
the local flavour in Malaysia. Labour and industrial jurisprudence in Malaysia 
originated from indentured Chinese and Indian labourers who, before 1957 under 
                                                     




British rule, were not free to choose the type of employment they wished, but needed 
to follow that which was offered by their colonial masters. However, the 
development of labour choices began to emerge in the 1930s as stated by Jomo KS 
and Vijayakumari Kanapathy that, “Free labour in the modern sense began to emerge 
in the 1930s following earlier colonial efforts to free Chinese labourers from Chinese 
employers and the protest from Indian nationalist activists protesting the exploitation 
and abuse of Indian labourers in colonial Malaya.”41  
 
With the Japanese occupation in the 1940s, labour rights ware severely suppressed. 
After the war, enactments such as the Wages Councils Ordinance 1947 was enforced 
allowing compensation to injured labourers. However, the enactment fell short of 
allowing labour unions which were banned for their leftist view springing from an 
opposition to the Japanese earlier. This was also based on the fact that if an over 
active trade union was to be allowed, it would disrupt the economic situation which 
had already been burdened by the Second World War. 
 
After the 1950s however, a change took place with British tactics, who began to 
allow the constitution of labour unions as part of the British scheme to win back the 
hearts of the population.42 This can be seen as a move to win back the trust of the 
labour population of Malaya for the continuance of British rule, realising that they 
were steadily losing colonies in Asia. 
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His Lordship, Justice Raja Azlan Shah in the case of Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Mfg.  Employee’s Union & Ors.  v. South East Asia Firebricks Sdn.  Bhd
 
[1981] A.C. 
363. stated that “The Act (Industrial Relations Act 1967) ... it seeks to achieve social 
justice, the Industrial Court is to a large extent free from the technical considerations 
imposed on ordinary Courts.” 
 
Since the industrial courts are not bound by the burdensome technicalities43 of the 
ordinary courts, it is apt that this is where the concept of social justice in their 
jurisprudence can be sowed and improved for the betterment of the workforce in 
Malaysia and the overall management of human resources. 
 
His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram (as he then was) in the case of
 
Hong Leong Equipment 
Sdn Bhd v. Liew Fook Chuan & Other Appeals [1997] 1 CLJ 665 also stated: 
The desire of Parliament to protect the nation's  work-force  from  the  harshness  of  an 
unbending  and  inveterate  common  law  and  doctrines  of  equity,  as  expressed  by  the 
passing  of  the  Act,  may  thus  be  seen  to  be  entirely  in  harmony  with  the  terms  of  
the supreme  law  of  the  Federation.  The high standards of social justice so carefully 
established by the legislature and by the framers of the Federal Constitution ought not, in 
my judgement, to be consciously lowered by any decision of this court. 
 
In the above statement, his Lordship stressed the importance of the application of a 
high standard in determining cases related to labour and industrial matters, as they 
carry with them the concepts of social justice which relates to basic ideas of human 
rights, and also ideas of constitutional guarantees of the right to work and be treated 
fairly.  
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The judiciary also basically need to follow the ‘Directive Principle’ of the Malaysian 
Federal Constitution. Article 6(1) of Malaysian Constitution safeguards every citizen 
from incidences of slavery. If there is any indication that a worker is paid lower than 
his due labour or that the courts’ jurisprudence fail to give him a fair trial or 
treatment, then this would certainly be tantamount to slavery, and may not be in line 
with a proper appreciation of the social justice nature of labour and industrial causes. 
The above quote by his Lordship Gopal Sri Ram indicates that the Directive 
Principle becomes of utmost importance when dealing with industrial and labour 
matters.  
 
The question whether there is conservatism of activism 
As a matter of fact, referring to the speech by Tun Dato’ Seri Zaki Tun Azmi as 
mentioned earlier in the introduction part to this thesis, his Lordship in that speech 
further stated that: 
 On the other hand, if there is no reformation of the law by way of judicial activism, any 
development of law would be at the instance of legislators only. There will be no 
Donoghue v Stevenson or ‘snail in the ginger beer bottle’ or ‘the High Trees’ cases. The 
neighbour in the tort of negligence will only be the immediate tortfeaser. In Malaysia, 
there will be no Ramachandran. If the court waits for the legislators to correct the law 
Adorna will still be good law. In closing I ask you all this question, are these decisions the 
result of acts of judicial activism or merely interpretations of the law?44 
 
Tun Dato’ Seri asked a pertinent question on whether the judiciary plays a role that 
can be deemed to be merely interpretive, or do they at times depart from precedential 
norms and adopt judicial activism. Judges interpret laws, as this is their duty; the 
question is whether they have adopted a conservative stance or one that is imbued 
with judicial activism.  
 
                                                     




The establishing of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 199945 was a 
positive step forward 14 years ago in affirming that the protection of labour rights in 
Malaysia be guaranteed. The impact of this Act and how it can be utilised for labour 
and industrial jurisprudence, is quite indispensable.  
 
Objective of the research summarised 
It is therefore believed that if any of the above circumstances exist and there are 
failed remedies from the courts, then the jurisprudential study of the judgements in 
the labour, industrial and civil courts of why such failure occurs may be essential. 
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The research methodology of this thesis is based on an approach to qualitative legal 
research where core elements of the research is based on materials obtained, either 
primary of secondary from online and library sources. The methodology follows 
from analysing case laws and statutes to determine the existence of the problem and 
to ask questions and achieve the objective of this research Thesis. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
The design employed here is a qualitative research with a doctrinal approach to 
reading law. However, this would be an applied form of doctrinal research, which is 
concerned with the systematic presentation and explanation of particular legal 
doctrines (from primary and secondary sources), and is therefore referred to as the 
‘expository’ and also ‘exploratory’ tradition in legal research. This form of 
scholarship has always been the dominant form of academic legal research. 46 
Therefore, there will be an analytical and critical method, which would be reading 
statutes and cases and extracting judgements on labour and industrial laws in 
Malaysia. This will then be used to determine the outcome of the research. The 
                                                     




reason why recent judgements are chosen is because it goes in tandem with the 
industrial growth in Malaysia which became prominent from 1970s onwards, and 
where today, there has been an extensive interpretation of such growth under labour 
and industrial cases in Malaysia.47 
 
The research relates more towards hermeneutics and argumentative legal research,
48
 
which is related to the jurisprudence of legal interpretation of statutes and case laws. 
This method allows for a broader understanding of a legal subject, and allows the 
legal researcher to take a step back allowing the researcher to not only describe the 
problem, but to find a solution to it.  
 
Since legal research is highly reliant on statutes and case laws, the idea was to 
produce important parts of the decisions which relate either to judicial activism or 
conservatism. It is of a general view that legal practitioners as well as academicians 
rely, not entirely on a judgement of a particular case, but to the relevant parts which 
would support their contention and fit the paradigm of the subject matter so chosen. 
This is often true in legal judgements by the judiciary which quotes and interpret 
relevant parts of other case laws, and not the case laws in their entirety to reach a 
single unified answer to a legal problem, as can be seen confirmed by legal jurists 
such as Ronald Dworkin.49  
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48 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1986), 1314.  




The decision which were selected are based on important aspects of labour and 
industrial laws such as dismissal, retrenchment, employment benefits, domestic 
inquiry, wages, insurance protection and constitutional rights. These areas are 
significant for the ultimate protection of the labour force. 
 
To be especially noted is that, the data referred to are not raw statistical quantitative 
data which is akin to research methods dovetailing scientific methods which are 
commonly used in socio-legal research, and not strict academic legal research. 
However, sociology is certainly an appendage to legal research, and may surface 
when dealing with legal ideas on social justice. However, such reference to social 
justice is the determination of the impact of employment and labour laws on the total 
sociality of the employment conditions, and not numerical statements of statistics. 
 
Thus, doctrinal legal research fits well with other disciplines. It would be a scientific 
perspective looked at in a very broad manner to determine facts, which would be 
involved in hypothesis and theory forming. 50  Richard Posner, a jurist, made the 
following observation on doctrinal research: 
The messy work product of the judges and legislators requires a good deal of tidying up, of 
synthesis, analysis, restatement, and critique. These are intellectually demanding tasks, 
requiring vast knowledge and the ability (not only brains and knowledge and judgement, 
but also Sitzfleisch) to organize dispersed, fragmentary, prolix, and rebarbative materials. 
These are tasks that lack the theoretical breadth or ambition of scholarship in more 
typically academic fields. Yet they are of inestimable importance to the legal system and of 
greater social value than much esoteric interdisciplinary legal scholarship.51 
 
Richard Posner is of the view that although most legal research are non-scientific in 
their approach compared to other fields, the importance of such research cannot be 
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eliminated when it comes to their contribution to the development of social justice 
than the so-called interdisciplinary legal research methods. Thus, legal research is 
flexible and fluid compared to scientific mechanical research which expects an 
outcome which is to a large degree certain. That does not mean that laws can never 
be certain, it simply means that laws morph more often than not in comparison to 
other areas.  
 
3.3 Research Scope  
Subject matter of the study 
The scope of this research basically encompasses the concept of labour and industrial 
relation laws and its jurisprudence under the Malaysian labour, industrial and civil 
courts (This would include relevant statutory provisions and case laws). It would also 
include brief comparisons to United Kingdom case laws on how they have 
traditionally influenced the Malaysian labour and industrial case laws. United 
Kingdom is chosen as a comparative country because of the similarities between the 
English legal system and the Malaysian legal system, as a residue of colonialism, and 
English law and equity’s applicability under section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956.52 
 
The main and relevant Acts and Laws analysed 
The main provisions which were analysed in the scope of study were the 
Employment Act 1955 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967. There are other acts 
which were discussed in conjunction with the above acts. The scope is limited to 
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labour and industrial laws, and how they are interpreted conservatively or actively by 
the judiciary. 
 
A comparison to another jurisdiction 
A brief discussion on other jurisdictions as comparison would also be included, 
especially the development of judicial activism in India, United States of America, as 
well as the European Union.  The Thesis seeks to confine itself to the understanding 
of the use of judicial activism and conservatism in judgements, and limit its scope to 
answering the thesis title that judicial activism should be the way forward for 
judgement under employment and labour matters. Any legal research, even then, 
cannot be confined to its constituent parts, as there are bound to be overlaps, which 
usually are welcome by legal researchers. 
 
3.4 Types of Data  
These are from primary and secondary legal sources.53 The primary legal sources are 
statutory provisions and common law judgements of the courts in Malaysia under 
labour and industrial laws.  The primary sources were a reliant on statutes such as the 
Employment Act 1955 and Industrial Relations Act 1967. Also, conventional or legal 
procedural laws are also included in the data derived from the above acts as well as 
conventional procedures such as the one employed for domestic inquiry. Secondary 
legal sources are journal articles in law journals such as the Malayan Law Journal 
and Industrial Law Journals and also law textbooks written by legal academicians. 
These data were obtained primarily from the Universiti Utara Malaysia's Sultanah 
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Bahiyah Library (virtual as well as hard copies) and also the University of London 
VLE.54  
 
3.5 Data Collection Methods 
The data collection methods were highly reliant on library research, internet research 
through studying cases, journals and textbooks. Important sites such as LexisNexis, 
Westlaw, JStor and others were accessed and case laws were extracted for analysis. 
 
These data were collected through online research as well as hard copy research at 
the library. The two most important sources of collection were the University of 
London VLE and the Sultanah Bahiyah Library of Universiti Utara Malaysia. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
According to Knight and Ruddock,55 for research which involves legal scholarship, it 
would be a hypothetical and an in-depth analysis of the law which allows it to be 
used in the deliberation of judges and lawyers.  The prime method was reading 
available case laws on the subject matter, extracted proper information and critically 
analysed them to observe whether there were judgements which were conservative 
and whether there was a need for judicial activism to be included in these 
judgements.  
 
A doctrinal and theoretical analysis was done on cases in the labour, Industrial and 
civil courts (high court, court of appeal and the federal court). McConville and Wing 
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divided legal research into doctrinal and non-doctrinal research. Non-doctrinal 
research can be qualitative or quantitative, while doctrinal is qualitative since it does 
not involve statistical analysis of the data. They also further state that doctrinal 
research asks what the law is on a particular issue. It is concerned with analysis of 
the legal doctrine and how it has been developed and applied. This type of research is 
also known as pure theoretical research. It consists of either a simple research 
directed at finding a specific statement of the law, or a more complex and in-depth 
analysis of legal reasoning. 56  Thus, the legal research here does not relate to a 
quantitative method which deals with numbers, statistics and hard data. 57  This 
confusion often time undermines the differences between a socio-legal research and a 
pure legal research. Answering a problem in legal research and to find a solution to it 
is different and internal to law, then trying to solve a social problem which the law 
has failed to address, which would be external to law. 
 
Thus, in conclusion, the research is a purely legal research which dovetails theory 
accentuation and analysis of primary and secondary sources to allow the solving of 
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FINDINGS I: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND 
LABOUR JURISPRUDENCE RELATING TO JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM AND CONSERVATISM 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The research is initiated by making a brief comparison of the position of the law in 
the English jurisdiction and how it has influenced the development of Malaysian 
labour laws. This is important, so that it can be ascertained as to how the Malaysian 
labour, industrial and civil courts have developed their jurisprudence in deciding 
labour matters. This Chapter deals basically with the first Problem Statement, 
Research Question and Research Objective in relation to the development of 
industrial and labour jurisprudence in Malaysia. 
 
4.2 Conservatism Under English Laws 
The United Kingdom's apex court - the Supreme Court (previously known as the 
House of Lords in its judicial capacity (judges are known as Law Lords), 
traditionally has a binding precedent on all lower courts.58  This is to ensure that 
decisions made do not depart far from the notion of stare decicis. This is to ensure 
that the United Kingdom maintained parliamentary supremacy. The traditional 
                                                     




development of English judgements has been strongly influenced by the events after 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 59 and the subsequent passing of the Crown and 
Parliament Recognition Act 1689 and the Bill of Rights 1689. The concept of 
parliamentary supremacy has ensured that judges remain within a well-defined ambit 
of statutory interpretation within a set penumbra.  
 
For example, Blackstone defined common law as immemorial customs which are 
declared by the judges when making decisions. 60  This indicates the conservative 
nature of the English judiciary which is bound by customs which were originally 
developed under Parliament and the monarchy. In turn, it would have certainly 
influenced the methodology employed in the process of practising judicial restraint in 
the decision-making process under English law. 
 
Even Francis Bacon stated that “Judges ought to remember that their office is jus 
dicere, and not just dare: to interpret law, and not to make law or give law”.61 Lord 
Esher MR in the case of Willis v Baddeley [1892] 2 Q.B. 324, aptly explained that 
there is no such thing as judge made law, what judges essentially do is to apply pre-
existing laws through their authority. An observation can be made that at a very early 
state of the development of English laws, conservatism might have developed which 
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seems to have continued till this day. This view is certainly supported by the earliest 
development in British jurisprudence under Bentham, Austin and Hart, who 
formulated positivistic theories where laws were to be found in rules and their strict 
interpretation, and not otherwise. This would develop into ‘strict legalism’ also 
known as ‘legal positivism’, 62 where judges declare laws and do not make laws. 
Positivists want certainty in laws, and judges must describe the laws as they are and 
not what they ought to be which is relegated to the realm of morality. Parke B, in the 
case of Mirehouse v Rennell [1833] 1 CL & F 527 6 ER 1015, stated that the English 
common law system is an amalgamation of legal principles and judicial precedents 
utilised for the ultimate purpose of achieving uniformity in the law, that there is a 
certainty in their application and promulgation. 
 
This is not to say that the English legal system has always been inclined towards 
strict legalism. There have been departures by bolder judges such as the late Lord 
Denning.63 In cases such as Spartan Steel and Alloys Ltd v Martin and Co [1973] 
Q.B. 27, he emphasised applying new duty situations to existing policies under the 
law of tort. However, such occasions have been considered as sudden burst of 
creativity when the need arises in situations where the resolution of cases does not lie 
in the laws and precedents previously set. Such an approach by judges have attracted 
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criticisms from the ruling elite of the parliamentary precinct, that it is an affront to 
the doctrine of separation of powers, bequeathed with the task of maintaining the 
efficient functionality of each state organ.  
 
In response, jurists such as HLA Hart has stated that it is not the personal preference 
of the judge which is at issue, but the affinity to a conscientious exploration where 
inadequacy becomes apparent in the bodies of law currently in extant. 64 Such an 
opinion actually squares in with Dworkin's application of the jurisprudential theory, 
that judges who are faced with hard cases apply principles extant in the legal and 
societal institutions of the state to resolve issues in what he terms as ‘hard cases’.65 
Though there is no high degree of judicial activism in United Kingdom, it can be 
seen that the recent purposive approach is steadily replacing the more literal 
interpretation of statutes and common law precedents.66  
 
Over and above this, the Human Rights Act 199867, section 3, allows liberty to judges 
in the United Kingdom in their obligation to the European Convention on Human 
Rights68 Articles and the European Court of Human Rights69, to ensure a compatible 
interpretation of domestic English laws to the laws of ECHR. Not only this, the 
courts are now allowed to further make a declaration of incompatibility under section 
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4 against domestic legislation if a compatible interpretation cannot be achieved.70 
Such legislative provisions may provide impetus to judges in becoming more liberal 
in their role in judicial interpretation with a purposive approach, which may lead to a 
more judicially active bench. 
 
Even then, such a development has received a cold shoulder from the then coalition71 
government and the current government after Brexit, which has plans to repeal the 
HRA 1998.  In 2005, the then Shadow Home Secretary of the Conservative Party, 
Michael Howard, warned judges in having allowed judicial activism to reach 
unprecedented levels. 72  The dichotomy between Parliament and the judiciary has 
always been there; however, the strings of attachment to the old adage by Albert Van 
Dicey, that the United Kingdom Parliament is always supreme, is in the modern 
context quite untenable in the face of modern modes of statutory interpretation. 
 
Not only is the United Kingdom obliged to the ECHR, earlier it brought itself under 
the obligation of the European Economic Community73 and the European Court of 
Justice74 by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972. This saw an appreciable 
increase in judicial activism cases in the United Kingdom based on the ECJ 
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jurisprudence pronounced at Luxembourg, including those related to labour and 
industrial matters.75   
 
On the overall, judicial activism in United Kingdom still remains in its infancy state. 
It has been argued that activist judges are crossing beyond the constitutional 
boundary of their respective roles.76 This gives an indication that, even with some 
traditional common law decisions opposing strict legalism with the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and European Communities Act 1972, the judiciary can still be considered 
to largely ascribe to conservatism. However, this is unnatural of the English law, as it 
developed as a common law system since the defeat of King Harold by William, the 
Duke of Normandy at the Battle of Hastings in 1066,77 allowing judges the flexibility 
of interpretation. Such flexibility is deemed to be necessary even today, as it allows 
the judges to reach just results in each case.78 
 
As far as labour and industrial laws in the United Kingdom are concerned, the same 
trend can be observed. In the case of Associated Newspapers v Wilson [1995] 2 AC 
454, the then House of Lords gave a rigid interpretation of the relevant trade dispute 
law compelling the claimant to take up the matter in the ECtHR. Whether the United 
Kingdom courts have been vehement in developing a framework on the term 
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‘reasonable and unfair dismissal’ to bring it in line with the Human Rights Act 1998 
and ECHR jurisprudence is still a moot point hotly debated among labour lawyers. 
The following was stated by Lizzie Barmes:  
The relevance of these points to Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation 
Trust & Botham v Ministry of Defence is that they tend to suggest that the Supreme Court 
decisions were entirely predictable. Viewed in the light of Griffith's scholarship, these were 
only the latest in a long line of cases in which senior judges, for reasons related to their 
composition, have found themselves unable either to interpret statutes or to develop the 
common law to recognize, protect and value the contribution of employees to working life 
and more generally.79 
 
The extract shows that the judiciary in the United Kingdom is more inclined 
to interpret labour legislations in an orthodox manner, maintaining their allegiance to 
the rules set by Parliament when there is an actual need to establish a more social 
justice slant in an area of law which relates closely to social justice jurisprudence. 
However, Barmes may not be so accurate in concluding that judicial conservatism 
happens based on the judiciary’s composition, but would be more precise to state that 
this trend occurs because of a need to achieve the collective goal of both the 
government and the judiciary based on capitalist policies.  
 
Lord Devlin himself was of the view that judicial activism may well be the best 
method for law reform, only because it is the only method that is available.80 This 
however needs some caution, as Lord Devlin was a strong proponent of rights and 
liberalism. This meant that he was favourable to the cause of realism, where judicial 
pronouncements are considered more legal than the legality of statutory provisions. 
Indeed, this mode of interpretation comes very close to American Realism. 
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Malaysian labour legislations were basically introduced by the British in the 1940s as 
a reaction to the need to stifle labour unions which were emerging fast on the 
horizons of pre-independence Malaya. 81 Inevitably, the Second World War which 
ensued in the same time frame caused the British to leave Malaya, and the Trade 
Union Enactment was held in abeyance, and was only introduced back again in 1947. 
During post-independence 1957, the labour relation laws took on a Malaysian 
flavour, albeit the English common law standards were still applicable. Thus, it can 
be surmised that there was labour repression during the British era, and that slowly 
started to change after the independence of Malaya. 
 
Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 of Malaysia states that the common law of 
England and that of equity, is to be applied in Malaysia so far as the circumstances of 
the States of Malaya and its inhabitants permit, and subject to such local 
circumstances as is rendered necessary. Although the formulation of most laws in 
Malaysia was considered in line with the local flavour, most of the technical aspects 
of common law and statutes pre-1956 were retained. This is in line with the decision 
of the Federal Court in the case of Permodalan Plantations Sdn Bhd v Rachuta Sdn 
Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 157, after some 30 years of evolution, the court made it clear that 
section 3 should be given a narrow interpretation, disallowing the application of 
United Kingdom statutes except some persuasive common law pronouncements. 
 
                                                     





4.3 Comparing the Concept of Judicial Activism and Judicial Conservatism 
(Restraint) 
The crux of the research is now discussed to understand what exactly is judicial 
activism and conservatism in judicial decisions. A development of such an idea in 
India, United States of America and the European Union is outlined and the 
Malaysian perspective is given. 
 
The term judicial activism and judicial conservatism (restraint) have an interplaying 
role depending on the stand taken by the judiciary or the judge in the decision-
making process in the court of law. As stated above under the Chapter 'Literature 
Review', the statement was first used with its practical application by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the Supreme Court of USA in the case of Marbury v Madison 5 U.S. 137 
[1803].  
 
A modern definition of judicial activism is broader than the definition given in the 
case of Marbury v Madison above or by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Judicial activism 
today is related to the fundamental protection of rights based usually on a written 
constitution which is adopted by the majority of countries, including Malaysia. This 
becomes more so in an area of law which is related to social justice such as labour 
and industrial matters. However, not all decisions call for activism, and some cases 
do better when judicial conservatism or neutrality is applied. When a judge only 
states the law as it is, he is not applying activism, he is simply said to be applying 
neutrality to a statutory provision when such provisions do not call for any form of 
extraneous interpretation.82 Therefore, activism only exists where the judge tries to 
                                                     




make laws by departing from the acceptable precedential interpretation made on a 
statutory provision under common law allowances. Judicial conservatism on the 
other hand is related to a decision where interpretation should have been applied and 
it was not undertaken. In this situation the judges restrain themselves from moving 
away from the normative interpretation of statutes or common law precedents, even 
so where such an interpretation is essentially needed and openly allowed by the 
legislative provision. 
 
Therefore, the judiciary must be careful when applying terms such as 'judicial 
activism', ‘judicial conservatism' and 'normativity’ to statutory provisions and 
common law precedents. For example, under section 20(1A) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 of Malaysia, it is stated that “The Director General shall not 
entertain any representation made under subsection (1) unless such representations 
are filed within sixty days of the dismissal: Provided that where a workman is 
dismissed with notice he may file a representation at any time during the period of 
such notice but not later than sixty days from the expiry thereof.” Section 20(1) of 
the same Act allows the filing of representations where the worker has been 
dismissed without just cause or excuse to be reinstated to his former position. Here 
the application of the time limit of sixty days uses the word ‘shall’ and therefore is 
mandatory and a failure may be detrimental to the worker's claim. Therefore, such 
statutes call for an exact normative interpretation, and not a judicially active one; as 
the wordings of the statute is not vague. A claim which is made within sixty days is 
well within the normative interpretation of the statute. A misinterpretation of the 
sixty days by allowing more than that is unwarranted judicial activism. However 




of the time given in the notice of dismissal, would be judicial conservatism where 
discretion was clearly given to the judge to choose if there is evidence supporting 
such a choice.  
 
It is difficult at times for judges to choose from one end of the interpretation to 
another, as this calls for much experience and great learning for judges to carry out 
normatively opposed statutory interpretations. Notably, such application of activist 
principles are visible in the higher courts, where there are experienced judges more 
willing to undertake active interpretation when and where it is actually needed. Not 
all matters call for judicial activism as a standard principle; neither should it be 
confused as one that is required most of the time. The peculiarity of such application 
is always related to matters that need social justice as its end, and matters which 
ultimately relate to rights embedded in the concept of constitutionalism. Statutes and 
precedents, by a logical deduction cannot remain relevant for all time and purposes. 
Christopher Wolfe has opined that though precedents are valued for their element of 
certainty that they bring to the law, the larger part of laws' evolution and benefit can 
be further obtained if matters change in accordance with time, place and 
circumstances.83 Therefore judicial activism and changes in law go hand in hand. 
 
Labour and industrial laws are deeply connected with the economic and social 
dimension and needs, often time, to be in tandem with developments that take place 
through industrial development and redistribution of the working class in varieties of 
industries.  The application of judicial activism is apparently inapplicable to run of 
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the mill cases which judges encounter in their daily duties in court. However, where 
the written law is vague and there is an apparent lacuna in the law, then an activist 
judge will trigger a further interpretation to ensure that social justice is achieved to 
the case at hand. The myth that judges do not make laws was dispelled by Lord Reid, 
when he stated that: 
There was a time when it was thought almost indecent to suggest that judges make law — 
they only declare it. Those with the taste for fairy tales seem to have thought that in some 
Aladdin's Cave there is hidden the common law in all its splendour and that on a judge’s 
appointment there descends on him knowledge of the magic words ‘Open Sesame’ ... We do 
not believe in fairy tales anymore.84  
 
The quote metaphorically gives an apt analogy that the law cannot be discovered in 
the seamless web of its existence at all times, in moments of truth and justice, there is 
a need to leave the old paradigm and adopt a new one when it is legitimately needed. 
Thus to depart from stated precedents and adopt new precedents is considered to be 
part of the evolution of law and society.  
 
Other interpretations of judicial activism have related it to a creative form of 
constitutional and political-social development.85 However, there have been claims 
that judicial activism which actively interprets any statute and precedent in front of 
the backdrop of the constitution is an act of questioning the constitution itself. For 
example Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of Gompers v. United States, 
[1914] 233 U.S. 604/610 stated that, “The Constitution is not a document of 
fastidious dialectics but a means of ordering the life of a people. It is an organic 
growth.” These adherents claim that such active interpretation is questioning the 
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legitimacy of the constitution itself. However such criticisms are unwarranted for the 
reason that the constitution itself can be amended by the legislature when the 
prerequisites of an entrenched provision are satisfied. Thus questioning the 
legitimacy of the constitution is not strictly restricted. 
 
In comparison to the United States and United Kingdom, it can be observed that the 
United Kingdom's judiciary is more actively able to change fundamental 
constitutional provisions compared to the United States, and yet judges in the United 
States are considered to be more judicially active in comparison to their counterparts 
in the United Kingdom. However such criticisms lack the understanding of the 
dichotomy of legislative change which is driven by policy, and judicial change, 
which is driven by a sense of social justice. Therefore activism for the judiciary is a 
creative constitutional development based on justice concerns, whereas activism for 
the legislature is based on policy concerns,86 which transcends the concept of justice 
and is more concerned with the concept of voters’ majority rights and government 
security as well as the ultimate question of the rule of law.  
 
Judicial activism is also related to judicial independence. How far can the judiciary 
be given independence within the framework of the doctrine of separation of powers? 
The separation of powers is an inbuilt system which operates in most democratic 
governments of the world. The doctrine was espoused by Baron De Montesquieu and 
as early as the fourth millennium BC by the Greek philosopher Aristotle.87 However 
separation of powers is never an absolute doctrine which promotes rigidity in 
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divisions of government organs. As a matter of fact, Montesquieu never advocated a 
strict separation of powers but a separation with a well-defined check and balance 
system where there is bound to be overlaps between the three organs of the 
government.  Therefore, the role of the judges which go beyond the traditional 
interpretive role and imbue the judges with the authority to make laws where it is 
required would be considered as a breach of separation of powers as the role of 
changing the laws should be relegated to executive policy making and legislative law 
making. 
 
Judicial law making therefore at times is seen as an encroachment by the judiciary 
into legislature’s premises. However, it is often true that the legislature cannot and 
will not be able to cover every possible eventuality which is envisaged when 
legislating a piece of policy proposed by the executive. Certain loopholes, or better 
known as lacuna in the legal parlance will always be present, and the judiciary would 
normally have the rights to mend these loopholes to avoid sinking laws. This in itself 
is already judicial activism. However the judicial activism that most are aware of is 
judge made laws which not only serves to mend the lacuna but to re-legislate laws 
created by the legislature into something completely new which would not have been 
envisaged by the legislature within the ambit or beyond the ambit of its provision. 
Judges and the judiciary though may restrain themselves where the statutory 
provisions are clear, may not be able to do so where the provisions themselves call 
for an active interpretation or where the provisions make no mention of newly 
arising circumstances. As a matter of fact, this is exactly what happens when a 
primary legislation provides authority to ministers and local authorities to make laws 




authorities are considered as integral branches of the one executive, and execute 
policies that are agreed upon by the government. This power to legislate is nowhere 
to be found to have been conferred on the judiciary. What has been conferred on the 
judiciary is only an interpretive duty. 
 
Judicial activism though generally refers to judges making laws, it can be understood 
from many different perspectives giving rise to different types. The first can be 
referred to as judicial activism which is related to the moral and political agenda of 
the court in achieving certain legislative intentions through government policies.88 
These are decisions which are by far controlled by the politics of the executive 
branch of the government. This would be a court, though pursuing a conservative 
agenda in relation to the liberty of the citizens, is on the other hand quite active in 
protecting government policies and agenda, and therefore are deemed activists 
unrelated to social justice of an individual citizen but to the rule of law as envisaged 
by the government. This is in a sense, judges exercising restraint in interpreting 
legislation to favour the citizens but are activists in interpreting it to favour the 
government. This type of judicial activism relates more to the protection of national 
security and embedded government interests rather than promoting social justice, 
especially in a field related to labour and industrial jurisprudence. 
 
The next type would be judicial activism which can be considered as an 
interpretation of legislation by judges which is in opposition to, and conflict with, the 
political branches of the government which purports to question the misuse of 
powers by the government and the sufficiency of protection afforded by legislations 
                                                     




related to labour and industrial matters.89  However such an interpretation would not 
seriously touch on the interpretation of the constitutional provisions as opposed to 
individual legislations, and relates only to a negative view of the government's 
policies for the people and not for itself. For example, when it comes to opposing the 
nature of the government which disallows trade union organisations and activities by 
the judiciary, it is deemed to be an activism protecting not only an individual 
labourer, but the protection of an entire sociological idea of labour and industrial 
doctrines for the rights of labourers to be collectively protected. The third distinction 
is an interpretation related to constitutional provisions of a country as opposed to the 
piece of legislation being considered. 90 This is a division of interpretation which 
adopts a new paradigm as against the old interpretation established by common laws 
precedents, and relates to individual cases in which the rights of the labourer are at 
issue. Therefore, judicial activism in labour and industrial matters may very well 
connect to all three types, depending on which mode of interpretation is being 
adopted by the judge. Hence, in matters relating to industrial disputes, for example, 
the concept of judicial review is important under the Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
as, if reference under section 20 for a claim in the industrial court is disallowed, then 
a litigant may proceed to question such a decision by the Human Resource Minister 
under judicial review.  
 
Noting the importance of judicial activism apart from its counter meaning of judicial 
conservatism may not be sufficient to state whether it should be considered as an 
important element in deciding cases related to labour and industrial matters. What is 
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important is that a connection has to be shown as to why such an interpretation is 
indeed needed in matters where the rights of not only the employee but the rights of 
the employer are at stake. The above three types of judicial activism can be 
summarised to relate to political, administrative and individual legislation activism. 
For labour and industrial matters, the second and the third may be considered 
important. However, there are some authors such as Shimon Shetreet who divides 
them into constitutional activism, administrative activism and activism relating to 
certain areas of law.91 Following this classification then, labour and industrial matters 
would fall under the second and third categories. It is rare that judicial activism in 
labour and industrial matters relates to political or constitutional activism, because 
much of which is under this head is questioning the constitutional provisions itself. 
Judges and the judiciary who are interested to uphold labour and industrial matters 
do so from a social justice perspective and not to challenge the legitimacy of 
constitutional provisions. 
 
4.4 The Development of Industrial and Labour Jurisprudence Relating to 
Conservatism or Activism in Courts’ Judgements in Malaysia 
A development of labour and industrial matters in Malaysia is presented as a brief 
overview as to the reason why the industrial and labour courts in industrial and 
labour matters could have developed judicial conservatism or activism in their 
judgements. 
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The Perak Enactment No 24 of 1899 was the first instance in the history of labour 
matters where labourers were allowed to take remedial actions in a 'Labour Court'. 
Such enactments were later adopted by the Federated Malay States labour 
enactments starting from 1904 to 1923. Originally, such enactments were exclusively 
applicable to Chinese migrant workers and later extended to all races by 1949.92 
Therefore, the application was limited to a certain ethnic group when there was an 
influx of Chinese migrants to Malaya in the early 19
th
 century. This protection was 
basically limited to those labourers working in the tin mines. However, the allowance 
of labourers’ rights were crude, in line with the British desire to extract as much 
wealth from Malaya as possible, and there was no real improvement of labourers’ 
rights as applied in the modern context. 
 
Labour and trade union laws did not exist in Malaya until after the 1940s,  when the 
passing of the Wages Council Union in 1947 allowed some form of compensation to 
workers where there was injury caused only to guard their general welfare.93 Labour 
unions which were anti-colonialists were stifled and the Trade Disputes Ordinance 
1949 ensured that workers for important services do not go on strike. 94  Such 
suppression showed that there was a lack of will in the British colonialists to allow 
freedom of employment as yet to Malaya, fearing that the rise of the labour leftists 
might cause disturbance to colonial rule, where the British were not as yet ready to 
depart and grant independence to colonies which fed their economic interest. 
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In 1959 the first post-colonial Act was passed, the Trade Unions Ordinance, to 
regulate Trade Unions. The Industrial Arbitration Tribunal was introduced in 1965, 
which later was revamped as the Industrial Court, governed by the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967. The act was supplemented by another earlier act, the 
Employment Act 1955 which governed employer-employee agreements. Certain 
principles were developed at this stage in the jurisprudence of the Malaysian labour 
and industrial laws. Some form of judicial activism was observable in relation to the 
concept of natural justice. In the case of Surinder Singh Kanda v Government of the 
Federation of Malaya [1962] 28 MLJ 169, Lord Denning stated that, natural justice 
means the right to know the case against a person and the right and opportunity to be 
heard. The principle in that case was applied later in the case of Audio Electronics 
Sdn Bhd and Kuldip Singh (Award 193/1987). This meant that, by this time, there 
was greater accessibility in claiming rights by labourers in tribunals and courts of 
justices in Malaysia, which paved the way for the development of labour and 
industrial jurisprudence. The core issue however remains on whether such 
developments encompassed the idea of free legal flow of ideas detached from 
statutory restraints, or applying the statutory forms in a rigid manner devoid of any 
judicial activism.  
 
In the case of Perusahaan Kemas Maju Sdn Bhd v Ramli bin Abu Hassan (Award 
250 of 1994), it was held that it was an extremely unhealthy development that the 
principles of natural justice which is so applicable to industrial laws were not applied 
by the law to affect a dismissal without just cause or excuse. It also stated that this 
would allow employers to flout or go against the reasonable demands of natural 




indication that labour and industrial laws are of certain character, and related to the 
concept of natural justice, and that judicial activism have to be applied in 
circumstances which allow or promotes a better outcome based on social justice 
elements. Historically, as can be seen above, this would have been a daunting task 
for the early tribunals and courts having mainly to deal with migrant workers and 
later on dealing with labour claims in a multicultural and multi-religious 
environment. 
 
It can be observed that labour and industrial activism through trade unions were rigid 
before the independence of Malaya even after the Awberry Daley Report,95 which 
stated that there were real concerns in industrial relations and the allowance of trade 
unions, as they were seen more as acts of sedition against the British colonial 
government. However, such suppression of labour and industrial expressions may 
not be taken as stifling the concept of natural justice which allows judicial activism, 
as the circumstances of post 1945 Second World War posed a unique emergency 
situation in Malaya for the British with the insurgency of Communism - who were 
not fighting for industrial fairness but to topple the ruling government. Therefore, the 
measures taken to stifle many trade unions’ active role would have been a matter 
more of prudence and not suppression of the labour force in Malaysia. The concern 
should not be a focus on what happened after 1945 or even after 1957 but after the 
true modernisation of Malaysian labour and industrial laws in tandem with the 
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
 
                                                     




Briefly, there was a fair amount of restrictions on development of labour and 
industrial legislation as a result of British colonial activities in regulating strict laws 
dealing with the post 1945 emergency presented by the communists, who by then 
dominated the trade unions which were not pro-government.96  Not only was this 
apparent during the period of post Second World War, but also became manifest 
again during the first national emergency that was facing Malaysia from the 
secession of Singapore and confrontation with Indonesia in 1965 and the race riots of 
1969.  
 
The development of labour and industrial jurisprudence in Malaysia however can 
only be stated as having a concrete development after the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy97 from 1971 to 1990. Subsequent to this, the National Development 
Policy 98  was introduced from 1991 to 2000. 99  These policies augmented the 
development of private employment, and therefore the growth of labour and 
industrial cases. It is opined that this would have made the judiciary face more novel 
cases to be decided and more opportunities to imbibe judicial activism in labour and 
industrial cases. Overton is of the view that much of the development of industrial 
jurisprudence in Malaysia was as a result of foundations laid down by the British 
rather than an offshoot of dissatisfaction with colonial restrictions and rigid labour 
and industrial regulations.100  Though it may be stated that the structural development 
of the courts with their application of statutes and common law may have been 
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exclusively British in style, the laws were now to be applied to a different situation in 
Malaysia with a plurality of races and cultures, with majority of the labour force 
consisting of lower and middle income groups. 
 
This eventually made way for the adoption of service contracts between employers 
and employees, which were governed by collective bargaining as a standard form of 
labour and industrial contractual relations and their arbitration under the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967. As an example, it is the view of the researcher that the collective 
bargaining concept under section 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 allows 
negotiations between parties which impliedly favours the employers in reaching a 
collective agreement. However, section 13(3) which was included in 1971 to the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967, gives an added prerogative known as ‘management 
prerogative clause’, which restricted the ability of the trade unions to raise any 
bargaining issues related to internal transfer, promotion, recruitment, retrenchment 
and dismissal and also the inclusion of duty and tasks assignments to a workmen. 
This can be seen as a regression from the expansion of collective bargaining power 
in a pluralistic society like Malaysia, giving ultimately an added advantage to the 
employers under the management prerogative clause.101  
 
Today, acts which deal with issues of employment contracts, terms and unfair 
dismissals are condensed into three main statutory provisions in Malaysia. These acts 
are the Employment Act 1955, the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and the 
Employment (Amendment) Acts 1998 and 2000. The Employment Act 1955 deals 
mainly with issues related to the contract of service, justification and fairness 
                                                     




between the employer and employee which is individualistic in nature. The Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 on the other hand deals with the concept of collective agreements 
under collective bargaining between the employer and a trade union. Under the 
guidance of these acts, myriad decisions by the labour, industrial and civil courts 
have been delivered creating a vast field of labour and industrial jurisprudence.  
 
One important area of development is the concept of judicial review. This is where, 
if the Human Resource Minister decides not to refer the matter to be arbitrated in the 
industrial court or where the decisions of the court was wrong, it is reviewable by the 
jurisdiction of the civil courts. As a matter of fact, the Industrial Court is a statutory 
creature under the Industrial Relations Act 1967. In the case of Federal Hotel Sdn 
Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1983] 1 MLJ 175, it was 
stated that the High Court only has the jurisdictional right to question the legal 
manner in which the power was exercised by the Industrial Court, and not the merits 
on which the decision was reached. In short, judicial review of industrial court 
decisions by the high court is a matter of questioning the way the decision was 
reached under the law and not a process of retrying the entire matter altogether. 
 
To this, we can add the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999, which 
certainly has had a far-reaching effect on Malaysian labour and industrial matters. 
The pre-amble to the act provides as follows: 
An Act to provide for the establishment of the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia; to set 
out the powers and functions of such commission for the protection and promotion of human 
rights in Malaysia; and to provide for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 102 
 
                                                     





The act certainly relates to matters under the protection of labour and industrial 
jurisprudence. The act also indicates that there could come with it the proliferation of 
decisions which would slant towards judicial activism, as most human rights 
legislation around the world have shown that human rights activism runs in tandem 
with judicial activism. Therefore, the study of labour and industrial jurisprudence in 
itself entails the evaluation of human rights, and whether through judicial activism 
such rights can be protected.   
 
Not only does labour and industrial protection relate to concepts embedded under 
human rights legislation, the origin of such protections usually can be traced back to 
what is known as written constitutions, where fundamental rights of the citizens and 
the role of the government is well defined. In Malaysia, the written constitution was 
adopted after independence from Britain in 1957. In the case of Tan Tek Seng v 
Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan [1996] 2 MLJ 296, it was stated that the right 
to live and livelihood cannot be strung on the fancies of those manning the authority, 
and since people earn income through work, that work itself becomes a fundamental 
right which gives it the reason to have well-defined parameters of clarifications. The 
judgement indicates activism though more towards recommending better statutory 
protections. 
 
By passing of the Minimum Wages Order 2012, it can be seen that constitutional 
fundamentals are being protected for the betterment of the life of the employee. The 
order is applicable to employers who employ more than 5 persons and those 




Standard Classification of Occupations 103  which comes under the purview of the 
Ministry of Human Resources. The order came into force in January 2012. Though 
the definition of wages or minimum wages is not contained in the order, it does have 
an earlier corollary in the National Wages Consultative Act 2011. The definition of 
wages contained in National Wages Consultative Act 2011 is similar to the definition 
under section 2 of the Employment Act 1955, wages mean basic payments which are 
made to the employee for work done under a contract of service. On the other hand 
minimum wages has been defined by National Wages Consultative Act 2011 as basic 
wages to be decided under section 23 of the act. 
 
Further developments in Malaysia can be seen in the earlier proposal of the 
Minimum Retirement Age Bill 2012 to ensure that the retirement age of workers in 
the private sector is in line with the National policy on such matters. This bill was 
passed as the Minimum Retirement Age Act 2012 and came into effect on 1 July 
2013. 
 
4.5 The Development of Industrial and Labour Jurisprudence Relating to 
Conservatism or Activism in Courts’ judgement in India, United States of 
America and the European Union 
A brief comparison to other jurisdiction is now presented to better understand how 
judicial conservatism of activism plays important roles in deciding cases under 
labour and industrial jurisprudence.  Most these foreign cases favours the adoption of 
judicial activism in deciding cases relating to labour and industrial jurisprudence. 
 
                                                     





The development of labour and industrial jurisprudence in India is one which has 
been historically based on social justice elements and relates well with circumstances 
in Malaysia, as both countries have more or less similar provisions governing their 
labour and industrial matters.  
 
Unlike America and United Kingdom, India's Constitution under Article 13 gives the 
Supreme Court the freedom to interpret legislative provisions and common law 
precedents to ensure that litigation which relates to public interest matters fall under 
the principles and concepts of social justice jurisprudence - this  has now largely 
become known as 'public interest litigations' (PIL).104 Article 13(1) allows the apex as 
well as the high courts of India to question the constitutionality of acts of the 
executive or the legislature, especially in relation to matters taken up by litigants 
under judicial review - which portrays itself quite frequently in labour and industrial 
matters.  Any act of parliament which is deemed to be against Article 13 can be 
avoided. Article 13(2) further ensures that no Act of Parliament can be passed which 
purports to take away the fundamental rights of the citizens as guaranteed under the 
Indian Constitution. 
 
The development of judicial activism in India can be traced back to the statement of 
the late Justice Syed Mahmood in the Allahabad High Court of India in 1890, that 
the courts must be able to avoid any mischief by taking into account principles of 
morality and conscience. His Lordship made this clear in the case of Queen-Empress 
v. Pohpi 13 ALL.171: 1891 A. W. N 48 P.B. 
                                                     




In the case of AK Gopalan v State of Madras [1950] SCR 88, the Supreme Court of 
India distinguished between the application of the principles of judicial activism in 
comparison to the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Unlike the 
American Constitution which gives absolute supremacy to the Supreme Court of 
America to strike down any legislative provision which go against the American 
Constitution, the Indian Constitution is basically considered to be subordinate to the 
Indian Parliament and legislature. However, such concepts of judicial activism as 
was held in this case must be carefully analysed as it relates to protecting rights of 
Parliament which are deemed not to have been restricted by the constitution itself. 
Even then, there were some provisions of the Indian Constitution which were 
deemed to be non-amendable by Parliament especially relating to Part III of the 
Indian Constitution which contention was pronounced and affirmed in the case of 
Golak Nath v State of Punjab [1967] SCR 762. In a sense, the legal supremacy of the 
Indian Constitution prevailed over the political supremacy of the Indian Parliament. 
 
How the Indian Supreme Court became judicially active is based on the evolution of 
the Indian society from a largely pastoral and agrarian society to one which 
embraced industrialisation after the arrival of the British in 1818 with the fall of the 
Maratha Empire after the third Anglo-Maratha War. The creation of labour unions in 
rights protection is not new to India, as such union for workers existed in ancient 
India as evidenced by statements which can be found in the Shukla yajur veda and 
the Arthashastra of the Indian Sanskrit literatures. These Unions were known as 
shrenis consisting of about a thousand members.105  With the arrival of the British, 
industrial revolution took a new footing and dimension, and gave rise to industrial 
                                                     




relation laws governing the now ever growing workforce. After the first and second 
world wars, the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was passed, becoming the central 
provision governing labour and industrial causes. The industrial relation laws were, 
in the beginning, largely influenced by British colonial pattern of judgements. After 
the 1970s and 80s, the Indian courts became judicially active by pronouncing 
judgements which were clearly favourable to the labour cause, with wider 
interpretation than that under colonial British laws.106   However such a protectionist 
approach may have had the effect of matters not developing in line with the 
development of new industries, their approach and technological advancements. Be 
that as it may, since labour and industrial matters have peculiarity with social justice 
concerns, these developments simply meant judgement patterns had to be fitted into 
them anew in reformulated judicial pronouncements. 
 
The earliest labour legislations in India during British era were the Tea District 
Emigrant Labour Act 1832 and Workmen's Breach of Contract Act 1859. These acts 
related specifically to the tea industry. Another early act was the Factory Act 1881 
regulating working hours and conditions of work. These acts were by their nature 
quite oppressive and controlling. There are many other statutory provisions 
governing labour and industrial matters in India which are protective in nature which 
were passed after the British left, such as the Minimum Wages Act 1948 and 
Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970. However, of the utmost 
importance is that such later acts were passed with a view to protect the social justice 
nature of labour and industrial matters.  
 
                                                     




The position taken by the Indian courts on ruling in such matters have been, to say 
the least, quite novel. The approach has always been based on the protection of 
fundamental rights following directive principles of the constitution to create social 
harmony between the employers and employees. The articulation of such matters 
require the Indian courts to reach a proper balance in their duty to uphold rights 
based on social justice and at the same time maintaining a limited encroachment on 
legislative powers. This principle was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case 
of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] AIR SC 1461, which allowed the 
Supreme Court to nullify any legislation which goes against the fundamental 
principles of the constitution, and relates to the fact that the basic structure of the 
Indian Constitution can never really be changed. Professor Upendra Baxi was of the 
view that the question is no longer whether the Indian Supreme Court can make law, 
but the question is to what degree such laws can be made in line with the provisions 
of the Indian Constitution and Parliament.107 This view accords well with judicial 
activism which relates to realism, in that court judgements are often looked upon as 
the true place where laws are created and not the legislature which only gives birth to 
policies embedded in rules. In other words, the legislative branch of the government 
only prepares the laws and the courts have the duty to mould them to suit each case, 
as they are more connected to what happens on the ground than the legislature. 
However, such activism may be to overreaching and may cause the legislature to lose 
its actual capacity as a law making body.  
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The most important and central legislation in India on labour and industrial matters is 
the Industrial Disputes Act 1947.  The act gives us an indication on how the courts in 
India have approached it from the perspective of social justice jurisprudence rather 
than rigid orthodoxy. In the case of The Management of Indian Oil Corporation v Its 
Workmen [1980] AIR SC 1856, it was stated that judges have a social conscience to 
ensure that the working class is protected in accordance with Part IV of the Indian 
Constitution except where the legislative provision itself is compulsive against 
further interpretation by the courts.  
 
In 2003, The Solicitor General of India, TR Andhyarujina stated108 that the Indian 
judiciary is considered one of the most powerful in the world with a socialist 
perspective, it nevertheless require mechanisms to ensure that judges do not cross the 
boundaries of acceptable judicial interpretations. What he had in mind was that, 
though it is a novel act of the Indian Supreme Court to be bold enough in protecting 
human rights, the protection also requires mechanisms to ensure that judges give 
correct interpretations of a given case and cannot be too subjective in carrying out its 
duties. The Indian judiciary is however well aware of such limitations. In the case of 
P Ramachandran Rao v State of Karnataka [2002] 4 SCC 578, it was made clear that 
the Supreme Court is not a despot functioning without limitations. The Indian 
Constitution itself does not in any sense aim at a strict separation of powers and 
rather that all three branches of the government work as a symbiotic whole. The 
nature of this arrangement made any case related to social justice becomes a case of 
public interest litigation (PIL) which would mean that legislative’s legal policy, the 
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executive’s socio-economic policies and the judiciary's interpretive policy would 
merged to reach a decision which would be favourable to the ordinary labourer. 
Therefore, in India when it comes to deciding labour and industrial matters where it 
has sufficient justification to be of a public interest litigation pedigree, then judicial 
activism is impliedly allowed by article 32 of the Indian Constitution. This is to 
ensure the proper protection of rights through an active interpretive duty, although 
the Indian Constitution itself nowhere states the term ‘judicial activism’ or the mode 
of its application. 
 
The worry however is the increasing observation by some that the judiciary in 
deciding PIL cases tend to usurp what is essentially an administrative function of the 
executive and the legislature. Even then the worry is not founded on strong reasons, 
as earlier explained, that this is more of a symbiotic relation between the three 
essential organs of a state. This is, then, considered as a bold attempt at upholding 
the rule of law in India which is new to it and has not to this extent been attempted 
elsewhere in the word - not even the United States of America. 
 
United States of America 
The first American Constitution was formulated in 1776 known as the Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union by the Continental Congress. After being ratified 
by 13 states, it was formally completed in 1781. In 1787 the Constitutional 
Convention further amended the Articles of Confederation and formally adopted a 
finalised version of the written constitution to safeguard the fundamental liberties of 
the subjects and also to clearly define the demarcations between the various organs 




though considered fundamental, adaptations would most often be required with 
change of circumstances as society progresses. This is where judicial activism began 
to play a significant role as a tool of statutory interpretation by the Supreme Court of 
United States of America.109 
 
The interpretation of the constitution and laws by the Supreme Court of USA in the 
beginning had an inclination towards conservative judicial restraint. Justice Holmes 
and Brandeis in early 20
th
 century felt that the Supreme Court should allow the 
legislature to pass laws in line with the progress of society and not be bound totally 
by the constitution, and therefore strike down legislations which are deemed to be 
contrary to the constitution. 110  This showed an inclination towards judicial self-
restraint rather than activism. However things did not remain the same during the 
Warren Court era when  liberal forms of judicial activism became popular.111 By the 
1960s, two camps emerged from this dichotomy: the conservatives which favoured 
judicial activism and the liberalists who favoured judicial restraint.  In USA, judicial 
activism today is in line with its modern definition by Arthur Schlesinger Jr. - where 
the court abandons stated government public policy reasons within which it should 
pronounce its decision, and embarks on a principle of neutrality by applying policy 
reasons suited to the case at hand in accordance with rights protected under the 
fundamentals of the constitution.  This gave the USA the first earliest case of judicial 
law making - Marbury v Madison 5  US 137 [1803], in which the Supreme Court 
struck down part of the Judiciary Act 1789 which was deemed to have violated the 
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USA Constitution, even before the dichotomy of judicial restraint or activism had 
been fully understood, and even before the term was popularised by Schlesinger in 
1947. 
 
What the concern here is not a mere striking down of legislations deemed to be 
violating the fundamentals of the constitution, but also the reinterpretation of both 
the legislative provisions as well as the constitution. Therefore a judge, who may be 
restrained to follow the constitutional fundamentals, is judicially active in promoting 
the constitution against legislative provisions. There are then other forms of judicial 
activism where the judge interprets both the constitution and the legislative 
provisions and applies his own personal leanings, which is quite rare. So in the USA, 
the concern is with the former instead of the latter - that legislative provisions must 
be in line with fundamental rights and social justice elements guaranteed under the 
constitution. This type of activism has been defined as conservative judicial 
activism 112  as opposed to liberal judicial activism 113  where judges make laws 
disregarding both the constitution and legislative provisions.  
 
In relation to labour and industrial matters in USA, the focus first is on its 
development and how judicial activism came to be applied in this area of law. It is to 
be noted with caution at the outset that the development of judicial activism in this 
area of law should not be generalised (as explained above) as to how this principle 
applies in other areas of law in USA. In this area of law, it is surprising that the 
Supreme Court of USA's decisions from early 20
th
 century has been dissimilar to its 
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counterpart in India, in that there is a greater indication of conservative judicial 
activism by the judges who, though strike down legislations deemed to be against the 
USA Constitution, it was for the benefit of the employer rather that the employee. 
Therefore in both India and USA, though judicial activism is applied in this area of 
law to any legislation which goes against the constitution, in USA, the application of 
it to achieve social justice to the employee in early 20
th
 century was conspicuously 
missing. Though, in cases such as NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Company 301 
U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 [1937], Chief Justice Hughes held that the 
American Congress was allowed under the USA Constitution to regulate labour 
disputes which affected interstate commerce to regulate the rights of labourers to 
collective bargaining on contract of service 114 , this was nevertheless judicial 
conservatism in not striking down legislations which are deemed to protect the rights 
of workers and not activism.  
 
Beginning from the earlier part of the 20
th
 century, there were a spade of decisions in 
the USA Supreme Court which were inclined towards judicial activism in protecting 
rights of employers rather than the employee, even when there were legislative 
provisions which provides for such protection to the labourers. This has been rightly 
termed as the 'Lochner laissez faire era'115 which saw many acts of Congress being 
passed to protect the rights of labourers in areas such as work hours, minimum wages 
and other welfare measures in line with social justice reforms during the industrial 
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revolution by the government, only to have them being struck down by judicially 
active judges favourable to the employers or more so the capitalist class.  
 
In the case of Lochner v US 198 U.S. 45 [1905] the Bakeshop Act 1899 fell for 
interpretation when the owner of a bakery took action claiming that the act which 
limits working hours to a maximum of 60 hours per week violated his 14
th
 
amendment rights under the USA Constitution. This limit was accepted as improper 
by the Supreme Court by the late Justice Peckham. The 14
th
 amendment term ‘liberty’ 
was interpreted as including ‘economic liberty’, to enter into contracts which would 
safeguard both employers and employees. The Bakeshop Act 1899 was held to be 
unconstitutional as it interfered with the freedom of contract between the employer 
and the employee. Though the decision favoured the employer, it showed seeds of 
judicial activism being planted in labour and industrial matters in USA, albeit in a 
reversed pattern - protecting the employer rather than the employee.  From thereon, 
for almost 30 years after the Lochner decision, it was followed by other decisions in 
the name of laissez faire which created inequality where the rights of the employers 
were better protected compared to the employees. This was quite an ironic result, 
when judicial activism should have been for the purpose of upholding labourers’ 
rights under a social justice concept, rather than the other way around. This decision 
needs to be compared to the decisions of the Indian Supreme Court above where the 
protection of the employee was considered more important as opposed the rights of 
the employer. Cases such as Hammer v Daggenhart 247 U.S. 251 [1918] and Atkins 
v Children's Hospital 261 U.S. 525 [1923] showed that this trend in Lochner was 
peculiarly adopted by the Supreme Court of USA as against the better judgement of 




However, judgements after the reforms undertaken by President Franklin D 
Roosevelt showed a trend of judicial conservatism when legislations which were 
passed by Congress to protect the rights of workers in line with the provisions of the 
American Constitution were rarely questioned. This could be seen in the decision of 
West Coast Hotels v Parrish 300 U.S. 379 [1937], where Justice Owen Roberts 
turned the tides and protected a legislative provision which provided for minimum 
wage against the liberal economy under laissez faire contracts which favoured the 
employers. It is right to say then that, judicial activism under labour and industrial 
matters in the USA in the beginning of the 20
th
 century was connected more towards 
the protection of the egalitarian capitalists rather than the common labourer. Because 
of a trend of judicial activism in a reverse pattern protecting the employers in the 
USA by striking down legislation which protects the employee existed earlier, it is 
common sense that today judicial conservatism is more akin to the protection of 
employees' rights in USA rather than judicial activism as most legislative provisions 
already clearly protect the rights of workers rather than suppress them.  
 
This is the reason a trend can be seen in the USA labour legislations which bend 
more and more towards the protection of labourers' rights after the 1930s. With such 
protection, there was no real need for the courts thereafter to be judicially active in 
protecting the rights of labourers under principles of social justice, as these principles 
were and are already embedded in statutory provisions. What was needed then was 
for the judges to follow these provisions and restraint themselves in striking down 






For example the Norris-La Guardia Act 1932 was passed to stop the courts from 
giving out anti-labour injunctions116 favouring the capitalist class - the employers, by 
striking down labour legislations which purported to protect the labourer. This can be 
seen from the Lochner era cases discussed above. Under section 2 of the above Act, 
the worker is considered to be vulnerable individually, and therefore, his liberty can 
be best protected when allowed to collectively organise his rights under trade unions. 
Section 4 of the Act itself limits certain actions (decisions) which the supreme court 
cannot enjoin. In the case of New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 
552 [1938], the court disallowed an injunction taken by the employer prohibiting 
picketers from picketing in the employers premise as section 13(a) of the Norris-La 
Guardia Act 1932 applied to this situation as being a genuine industrial dispute, and 
therefore they were allowed to picket. Another act which was passed as a measure of 
protection of labourers was the National Labour Relations Act 1935 as amended by 
the Taft-Hartly Act 1947. The act actually exhorts active government participation in 
the protection of labourers. Section 7 of the Act allows the organisation of labour 
unions, and section 8 list prohibitions to employers from how they can interfere with 
such rights. Other Acts which were formulated to favour the working class were the 
Fair Labour Standards Act 1938 (dealing with wages and hours of work), The 
Labour Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 1959 (dealing with equal rights 
of all workers) and many more.117 
 
The cases and statutes above show that when it came to the protection of industrial 
and labour matters in the USA, the trend moved from a judicially active Supreme 
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Court striking down legislations to make decisions favourable to the capitalist class, 
to finally restraining themselves from doing so by abiding through legislative 
provisions which protect labourers as it would not be prudent for the Supreme Court 
today to go against provisions which are welfare oriented and uphold social justice. 
Since in the United States the protection of rights are well defined under its 
Constitution and labour and industrial statutes, judges are less judicially active in the 
liberal sense as there is not much need for them to be so, but are conservatively 
active in upholding the Constitution and statutes. However, the discussion above 
relates to a trend of judicial restraint in labour and industrial matters in the USA, and 
not other areas of law where the trend may be one which follows the original notion 
of judicial activism, where statutes are interpreted to achieve justice where they 
purportedly don't seem satisfy that end.  
 
European Union 
The European Union118  was originally formed after the Second World War.119 The 
Treaty of Paris 1951 and Rome 1957 set up the first instances of the legal and 
institutional order of the beginnings of the EU in terms of economic cooperation 
between member states. The Treaty of Rome 1957 also set up the central community 
- the European Economic Community. Today the EU comprises 28 member states 
from Europe. 120  EU laws are made by proposals being made by the European 
Commission which will then be approved by the European Parliament and the 
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European Union Council (Council of Ministers). 121  The earlier court which was 
established under the Treaty of Rome 1957 was labelled as the European Court of 
Justice122 which was changed under the Treaty of Lisbon 2009, and currently goes by 
the name, the Court of Justice of the European Union. 123  This final treaty also 
renamed the Treaty of EC to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.124 
Most laws formulated by EU are contained today under the various treaties which are 
sources of primary laws; and regulations, directives, recommendations and decisions, 
which are considered as secondary laws. 
 
It is to be understood that the EU stands for liberty of the people and not the clench 
fist control of politicians. The role of CJEU under EU laws is to give an ever liberal 
interpretation of the laws favouring the people, and in labour and industrial matters, 
this is what is deemed to be the most important aspect. This has allowed the courts to 
take European Community laws out from being controlled by the politicians and put 
under the control of the people.125 Thus it can be seen that judicial activism in its true 
essence is readily practised by the CJEU. The laws formulated under the articles 
relate quite largely to economic matters which impacts labour and industrial laws for 
the 28 member states. Article 2(1) of TFEU establishes the EU competence in 
regulating labour and industrial laws for member states. Articles 45-48 of TFEU 
states the free movement of workers from member states within the Union. Article 8 
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of TFEU ensures equality between all workers and men and women. Article 10 of 
TFEU helps combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. Based on the few Articles above, it is 
observable that the EU is very much concerned about the rights of labourers in 
member states. 
 
However, the unique nature of CJEU is that, it regulates its laws as against the laws 
of the 28 member states. The judges therefore are judicially active in promoting the 
application of EU laws which are superimposed on national laws. Where there are 
conflicts between EU laws and national laws, EU laws are deemed to prevail except 
where national laws prohibit such matters, or where it is overridden by national 
courts.126 It can be stated that the EU under the CJEU practices both judicial activism 
and conservatism depending on the politics and policies against member states. 
Though member states ratifying EU laws are bound by them, these laws can be by-
passed if the national legislature deems it fit to do so. This is where CJEU created a 
balance by fine-tuning its laws, oscillating between judicial activism and 
conservatism. The notion of economic equality, free market and movement of labour 
force was embedded long ago in the Treaty of Rome 1957. This prompts the CJEU to 
be careful in its approach towards labour and industrial law interpretation, as it has to 
be done collectively by referring to domestic labour and industrial laws of the 28-
member states. The CJEU strives on the principles of equality and anti-
discrimination when deciding labour and industrial matters, which gives it quite a 
large scope not only in departing from national labour and industrial laws, but also 
creating new interpretation of its own primary and secondary laws. 
                                                     




In the seminal case of Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 [18]-[24], the rights of a 
female worker to obtain equal pay was established for a French air stewardess 
against national laws by the then ECJ, applying the principle of direct effect of 
Treaty articles. This was the CJEU's way of asserting judicial activism over national 
laws of member states. However, this may not be possible every time, as the decision 
must be accepted later on by national courts under their common law or statute. As a 
matter of fact, article 145 of the TFEU itself prompts national courts and their 
legislatures to work towards the overriding objective of working in tandem in 
developing a coordinated strategy for employment. This is done through the 
European Employment Strategy 127  principle. According to Maduro, the European 
legal order is judge made, as the EU does not strictly speaking have a codified 
constitution. This is known as the majoritarian activist approach where the CJEU 
judges apply the laws which have the highest degree of consensus among member 
states.128 Thus, the bulk of the development of EU laws is largely influenced by the 28 
judges of the CJEU. This leaves them with much liberty on interpretation and law 
creation. Although the EU came close to the creation of a constitution,129  it never 
materialised. Even if it did, it would not have given it the status which would be 
equivalent to the likes of the USA Constitution.  
 
In attempting to create a coherent EU legal order, what the CJEU has essentially 
done is to further penetrate and interfere with member states' social welfare systems. 
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However, this has somewhat been toned down by the Lisbon Conclusion 2000,130  
which further developed the social legal order of the EU and CJEU decisions. 
Although the conclusion is not a treaty, it has strong influences in the way laws are 
made by the EU and CJEU. It introduced a new regulatory method - the Open 
Method for Coordination131 which excludes the then ECJ in areas of social policies 
where the EU has no competency and allows national governments to control its 
development. This may indicate the reduction of CJEU’s judicially active role in 
labour and industrial matters. Therefore, today the EU and CJEU are at crossroads on 
whether to increase judicial activism or further restrain it. It can be noticed that under 
the Treaty of Nice 2001, article 13(2) provides stronger powers to EU in relation to 
equal treatment under labour and industrial matters, and article 251, it provides for 
protection against termination, as  well  as  rules  on  the  representation  and  
collective defence  of  the  interests  of  workers  and  employers. The OMC social 
legal order principles seems not to have found their way into the Treaty, indicating 
that judicial activism of the CJEU still remains, as far as labour and industrial matters 
are concerned. Over and above this, the OMC also has found its way into the Treaty 
of Lisbon in 2009, by being extended in areas relating to social policy, public health, 
industrial policy and technological development.132 
 
At the heart of EU legislation is the concepts of overriding force of its laws and 
CJEU's decisions in relation to national laws of member states, which gives it an 
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activist position. In cases such as Case 26/62, Algemene Transport en Expeditie 
Onderneming Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 
[1963] E.C.R. 1. and Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 
matters have been made clear that EU laws prevail over and above national laws 
through the principle of direct effect. This is where non-conditional treaty articles, 
regulations and non-conditional directives take direct effect against laws of the 
member states and their public bodies.133 National courts are therefore bound by EU 
laws and accord them absolute priority. Therefore, such judgements which give 
supremacy to EU laws are purely a creation by the judges, indicating an activist 
judiciary in the CJEU. Industrial and labour laws created under EU are therefore 
mostly directly applicable through the principle of direct effect. However the 
principle of direct effect only makes national governments and their public bodies 
liable. EU regulations and treaties are automatically applicable to private employers134 
as confirmed in the case of Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 [18]- [24]. The bone 
of contention however has always been on whether directives apply to private 
employers as it has been trite law that they do not. However, treaty articles provide 
limited individual rights which relates to labour and industrial matters. This has been 
overcome by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union which came into 
force in 2009 through the Treaty of Lisbon 2009, which includes fundamental 
individual rights relating to employment and industrial relations.135  
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The main reason why the CJEU has a law making attitude is related to the European 
Union institutional framework and languages use by the treaties. 136  The CJEU is 
judicially active because there is a need for them to fill the legislative voidleft by the 
European Union Council, the Parliament and the Commission.137 The laws formulated 
by EU are by nature a difficult consensus reached between member states through 
long wrought out negotiations. Therefore, EU laws cannot possibly cover every 
eventuality which may arise under the laws of the 28 member states. This in turn 
gives the CJEU the opportunity to interpret EU laws as and when the need arises, and 
therefore can be seen to be judicially active. However, this is not an unwarranted 
plan of judicial interpretation, but something which is actually welcome by the EU 
legislature and member states to a large extent. In labour and industrial matters, this 
can be clearly seen from the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
European Union in 2009 which embedded principles that were laid down in cases 
such as Ven Gen & Loos, Defrenne v Sabena, Costa v ENEL and many more others 
decisions.138 
 
The CJEU currently can be considered as a constitutional court for EU, and often 
times as constitutional courts do, they are criticised for being judicially active. A 
parallel of this can be seen with the United States and Indian supreme courts. The 
fact that CJEU is a constitutional court was affirmed in Case C-294/83 Partie 
Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v Parliament [1988] ECR I-01017. The CJEU also can be 
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considered as interpreting a supreme constitution of EU as against the subordinate 
constitution of member states.  This supra-national139 nature of CJEU is important for 
the fundamental protection of the rights of labourers, as it relates to social justice 
matters which are fundamental to the EU since the first treaties were entered into in 
1951 and 1957. The CJEU therefore extends its reach over and above the national 
laws and constitutions of member states, and can be considered to be specifically an 
activist court out of necessity for the achievement of uniformity of EU laws.  This 
type of activism needs to be distinguished from activism which is internal to national 
courts of a particular country, which is reliant either on a state constitution’s 
overriding force or the judiciary’s legitimate aim at achieving justice. However, this 
may give a hint as to how flexible judicial activism can become and can be shaped to 
meet possible circumstances which may be faced by the courts. As far as labour and 
industrial matters are concerned, the EU and CJEU’s role is considered fundamental 
in the political and economic arena of Europe. 
 
Not only the CJEU is activist in its protection of fundamental freedom and rights of 
workers, such rights are also readily entrenched in the articles. For example, article 9 
of the TFEU states, “The promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection [and] the fight against social exclusion”, which have thus 
far been homogenised under EU policies. Ultimately it is the imprecise, politically 
flexible and policy laden EU laws which has left huge lacunas and gaps to be filled 
by the CJEU. It has been stated by A Arnull that: 
The imprecision of the EC Treaty would have made it wholly implausible for the court of 
justice to purport to be merely the mouthpiece of the written law; there was in any event no 
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reason why it should. The authors of the Treaties seemed motivated less by controlling 
judicial excesses then by ensuring the observance of the law.140  
 
The above quote states clearly that the judicial activism of the CJEU even at a very 
early stage was brought about not based on judicial principles, but the necessity to 
set principles which were largely absent when the treaties were organised and 
entered into. It further indicates that the CJEU is more keen on the fact that EU laws 
need to be followed by member states and will do the needful to achieve that, and 
that this did not and does not mean that they were and are practising excessive 
judicial discretion over and above the rights of national laws and courts, but fill in 
matters which otherwise would have left gaps in a huge body of   laws governed by 
EU.  
 
Thus far we have noted judicial activism in India, United States of America and the 
European Union with quite diversified modes of application of the principle of 
judicial activism in labour and industrial laws. In brief it can be stated that in India 
judicial activism is governed by the legitimate aim of the Indian Constitution in 
achieving social justice to the extent that even the constitutional provisions may be 
overridden.  In the United States of America, judicial activism by the judges took an 
opposite connotation in the beginning of the 20
th
 century where it was used as a tool 
to enhance the standing of the capitalist class in opposition to the labour class. 
However, in USA, this trend was subsequently reversed not by the judges but by 
legislative provisions ensuring the rights of labourers in opposition to the capitalists 
is upheld and in relation to such statutes, the judges were judicially restrained to 
ensure decisions favour the working class. Still, in the USA today the Supreme Court 
                                                     




plays an important role in upholding the constitutional provisions, having the status 
of a constitutional court, enabling it to strike down legislations that are deemed to be 
against basic fundamental rights as entrenched within the USA Constitution. This in 
turn makes it an activist court only in the strict sense that no laws can go against the 
USA Constitution. The CJEU on the other hand is judicially active because there is a 
necessity to do so to cover the lacuna and gaps apparent when laws are made by the 
EU is to be applicable to a large conglomerate of nations. With this broad 
understanding of judicial activism in various countries and their legal systems, the 
researcher will turn his attention to the core idea of this thesis, which is to observe 
whether there is judicial activism in the decisions of the labour, industrial and civil 
courts of Malaysia. 
 
4.6 Comparative Analysis 
Judicial activism in Malaysia is lacking in the decisions of the labour, industrial and 
civil courts. However, the notion that there may be some form of judicial activism 
cannot be rejected outright. Though the legal system which Malaysia has inherited 
comes from the English legal system, it may be that the Malaysian legal system 
differs when it comes to the application and formulation of laws and precedents. A 
proper conclusion cannot be drawn unless evidence can be put forward on whether 
the labour and industrial decisions in Malaysia follows judicial activism or 
conservatism or perhaps both, depending on the circumstances of each case. In the 
Introduction and Literature Review Chapters of this thesis above, some evidence has 
been produced by the researcher showing that judicial conservatism is more 
preferred (albeit this may not be the case) in comparison to judicial activism in the 




Malaysia has a written constitution which is similar to India and the United States of 
America, whereby the Federal Court can be regarded as a constitutional court, 
especially when dealing with statutory provisions which go against the fundamental 
provisions of the Malaysian Constitution. Therefore, if any form of judicial activism 
exist, it was pronouncements to establish the supremacy of the constitution as against 
individual statutory laws. 
 
This section on ‘Comparative Analysis’ is to set the scene as an introduction on a 
general possibility that there is a slant towards judicial conservatism which will be 
discussed in detail in relation to relevant Acts of Parliament and case laws. Lord 
President Tun Suffian stated in the case of Datuk Haji Harun Bin Haji Idris v Public 
Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 that, to follow the Indian judges in their judicially 
active role is too idealistic, where a reconciliation was being sought of that which 
cannot be reconciled.141 However his Lordship agreed that the possibility of judicially 
active ideas was planted after 1949 in India and 1957 in Malaysia. This decision 
which was delivered in 1977 might have been conservative in its outlook on judicial 
activism, and whether such an unlimited interpretation by the then young-ling courts 
of Malaysia was even needed. However, it is quite an irony that in the same case, the 
interpretation of article 8 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution on equality was 
given a judicially active meaning by adopting the meaning of ‘reasonable 
classification’ of equality by the Malaysian Supreme Court. Therefore, though there 
was an attempt to introduce the concept of judicial activism in this case, it was done 
rather in a very tactful manner, so as not to disturb the status quo of the stability of 
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the laws in Malaysia. This gives an indication that the judges and judiciary in 
Malaysia were not totally averse to the concept of judicial activism, but were mindful 
that introducing such a concept need to be threaded carefully, as the Malaysian legal 
system which was as yet quite young, should with all prudency be selective in the 
application of judicial activism. The interpretation of article 8 of the Federal 
Constitution not only showed that the attempt to apply judicial activism was not only 
limited to questioning laws infringing the Federal Constitution, but also the very 
interpretation of the provisions of the Federal Constitution in a judicially active 
manner. 
 
The above odd case however does not prove that there was an attempt to make 
judicial activism an acceptable concept in the Malaysian legal system. In the case of 
Loh Kooi Choon v Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187, the court far from 
applying rigorous interpretation of the Federal Constitution, chose not to follow the 
basic structure interpretation [that the constitution has a basic core structure to it 
which can never be interpreted otherwise] of the constitution as held by the Indian 
Supreme Court in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala [1973] AIR SC 
1461. Therefore, there were contradictory opinions in cases on whether judicial 
activism by the judicial authorities was tenable. Most legalists in an attempt to prove 
that there is judicial activism in Malaysia, would start by quoting the case of Tun 
Salleh Abbas where the report by a tribunal convened under article 125 of the 
Federal Constitution was stopped by the then Supreme Court in a special session. 
However, the case, strictly speaking, is not a genuine example of judicial activism, 
but a case of the judiciary encroaching on the powers of the executive. There is a 




and when it takes a stance protecting one of its own members which would be more 
akin to protection from an infringement of the doctrine of separation of powers.  
 
However, the case of Loh Kooi Choon itself has been somewhat diluted where the 
basic structure interpretation was applied in the case of Sivarasa Rasiah v Badan 
Peguam Malaysia & Anor (2010) 2 MLJ 333, where the term ‘reasonable’ was 
inserted by the court in assisting the understanding of the term ‘restriction’ under 
clause 2(a) of article 10 of the Federal Constitution dealing with freedom of speech. 
Thus far it has been seen that judicial activism exist in relation to constitutional 
provisions and its interpretation. However the concern of the researcher is whether 
such trend exists when it comes to the interpretation of statutory provisions dealing 
with labour and industrial matters. The researcher also is of the opinion that if such 
activism is not present, then it should be introduced, and if it is already present, then 
it should be enhanced. It is argued that when judges make decisions which are 
different and out of the box, they are essentially crossing the boundaries of stare 
decisis and also settled constitutional provisions and interpretations. This means that 
there will be an invitation to create instability in trite laws held sacred by the judicial 
institution, as well as the legislature, based on what is called the best practice rule.  
 
It is seen that the Malaysian judicial institution is to an extent influenced by 
commonwealth decisions, be it those commonwealth countries which practice 
judicial conservatism or judicial activism. The above seems to echo its relatedness to 
the way the English legal system works and is defined, and how the courts have to 
subjugate themselves to the will and doctrine of parliamentary supremacy. However, 




matter of fact, the Malaysian Parliament is bound by the Federal Constitution when it 
purports to make laws and does not in any way ascribe to Dicey’s idea.142 By this 
logic, some form of judicial activism by the judiciary in accepting the basic structure 
of the Federal Constitution must be present, as laws made by the Malaysian 
Parliament surely cannot go against the Federal Constitution. Therefore, there is an 
inherent jurisdiction of the Malaysian apex courts to apply judicially active 
interpretation against laws made by Parliament where they go against the very fabric 
of the Malaysia Federal Constitution. 
 
If one were to make reference to rule 137, of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, it 
is clear that the rules guiding the courts does not in any way limit the inherent 
jurisdiction of the courts to prevent abuse of process and to achieve justifiable 
decisions [a reminder that the courts are the ultimate arbiters of justice and that 
judicial activism could be an inherent principle within the inherent jurisdiction of the 
courts to depart from previous statutes and precedents143]. The rule itself gives an 
indication that there is actually no restriction on the courts to apply a judicially active 
interpretation in the promulgation of laws; it is only whether the court chooses to do 
so or not, and very often they do so with all the prudency of judicial interpretations. 
As a matter of fact, his Lordship Gopal Sri Ram144 in the case of Subramaniam a/l NS 
Dhurai v Sandrakasan a/l Retnasamy & Ors (2005) 6 MLJ 120 stated that, where a 
decision made by the Federal Court is made per incuriam, then the lower courts are 
not bound by it and may depart from such decisions if the case at hand calls for such 
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an active decision. It is then to be noted that the issue is not so much whether judicial 
activism is allowable in the Malaysian courts, but the issue is how far is the judiciary 
prepared to go to establish wide ranging decisions based on judicial activism, where 
the necessity arises when the court is dealing with matters related to labour and 
industrial disputes. Sir John Salmond echoed this position of the court when he made 
a statement that: 
A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the 
force of statute, i.e. delegated legislation.145 
 
The statement shows that in so far as the court's jurisdiction and powers are 
concerned, they are usually not bound by particular statutes where a decision is made 
in ignorance of the fact that there is a possibility of departing from that decision 
based on principles not applied, which were extant in other statutes or precedents. 
However, this refers to the legitimate right given by statutes and precedence not 
utilised in ignorance of the law, and not the departure which relates to creating the 
law anew, which is the true colour of judicial activism. Although from the above 
examples one may try to draw the possibility of some form of application of judicial 
activism where it is necessary, it does not in its true sense portray the general 
understanding of judicial activism as propounded by Schlesinger or Chief Justice 
Marshall. The general view could be that, a soft form146 of judicial activism exist in 
the Malaysian judiciary based on choice of statutes and precedents made by the 
judge or the judiciary, but not the hard activism which is exemplified in countries 
such as USA, UK, India and also the EU as discussed earlier. 
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One may at this stage question the very utility of judicial activism in labour and 
industrial cases in Malaysia. Do we really need judicial activism which may serve to 
create instability in the law? Recently, the National Union of Bank Employees147 went 
as far as stating that workers in Malaysia experience modern day slavery because the 
government and courts lack seriousness in protecting their rights.148 What essentially 
is needed according to this article is that, a check and balance system infused with 
judicial activism by utilising a purposive interpretation of the law to stop the abuse of 
the judicial process by the employers. How far such a statement is true, nevertheless, 
is subject to close scrutiny. However, it does show that people are aware of the need 
of a more judicially active judiciary in protecting labour rights in a more circumspect 
fashion, rather than through stop gap measures. Even then, the claim that the 
judiciary totally lacks a purposive approach is not accurate as evidenced by the 
above case laws. What it lacks is simply an active purposive approach. The article 
also urged for the reform of the judicial system in the country by checking the abuse 
of powers by the executive and also the employers, for the preservation of social 
justice. However, a mere statement of abuse does not mean it exists, and must be 
proven by indelible evidence. It is the purpose of the research in determining whether 
there are such abuses and whether a judicially active judiciary is of help in such 
matters. Such a research was to be threaded carefully so as not to over exaggerate 
such abuses, and make it look like the judiciary has totally failed in its duty, or be too 
soft, where the actual outcome was not one which was accurate. As a matter of fact, 
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the researcher proposes that the problem lied not in the judiciary's inaction but in 
enhancing the soft activist position taken by the judiciary currently.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
The above developments in industrial and labour jurisprudence helps answer the first 
Research Question in understanding the development of labour and industrial 
Jurisprudence in Malaysia. It has also helped in the understanding in achieving the 
Research Objective on the nature of judicial conservatism and activism in the 
Malaysian judiciary dealing with labour and industrial matters. This initial study of 
the development of labour and industrial laws in Malaysia, is indicative that the 






FINDINGS II: COURTS’ INCLINATION TO JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM OR CONSERVATISM 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is important now that we look at the general and specific statutory provisions in 
relation to labour and employment matters to determine their influence on the 
inclination to judicial activism or conservatism in the Malaysian labour courts. This 
was to identify the second Problem Statement, answer the second Research Question 
and achieve the second Research Objective. 
 
5.2 Statutory Provisions in Relation to Labour and Employment Matters 
The main provisions in Malaysia dealing with labour and industrial matters are the 
Employment Act 1955, Trade Unions Act 1959, Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
Employment (Amendment) Acts 1998, 2000 and 2012, Human Rights Commission 
of Malaysia Act 1999, Civil Law Act 1956, Pembangunan Sumber Manusia Berhad 
Act 2001, National Wages Consultative Act 2011, Minimum Wages Order 2012, 
Minimum Retirement Age Act 2012 and last but not least the Federal Constitution. 
From these major provisions, the researcher will be focusing mainly on the 
Employment Act 1955 (as amended by the Employment (Amendment) Act 2012) 





scope of the rest of the provisions will be discussed as adjuncts to these major 
provisions.  
 
5.2.1 The Employment Act 1955 (As amended by the Employment 
(Amendment) Act 2012) and Other Acts 
The Employment Act 1955 was passed ten years after the end of the second world 
war which marked the turning point in Malaysian labour history to set the rights of 
labourers in Peninsular Malaysia [it was extended to the Federal Territory of Labuan 
by the Federal Territory of Labuan (Extension and Modification of Employment Act) 
Order 2000 (P.U. (A) 400/2000) on 1
st
 November 2000], but fell short of creating the 
allowance of the unionisation of labourers. Even then, according to D Cruz,149 the act 
paved the way to a greater protection of rights for the labourers compared to the 
protection afforded during the colonial era. The act is applicable for all persons who 
are categorised as labourers, the meaning of which is provided under the First 
Schedule of the Act. Section 2(1) of the Employment Act 1955, with reference to the 
first schedule, defines an ‘employee’, as a person coming under a contract of service 
in an occupation whose wage does not exceed the sum of one thousand five hundred 
ringgit a month. Under the Employment (Amendment of First Schedule) Order 2012 
(P.U. (A) 88), this wage threshold was increased to one which does not exceed two 
thousand ringgits. The Employment (Amendment) Act 2012, under section 23, 
confirms this amendment from RM1500 to RM2000. Essentially, the amendment 
follows the economic growth in modern Malaysia today especially after the 1970s. In 
Sabah and Sarawak, there are a similar provision to the Employment Act 1955 with 
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minor differences - these are the Sabah Labour Ordinance 1950 and Sarawak Labour 
Ordinance 1952. For example, in the Labour Ordinance related to Sabah the term 
‘employee’ under section 2(1) and the schedule thereto is a person who enters into an 
employment contract with wages not exceeding two thousand five hundred ringgit a 
month. For Sarawak, its Labour Ordinance has exactly the same provision as the 
Labour Ordinance of Sabah in its definition of an ‘employee’. The rest of the 
ordinance is the same with the Employment Act 1955. 
 
Under the Employment Act 1955, manual labourers, carriers for reward or 
commercial purposes, supervisory functions in relation to manual labourers and 
operators of vessels do not have a cap on their wages as above. There are then 
independent contractors who are considered as self-employed, and enter into contract 
for services instead of contract of service, which does not come within the definition 
of an employee under the Employment Act 1955. Therefore, for example, hiring a 
person to do gardening intermittently, and if there is a breach, then the gardener who 
provided the contract for service seems to be unable to make any claims in the labour 
court. His only recourse would then be under the ordinary breach of contractual rules. 
However, in the case of Lian Ann Lorry Transport & Forwarding Sdn Bhd v 
Govindasamy (1982) 2 MLJ 232, Tun Salleh Abbas FJ 150  stated that even if an 
employment is considered to be temporary and where a person is self-employed to 
provide services, the courts will still construe that there was an employee and 
employer relationship. This decision bodes well for judicial activism as his lordship 
imbued additional definition over and above the definition of ‘contract of service’ 
facilitated by section 2(1) of the Employment Act 1955 - where it is defined as an 
                                                     




agreement express or implied where one person employs and the other ready to 
serve.  
 
The portal of the Public Service Department of Malaysia provides for a working 
definition of the difference between contract of service and contract for service.151 It 
states that the difference lie essentially in the salary, service and grade being 
stipulated in the contract of service, whereas for contract for service they are absent. 
However, this definition is applicable to civil servants only, and for the private 
sector, there has to be a better and wider definition, as there are differences in 
employment procedures for public and civil servants. For the private sector, we 
recourse can be taken in the definition of a ‘contractor’ given in section 2(1) of the 
Employment Act 1955. This is where a person contracts with the principle in 
carrying out functions taken on by the principle. Further, the definition of ‘contractor 
for labour’ under the same section states that this is where a person contracts with the 
principle, contractor or sub-contractor for the supply of labour. This indicates that 
those who are involved in part-time and temporary work would also come within the 
ambit of protection of the Employment Act 1955.  It would further suffice to state 
that where the court deems that there is in existence of any form of a service contract, 
it would allow the protection of such contractors under the Employment Act 1955. 
The Federal Court judgement above itself shows the readiness of the judiciary to read 
an interpretation into section 2(1) of the Employment Act 1955, to ensure that the act 
covers every form of possible employment modes. It seems also that such an 
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interpretation has actually been given effect by the amendments to the Employment 
Act 1955 by the Employment (Amendment) Act 2012.  
 
The Employment (Amendment) Act 2012 amended the old laws and breathed into 
the law new elements in line with the socio-economic growth of Malaysia. This 
became law on 30
th
 January 2012 after being given the royal assent. It came into 
operation on the 1
st
 of April 2012. The essential amendments that have been injected 
by this act can briefly stated below.152 
 
In relation to employees, as stated above, there has been an improvement in the 
categories of wage earners who come within the ambit of the term ‘employee’. There 
is an increase in the wage amount from RM1500 to RM2000. Even then, it seems a 
little odd that this amount is still not at par with the amount provided under the 
labour Ordinances in Sabah and Sarawak. The reasons may never really be known. 
However, it may be because of the fact that the employment rate in Peninsular 
Malaysia is higher than in Sabah and Sarawak. Nevertheless, this would be a 
digression from the fact that the per capita GDP in some states in Peninsular 
Malaysia is lower than that in Sarawak but not Sabah. 153  Under the Malaysian 
Economic Planning Unit website, the overall per capita income of Malaysia as a 
whole stood at RM33,010.154 
                                                     
152 Nazruzila Razniza Binti Mohd Nadzri, “Malaysian Employment Laws: Tracking the Recent Updates,” South East 
Asian Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics and Law, Vol. 1 ISSN 2289-1560 (2012): 160. 
153  List of Malaysian States by GDP, accessed May 8, 2014,  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Malaysian_states_by_GDP. 
154 The Malaysian Economic Figures in 2013, Economic Planning Unit - Prime Minister's Department, accessed May 




The next area of employment which has been affected by the amendment act is the 
protection for maternity. Section 2 of the amendment act now provides for the 
allowance of the taking of maternity leave from the 22
nd
 week onwards compared to 
the old law which allows it at 28 weeks. This has been possible by amending the 
definition of 'confinement' under the Employment Act 1955. Section 37(1)(a) of the 
Employment Act 1955 has been amended by the 2012 act, which allows a time frame 
of 60 days for maternity leave. The addition of a new sub-section (4) to section 37 of 
the Employment Act 1955 prohibits the termination of any female employee who is 
on her maternity leave, where such an attempt at termination would now amount to 
an offence. 
 
The next area of amendment is related to the advancement of wages. Section 22(1) 
and (2) of the Employment Act 1955 has been amended by section 5 of the 
amendment act to the effect that employers are now allowed to give advancement to 
their employees in listed circumstances. This in itself shows important sociological 
developments in this area of the law, where the employee is considered as a worker 
and not property to be utilised as pleased. This is a welcome development in the 
labour laws of Malaysia. 
 
Another change which has been affected by the Amendment Act 2012 is related to 
the method of paying employees their wages. Section 25(1) of the Employment Act 
1955 has been amended that the salary of employees must be payable directly into 
their bank account unless the employees wish to be paid in by other methods. This 
change has been effected by the new section 25A (1) of the Employment Act 1955. 




servants within the ambit of this mode of payment, and if any other mode of payment 
is sought by the employer, then a consent must be obtained from the Director 
General of the Labour Department. 
 
There have also been amendments to laws relating to sexual harassment in the 
employment environment. A new Part XVA has been introduced by the Amendment 
Act 2012 into the Employment Act 1955. This is a totally a new development, when 
the previous law made no mention of sexual harassment in the employment 
environment. Before these amendments, there however was a code known as the 
Code of Practice on the Prevention and Eradication of Sexual Harassment in the 
Workplace, introduced by the Ministry of Human Resources in 1999. However, the 
nature of this code was of voluntary binding on employers, and that they were not 
compelled to apply it. Because of the non-compelling nature of the code, the 2012 
amendments to the Employment Act 1955 is welcome as a good social development 
in the protection of both genders from incidences of sexual harassment. The new 
provisions related to this matter are contained in section 81A and 81G of the 
Employment Act 1955. These sections apply to all categories of employees, and are 
not confined to the definition of employees given under the first schedule of the 
Employment Act 1955. Moreover, section 81B (1) imposes a legal duty on the 
employer to inquire into any allegations of sexual misconduct in the workplace. It 
also has to be noted that, the sexual harassment provisions under the Employment 
Act 1955 is applicable without limit as to wages. This means, the provisions can be 





Another amendment to the Employment Act 1955 relates to contractor for labour and 
registration of employees. Section 2(c) of the amendment act inserts a new category 
after the category ‘contractor’, known as ‘contractor for labour’, in section 2(1) of 
the interpretation section of the Employment Act 1955. Where previously, only 
contractors who are employed by the principal in carrying out the work undertaken 
by the principle were protected, the new category allows for the protection of 
labourers supplied by a person to a principal, contractor or sub-contractor for the 
purpose of carrying out the work undertaken by the principal, contractor or sub-
contractor.155 Therefore, the protection of those who are independent and temporary 
employees employed by an employer has been included by the amended 
Employment Act 1955. Not only has this been done, the new section 33A of the 
Employment Act 1955 has made it mandatory for those who wish to supply labourers 
to register within fourteen days with the Director General before supplying the 
labourers, and also maintain a register of information on such labourers. Failure to 
follow this requirement would amount to an offence. This amendment has been 
introduced based on the sociological change in employees’ circumstances in 
Malaysia. Most jobs related to the construction industry and odd jobs are related to 
foreign workers, and the government of Malaysia saw it fit that they too are protected 
under the employment laws. However, seeing the problem of the mushrooming of 
labour supplying consortiums which may in the end abuse these workers, through the 
protest by the Malaysian Trade Union Congress,156 the Malaysian government passed 
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the Employment (Exemption) Order 2012 (P.U. (A) 87) to ensure that such supply of 
labour is only limited to the plantation and agricultural sectors.157 
 
Apart from the above amendments, there have also been amendments relating to 
offences committed by a body corporate. The new section 101B of the Employment 
Act 1955 imposes liability on directors and managers of a body corporate under 
employment laws, where previously they were excluded. Finally, there have been 
some amendments relating to foreign domestic servants. Section 57 and 57B were 
inserted by the amendment act into the Employment Act 1955 to ensure the 
protection of foreign workers in Malaysia. Today, an employer must inform the 
Director General of any foreigners employed within 30 days of entering into a 
contract of service, failure which, it would amount to an offence.158  
 
From the above discussion we can observe that there have been a considerable 
number of amendments to the Employment Act 1955 to effect a better protection of 
labourers. The concern here then needs to be turned to whether the old and new 
provisions are interpreted actively by the courts, or have they taken a conservative 
role in interpreting the old and the amended laws. This matter will be discussed 
below. However it is sufficient to say the least, that the amendments themselves 
would give an indication that the old court judgements would have to a large extant 
influenced such amendments to have been brought forth, and what remains to be 
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seen is whether the new amendments would be interpreted actively or conservatively 
in turn. 
 
5.2.2 The Industrial Relations Act 1967 
The act was an outcome of the active development of trade unions and their members 
since 1949, after the Second World War and post-independence 1957 Malaysia.159 
This development was in line with the assertion of workers’ rights and also the 
concept of collective bargaining in industrial relation laws. The number has grown 
steadily. There were 163 trade unions with a membership of 68,814 in January 1949. 
In January 2015 that number had already reached 729 trade unions and 913,169 
members. 160  However such a growth is not considered as reflecting a positive 
development as Malaysia has a labour force of 13,300,027 as of 2014 according to 
the World Bank Report.161 Therefore the number of workers who are represented by 
the trade unions is merely around 6.4% of the entire labour force. Though workers 
may utilise the Industrial Relations Act 1967 without belonging to trade unions, the 
level of protection afforded and the means may be limited, and this could be a cause 
for concern. The act not only relates to the direct protection of the rights of labourers 
by making a reference to the industrial court, it also relates to rights under the 
doctrine of judicial review, and is related to action against the Ministry of Human 
Resources for failure to apply procedural propriety in allowing a reference to be 
made to the industrial court where there has been an unfair dismissal. It can be 
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observed that section 9 - 12 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 specifically 
recognises the scope and representations by trade unions. 
 
The industrial court which deals with industrial disputes is established by section 21 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 as a statutory tribunal. Its main function is to 
hear disputes from employer and employees in relation to obligations and duties 
which arise under employment relations. The main difference which has to be noted 
between the Industrial Relations Act 1967 and Employment Act 1955 is that, 
whereas the industrial court deals with individual disputes which arises from an 
employment relationship (for example unfair dismissals) and trade disputes between 
trade unions and employers (such as transfers and collective bargaining contracts) 
and breaches of rights and obligations imposed under the Industrial Relations Act 
1967, the labour court on the other hand  deals with the issue of recovering wages 
and employment benefits provided to employees under the Employment Act 1955 
such as overtime pay, maternity allowance, salary in lieu of notice of termination and 
termination benefits. The labour court is not a statutory tribunal like the industrial 
court, but refers to the hearing conducted by a labour officer of the labour department 
into complaints by employees.162  
 
Section 13(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 can be a starting point to show that 
certain privileges are still afforded to the employer, which are terms which may not 
be included in the collective agreement. Firstly, the right to promotion is exclusively 
under the jurisdiction of the management. Secondly, the transfer of workers is at the 
                                                     





discretion of the management, as long as it does not intrude into the terms of the 
collective agreement. Thirdly, any vacancy in the employment establishment is to be 
filled by the management. Fourthly, the right of the employer to terminate the 
employee by reason of redundancy or where there is a reorganisation of the 
employer’s business. Fifthly, the issue of termination and reinstatement of an 
employee. Finally, the allocation of task and allotted duties which are in line with the 
work to which the employee is employed. Although it looks like the termination of 
the employee is an absolute right of the management, this needs to be seen in light of 
natural justice principles, which will be discussed below.  
 
The next important provision is section 21 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The 
provision comes under part VI of the act. Section 20(1) makes it clear that 
representations can be made both by a worker represented and unrepresented by a 
trade union. The principle requirement for a representation to be proper is that the 
worker has been 'dismissed without just cause and excuse by the employer'. The 
representation has to be made in writing to the Director General of Industrial 
Relations. Section 20(1A) imposes a time limit of sixty (60) days in filing 
representations starting from the date of dismissal or starting from the expiry of the 
notice of termination where such notice of termination has been issued. The 
Industrial relations system in Malaysia is a tripartite system where there is the worker 
(may or may not be represented by the union), the employee and the government 
(Ministry of Human Resource). The act is applicable to the whole of Malaysia 
including Sabah and Sarawak. The act is couched in such terms as there is minimal 




aggrieved by the decision of the President of the Industrial Court, he may appeal to 
the High Court. 
 
The process of taking actions to the industrial court consists of several steps. At the 
first instance of an irresolvable dispute, it would prompt both the employee and 
employer to refer the matter to the Director General of Industrial Disputes163 for an 
amiable settlement. It is his duty to entertain the application for settlement, and do 
the needful to resolve the dispute as amicably as possible. If the dispute is not 
resolvable, then under section 18(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, the DGIR 
must make a report informing the Human Resource Minister in relation to the 
particular dispute. The Human Resource Minister then must balance the view 
presented in the DGIR report on whether to refer the matter to the Industrial court to 
be heard under his ministerial discretion. If it is a dismissal, the referral to the 
Industrial Court would be under section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, and 
if it is a trade dispute, the referral would be under section 26 of the same Act. 
 
The referral by the Human Resource Minister is based on his discretion, and this is 
an area of unsettled law. The discretion for a referral is given to the Human Resource 
Minister under section 20(3) and also 26(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. 
However, the Act itself does not lay down any indication as to the criteria which 
must be considered before such a referral to the Industrial Court is allowed by the 
Human Resource Minister. Referring to the case of Minister of Labour Malaysia v. 
Lie Seng Fatt [1990] 2 MLJ 9, it has been stated by his Lordship Hashim Yeop A 
Sani SCJ (as he then was) that such a discretion is not one which is unfettered, which 
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would create too much arbitrariness in the Minister's decision. This is where the 
concept of judicial review on the ultra vires nature of the actions of the Minister 
plays an important role in industrial disputes. It is elaborated in the above case that: 
The Minister’s discretion under section 20(3) is wide but not unlimited. As stated earlier, so 
long as he exercises his discretion without improper motive, the exercise of discretion must not 
be interfered with by the Court unless he had misdirected himself in law or had taken into 
account irrelevant matters or had not taken into consideration relevant matters or that his 
decision militates against the object of the statute. Otherwise he had a complete discretion to 
refuse to refer a complaint which is clearly frivolous or vexatious which in our view this is one. 
 
The above statement gives an indication, if an act of discretion of the Minister does 
not follow the principles of judicial review, then the courts can question the non-
referral of the matter by the Minister to the Industrial Court. At every stage of the the 
application to refer the dispute to the industrial court therefore involves some kind of 
discretion. Of interest for the current issue for the researcher is whether judicial 
activism is applied in the interpretation of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. This 
would not only involve the decisions of the industrial courts based on the merits of 
the dispute, but also the decisions made by the courts under judicial review 
applications, questioning the Human Resource Minister in the exercise of his 
discretion. 
 
5.2.3 Employment Act 1955 (As amended by the Employment (Amendment) 
Act 2012 and other Acts and their interpretation by the courts) 
Earlier, the researcher has briefly laid down the scope applicable when the 
Employment Act 1955 and the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is utilised by the courts 
- two of the main acts dealing with labour and industrial matters in Malaysia. The 
issue was to trace whether the interpretation of these acts in case laws are bent 
towards judicial activism or judicial conservatism, as understood in their original 




judicial activism or conservatism is briefly treated in this Chapter. This would be an 
overview before the subject matter is treated with an in depth analysis below in detail 
with ultimate recommendations for improvements given in Chapter 6 for selected 
areas. It is to be noted that the researcher has devoted a section to procedural matters 
to further enhance the understanding of how the process of labour and industrial 
disputes work in the labour, industrial and civil courts, before proceeding into a more 
detailed analytical discussion on interpretive matters. Discussions on interpretations 
of the Employment Act 1955 will be focused only on major areas which have been 
interpreted extensively under case laws, this was to detect whether judges are 
favourable in interpreting the provisions in a judicially active manner or otherwise. 
 
For starters, the researcher would like to point to article 5(1) of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia which states that “no person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberties save in accordance with law”. The fundamental right to livelihood 
is intricately connected to this fundamental constitutional statement. 164 The courts 
therefore are under an obligation to ensure that interpretation of the Employment Act 
1955 is in line with the fundamental provisions of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia. Further to this article, article 135 (2) of the Federal Constitution provides 
that “no member of such a service as aforesaid shall be dismissed or reduced in rank 
without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard”. Even then, the right of 
the employer has to be balanced, as he has to run a business and care for other 
workers. The understanding of the rights of a worker who is dismissed for 
misconduct must at the outset be differentiated with the issue of retrenchment, which 
                                                     





underlies the economic reality of doing business by the employer. The focused of the 
researcher's thesis therefore is on the issue of dismissal under the Employment Act 
1955. The development of the law in this area is discussed, and judgements are 
extracted on whether the courts treat matters under employment law as suitable for 
judicial activism or conservatism. 
 
The issue of dismissal of an employee is provided for under section 14 of the 
Employment Act 1955. The section states that: 
An employer may, on the grounds of misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of the express 
or implied conditions of his service, after due inquiry. (a) dismiss without notice the employee; 
(b) downgrade the employee; or (c) impose any other lesser punishment as he deems just and 
fit, and where a punishment of suspension without wages is imposed, it shall not exceed a 
period of two weeks.165  
 
The provision makes it clear that it is a statutory requirement that the employee is 
afforded a pre-dismissal inquiry before he is to be dismissed. This is normally known 
as a domestic inquiry. However, whether such a requirement is mandatory or not is 
subject to the courts' interpretation. The wordings of the statute, ‘due inquiry’, has 
been interpreted in the case of Said Dharmalingam v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) 
Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 by the Federal Court as follows: 
In R. v. BBC, ex parte Lavelle (1982) 1 RId? 404, Woolf J indicated, albeit obiter, that when 
there is a procedure for dismissal in an employment not covered by statute at all, employers 
must comply with that procedure for the dismissal to be valid. If the contractual procedure was 
infringed an injunction should issue to prevent the dismissal. This view was partly based on the 
notion that employment protection legislation had substantially changed the position at 
common law, so that ‘the ordinary contract between master and servant now has many of the 
attributes of an office.’  
  
In the present case, there is a statutory requirement, to wit, s. 14(1) of the Act, providing for 
the elementary safeguard of the right to “due inquiry” by the employer. It follows, that at least, 
prima facie, a dismissal in breach of s. 14(1) would be void.  
  
Having said that, we must add, that when, as here, a claimant is an employee within the 
meaning of the Act, he has by s. 14(2) thereof a statutory right to “due enquiry” by his 
employer, and so, the approach of the Industrial Court or for that matter the High Court, in 
                                                     




considering the question whether the claimant had been dismissed without just cause or excuse, 
would be, to examine the decision not just for substance but for process as well.  
 
The above quote from the case of Said Dharmalingam v Malayan Breweries 
(Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 give an indication that the court had favoured 
an interpretation which is mandatory by stating that this is a ‘statutory requirement’ 
and that it is a ‘statutory right’. The interpretation here seems to favour a judicially 
active interpretation in line with the fundamental protection provided under the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia. It also means that, unless there has been a 
domestic inquiry in relation to the dismissal of the employee, then the dismissal will 
be treated as not having followed a proper procedure and would be subject to be 
nullified by the courts. However, the above decision does not square in with the 
interpretation which was given earlier by the Federal Court on matters related to the 
interpretation of due inquiry under section 14 of the Employment Act 1955. The 
Federal Court in the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen [1996] 1 AMR 49 
stated that although there is a requirement of a due inquiry under section 14(1), that 
requirement is not one which is mandatory. The Federal Court here went on the 
premise that such a failure to hold a domestic inquiry or where the inquiry is 
defective, is a matter which is curable if the dismissal itself in the end, in the opinion 
of the Industrial Court, was done based on proper grounds. In the case of Bumiputra 
Commerce Bank Berhad v. Mustaffa Husin & Anor [2004] 7 MLJ 447 the High 
Court stated that: 
The Industrial Court's jurisdiction, in instances where a domestic inquiry has been held, was 
limited to considering whether there was a prima facie case against an employee. Thus, in the 
present case, the Industrial Court should have first considered whether or not the domestic 
inquiry was valid and the inquiry notes accurate. 
 
The above quote also shows us that where an employer deems to have dismissed an 




evidence that there was misconduct warranting a dismissal, and this can usually be 
proven where there had been a fair domestic inquiry giving the employee a 
reasonable opportunity to explain charges levelled against him. Though the word due 
inquiry can be interpreted in its narrow sense, that there is to be an inquiry and not 
that it should be mandatory, the court nevertheless interpreted it to be one which is 
mandatory. It is also to be noted that section 14 Employment Act 1955 does not use 
the word ‘shall have an inquiry’, which in legal parlance and statutory interpretation 
connotes imperativeness and that which must be undertaken mandatorily.166 
 
This gives us a flavour of how difficult the duty of a judge can be when interpreting 
statutory provisions. However, there is a difference when the courts are interpreting 
matters which are related to procedure as in the case of section 14 of the 
Employment Act 1955, and matters which are related to the merits of the statutory 
provision and its interpretation. In the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen 
[1996] 1 AMR 49, that which was advised was precisely not followed. The proper 
ground issue, which is that the case had good grounds on merits based on section 20 
requirement of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, was not satisfied, and therefore it 
can humbly be stated that the interpretation of section 14 of the Employment Act 
1955 as held in the case of Said Dharmalingam v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn 
Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 seems to be proper and accurate. This is because Milan is 
based on the idea of non-satisfaction of merits of the case, which if it had, would 
cure the defective domestic inquiry, whereas Said Dharmalingam v Malayan 
Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 was based on the fact that domestic 
inquiry must be held. Thus the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen [1996] 1 
                                                     




AMR 49 shows that the court gave a restrictive interpretation of section 14 and was 
not prepared to apply activism, whereas in the case of Said Dharmalingam v 
Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 court gave an activist 
interpretation to section 14, although section 14 was not couched in mandatory 
terms. 
 
Another area which calls for interpretation under the Employment Act 1955 is in 
relation to matters which come under working hours and overtime.  Under section 
60A of the Employment Act 1955, the hours of work per day may not exceed 8 hours 
and not more than 48 hours a week. However there are exception to this time limit as 
when the worker is required to do overtime work when: there is an accident actual or 
threatened; the performance of the work is essential for the life of the community; 
the work is essential for the defence and security of Malaysia; urgent work to be 
done with machinery in work plant; interruption of work which was unforeseen; and 
where there is a an industrial undertaking where work is essential to the economy of 
Malaysia. There are times employers breach the agreement of payment of overtime 
wages for extra work hours, which would be against the Employment Act 1955. The 
Employment (Limitation of Overtime Work) Regulations 1980 states that an 
employer cannot allow or force an employee to work on overtime exceeding the limit 
laid down in the Regulations. Regulation 2 states that overtime work for the purpose 
of section 60A(4) of the Employment Act 1955 shall not exceed a total of one 
hundred and four hours in a month. The issue has always been whether an employee 
can be compelled to do overtime work where the requirement laid down in section 





However, the case laws on this area are scarce, as the issue has always been on 
restricting an employee from doing overtime work rather than compelling him to do 
overtime work. This may become apparent when there is an economic downturn 
where the employer will resort to cost cutting measures. However, an employee who 
has always been able to earn that extra money may face difficulties in fulfilling his 
undertaking payments for his livelihood. Some employers may even compel the 
employee to take annual leaves. At times even bonuses, allowance and incentives can 
be cut, or as a last resort, there can even be retrenchment by reason of redundancy.167 
The researcher further observes the position the courts have taken in interpreting 
section 60A of the Employment Act 1955. In the case of William Jacks & Co. (M) 
Sdn. Bhd. v. S Balasingam [1997] 3 CLJ 235 the court in interpreting the issue of 
reducing overtime stated that the employer has the right to reorganise his business in 
line with the economic climate, provided it is done bona fide. The court further stated 
that such economic prudency would also allow the employer to resort to 
retrenchment. However this interpretation may be a little conservative, which is 
based more on a capitalist construct of the economy rather than one which is related 
to establishing social justice. 
 
The next issue is one which is connected to working hours, which is lay-offs and 
retrenchment by the employer of workmen. The concept of a contract of service is 
closely related to the security of tenure of an employee to safeguard his means of 
livelihood by being actively employed at all times till retirement and continued 
income thereafter. The law on lay-offs and retrenchment benefits in Malaysia is 
                                                     





governed by section 60J of the Employment Act 1955. Under this provision, a set of 
regulations were enacted in the 1980s under the Employment (Termination and Lay-
Off Benefits) Regulations 1980 for regulating issues dealing with lay-offs and 
retrenchments. The act and the regulations govern only those under a contract of 
service and not contract for service. The provisions of the act and the regulations 
ensure that lay-offs and retrenchments entail benefit to the employees in an amicable 
settlement with the employer. Those who fall outside the ambit of these provisions 
will only receive lay-off and retrenchment benefits at the sole discretion of the 
employer. In the case of Pengkalen Holdings Bhd v James Lim Hee Meng [2000] 2 
ILR 252, the Industrial Court stated that the purpose of retrenchment benefits is to: 
Serve as a cushion against the hardships faced by an employee who has to contend with the 
loss of his employment and the consequential loss of his immediate means to earn an income. 
In the context of good industrial relations practice, it serves to minimise resistance and 
opposition to genuine reorganisation measures undertaken by management. It acknowledges a 
workman’s security of tenure and recognises the fact that through no fault of his, such security 
of tenure has to be given away to his employer’s overriding interest of economy and efficiency. 
 
The above quote though comforting at a glance, underlies the basic principle of 
capitalism, that the employer's interest in his economic well-being ultimately 
supersedes that of the employee. The above statement of the court is one which may 
be conservative. A more active interpretation would have addressed not only the fact 
that some benefit should accrue as a result of lay-offs and retrenchments, but also it 
should have addressed the fact of future security of tenure, or the issue of re-
employment of the worker who was made redundant. Though it is fair to say that 
economic downturn justifies lay-offs and retrenchments, it must be seen that this is 
done bona fide by the employer, and not for sheer advantage in profiteering. It must 
however be noted that at times retrenchment may be disguised as dismissal by the 
employer, as was stated in the case of East Asiatic Company (M) Bhd v Valen Noel 




employer to reorganise his company for the purpose of the changing economy, but 
this must be done by the employer bona fide, if not, it could lead to victimisation and 
unfair labour practice. 
 
The next focus is the issue of probation. Most workers would think that probation is 
not considered as a contract of service. However, it is recognised that a person on 
probation in an employment is treated as having the same security of tenure as in 
employment after confirmation. However, the term probationer is not defined under 
the Employment Act 1955. Section 2 of the Employment Act 1955 however does use 
the term ‘apprentice’ as categories of employees - this was held to be so in the case 
of Khaliah Abbas lwn Pesaka Capital Corporation Sdn Bhd[1997] 1 MLJ 376.  
Moreover, security of tenure is given to such a probationer as confirmed in the case 
of Koperasi Serbaguna Pekerja Felda Bhd v Zainal Ariffin bin Mohd Noor [1994] 2 
ILR 862. However, the issue of probation is exclusively under the prerogative of the 
employer.168 The issue of probation then is definitely under the purview of common 
law interpretation of the courts. It is not so much the employment and probation 
period which is an issue, it is when and in what circumstances a probationer can be 
dismissed within the probationary period, and reasons for not confirming him into 
employment. In the case of K C Mathews v Kumpulan Guthrie Sdn Bhd [1981] CLJ 
(Rep) 62; [1981] 2 MLJ 320 it was stated by the Federal Court that a probationer 
cannot be dismissed within the period allowed him for the probation. In other words, 
if a person is given a period of 6 months, then he cannot be dismissed before the time 
is up except where there is evidence of misconduct which would justify dismissal. 
                                                     





This interpretation seems to be on the same level as that which is applied to a person 
who has been fully confirmed in employment. This interpretation seems to be 
judicially active. But again, the interpretation is in the absence of any statutory 
provision laying down guidance in this area of law. If statutes do not provide 
guidance in the area of dispute, then common law steps in with the freedom to 
interpret on the so-called disputed area. 
 
When a probationary period ends, then it is the prerogative of the employer either to 
confirm or not the worker into employment based on the performance shown by the 
probationer. The issue at the end of the probationary period then is closely related to 
satisfactory performance by the probationer. This issue was confirmed in the case of 
Braunstein v Accidental Death Insurance Co [1961] 84 LJKB 2165, where the Court 
of Appeal stated that satisfaction is interpreted as something which must be within 
the ambit of reasonableness. Therefore, the reasons for an employer not to confirm 
the probationer must be based on sound and not flimsy reasons.  
 
The complicated part, however, is when a probationer after the term of his probation 
is not officially notified on confirmation. Is the probationary period automatically 
extended or is there an automatic confirmation in employment? In the case of K C 
Matthews as stated above, the Federal Court stated that where there is no 
confirmatory indication from the employer at the end of a probationary period, then 
the probationary period is deemed to have been extended. However there is a more 
judicially active decision made by the High Court in the case of Paari Perumal  v 
Abdul Majid Hj Nazardin & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 127, where it was asserted by the 




probationary period, he should be treated as a person who has been confirmed in 
employment. This is certainly a judicially active interpretation which departs from 
the Federal Court's statement on the issue. Thus, here we get a flavour of how freely 
the courts are able to interpret certain matters where there are no statutory provisions 
guiding them. However, it remains to be seen and elaborated further in the 
researcher's thesis as to whether such judicial activism also appears to be the case 
when it comes to matters under the purview of statutes.  
 
The next area of contention is annual and sick leave. Section 60E (1) of the 
Employment Act 1955 makes it clear as a mandatory requirement that an employee 
is entitled to an annual leave of eight days if employed for a year, twelve days if 
employed between two to five years and sixteen days if employed for more than five 
years. Section 60F (1) (aa) of the Employment Act 1955 states in relation to sick 
leave that, an employee is entitled to it for fourteen days if employed less than two 
years, eighteen days if employed two to five years and twenty two days where 
employed for more than five years. However, where hospitalisation is required, the 
sick leave is sixty days in a year. Therefore, those employees who have been 
working with the employer for more than five years are aggregately entitled to a 
general leave of 38 days in a year. These leaves do not include public and gazetted 
holidays in Malaysia. It can be stated that annual and sick leave requirement is 
mandatory. There has not been much interpretation on matters which deal with 
annual and sick leaves, except where sick leaves are taken without producing a 
medical certificate, or where the worker is absent without taking annual leave and a 





The law in this area is quite settled as dismissal from absenteeism from work would 
only be genuine where the employee is unable to provide justification when taking 
leaves in circumstances where it could not be immediately informed to the employer. 
In the Industrial Court case of CK Lee & Associates v Goh Shaw Yuh [2002] 3 ILR 
645 (Award No. 688 of 2002), the court stated that where there is a genuine medical 
emergency and documentary evidence is provided, the dismissal by the employer 
was without just cause and excuse. In the case of Penang Park Royal Hotel v 
Norzaidi Sabri [2004] 2 ILR 486 (Award No. 525 of 2004), the employee was unable 
to move because of his illness and therefore was not able to inform the employer and 
this was justified, and further that his sickness was informed earlier to the company. 
The interpretation in both cases cannot be stated as being judicially active or 
conservative as it follows the letter of the statute in a literal sense, where the 
employee needs to justify why he was not able to inform his employer. Here the 
statute itself is fair and just and does call for the judge to be judicially active. Section 
60F(2)(b) of the Employment Act 1955 states that, even if the employee is certified 
by a medical practitioner to be ill, the employee seems to have an obligation to 
inform or attempt to inform the employer within forty-eight hours on this condition, 
or he will be considered as having been absent from work. The forty-eight hours 
shows that if one is sick for one day, he has no real obligation to inform the employer 
and can do that the next day as this is well within the forty eight hours’ time frame 
given under statute. This justifies the decision in the above two industrial court cases, 
in that the obligation to inform the employer is not immediate and can be done 
within forty-eight hours. These are examples of statutory provisions where there is 





Another area of significance under the Employment Act 1955 is wages and monetary 
benefits. Common sense itself would lead us to believe that this is the most important 
to the employee, as it deals with the actual reason for the contract of service - means 
by which the employee maintains his livelihood. Section 2 of the Employment Act 
1955 defines wages as payment made which are basic and all other payments in cash 
made to the employee for work done under the contract of service. However, the 
definition seems not to include remunerations related to travel, housing or food 
allowances, bonuses, EPF contributions and pension payments. In the case of Chin 
Swee Hin v Mohd Arif bin Khalid [1977] 1 MLJ 31, it was stated by the High Court 
that food allowances come within the definition of wages. In referring to section 
2(1)(a) on the definition of wages and the exception in the subsection, the court 
stated that it refers to supply of food by the employer and not the allowances given 
for food. Allowances given for food, the court, thought rightly, referred to monetary 
benefits which amount to wages. Thus, where an employer provides meals, the value 
is not considered as a wage, but when allowances in monetary form are given to the 
employee to buy food, that comes under the definition of wages. The judgement 
certainly shows a liberal judicial interpretation of section 2(1)(a) of the Employment 
Act 1955 and may be assumed to be flavoured with judicial activism. 
 
However, this interpretation by the court must be trodden with care. The reason is 
that the definition of an ‘employee’ under section 2(1) of the Employment Act 1955 
clearly lays down the eligibility of persons using the Act. These are employees 
earning not more than RM2000. Thus, where an employee earns RM1700 and there 
is a bonus of RM500, the employee still comes under the purview of the Act as 




‘wages’. However, if this section is defined as the High Court did in the case of Chin 
Swee Hin, then it can also be interpreted as coming within the definition of wages if 
bonuses given are calculated in monetary value and not goods. The example goes to 
show that not all the time a judicially active interpretation is beneficial, and should 
be utilised only where there is absolute necessity in order to establish social justice 
matters. 
 
Section 60I(1)(a) of the Employment Act 1955 states that wages are as defined under 
section 2 of the act, however this excludes “any payment made under an approved 
incentive  payment  scheme  or  any  payment  for work  done  on  a  rest  day  or  on  
any  gazetted  public holiday  granted  by  the  employer  under  the  contract  of 
service  or  any  day  substituted  for  the  gazetted  public holiday”. This shows that 
overtime payments and bonuses are not considered as wages, and only refers to the 
basic payment agreed to by the employer and employee under the contract of service. 
This can at times cause problems upon dismissal and claims made by the employee 
thereafter, as his claims for wages would only be limited to the basic amount stated 
in the contract of service. 
 
Section 2 of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 on the other hand states that 
wages are “all remuneration in money, due to an employee under his contract of 
service or apprenticeship whether agreed to be paid monthly, weekly, daily or 
otherwise and includes any bonus, commission or allowance payable by the 
employer to the employee whether such bonus, commission or allowance is payable 
under his contract of service, apprenticeship or otherwise”. The act then excludes 




retrenchment, lay-offs or termination benefits, any travelling allowance or the value 
of any travelling concession and any other remuneration or payment as may be 
exempted by the Minister. This definition seems to tally with the excluded categories 
of payments under section 60I(1) of the Employment Act 1955.  
 
The next issue is of minimum wage. The Employment Act 1955 was silent on this 
issue except under section 16 which guarantees minimum wage for workers who are 
employed in the agricultural sectors - Viking Askim Sdn Bhd v National Union of 
Employees in Companies Manufacturing Rubber Products & Ors [1991] 2 MLJ 119. 
The issue of minimum wage is normally determined by each individual country’s 
economic achievements and per capita income. The rate of minimum wage therefore 
is not an international standard, but a standard wage corresponding to each individual 
country's economic capacity and social environment. Under the National Wages 
Consultative Council Act 2011 (which repealed the Wages Council Act 1947), the 
minimum wage set by the government in Peninsular Malaysia at RM900, whereas 
for Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan at RM800. 169   These wage thresholds were 
implemented by the Minimum Wages Order 2012 and came into effect on 1
st
 July 
2013. However, the order excludes workers in the categories of apprentices and 
domestic servants. Even then, the issue of minimum was not always so clear before 
the National Wages Consultative Act 2011. There were three elements before the Act 
which profoundly influenced the issue of setting the minimum wage for employees. 
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The three elements were the Wages Council Act 1947, collective bargaining and 
market forces.170  
 
The issue of wages has always been connected to the concept of equality and justice. 
However, the previous position in Malaysia on minimum wage was largely 
determined by market forces and not on the principle act of 1947 or the strength of 
collective bargaining.171 The increase in the wages was an effort by the Malaysian 
Trades Union Congress172 which has been asking for increase in minimum wages for 
workers in Malaysia. The issue now is not so much the achievement by MTUC in 
gaining the mileage for minimum wages to be established, but whether this setting of 
minimum wages is actually sufficient to meet the demands of social justice. This is 
where recent and earlier173 case laws decided in relation to minimum wages need to be 
analysed on whether the courts deemed this to be sufficient or whether they have 
taken a more judicially active role in promoting further changes to minimum wages. 
However, it has to be noted that case laws in this area is scarce as there was no law 
before the National Wages Consultative Council Act 2011 which governed the issue 
of minimum wages in Malaysia. For example, the case of Lina Joy v Majlis Agama 
Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2007] 4 MLJ 585 it was stated by the Federal 
Court that though list 1, item 15 of the 9
th
 schedule to the Malaysian Constitution 
which allows the Malaysian Parliament to pass laws ensuring ‘social security’ of its 
citizens, such laws were not passed as late as the year 2007. However, the court went 
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172 Hereinafter referred to as MTUC.  




on to state that though such laws were not implemented as yet in 2007, at the time of 
the decision, it did not prevent the Industrial Court in assuming jurisdiction in 
adjudicating on matters related to minimum wages. The decision shows that although 
there were no laws in Malaysia adjudicating on matters related to minimum wages, 
the court applied judicial activism by interpreting the Malaysian Constitution and the 
provision of schedule 9 in a judicially active manner by using its own inherent 
jurisdiction. However, the court also gave an indication that the jurisdiction for the 
court to include a reading into a law which was not in the law books has to be a 
jurisdiction conferred expressly and not impliedly. This was a balanced view taken 
by the federal court in that only if the Federal Constitution of Malaysia allows the 
court to expressly read anything into a ‘non-present law’, it would not do so. This 
part of the decision shows that although the courts were more than willing to apply 
judicial activism, they were only ready to do so where the authority given was 
expressed and not implied, by the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
 
Reference is now made to the issue of maternity benefits under the Employment Act 
1955. Section 37(1)(a) of the Employment Act 1955 allows a continuous maternity 
leave of 60 days. However, there is a proviso under subsection (c) where a woman 
who has 5 of more surviving children, she shall not be entitled to maternity 
allowance. The act does not prohibit maternity leave for an unmarried woman, and it 
does not matter if the child is born alive or dead. This area of law is quite well settled 
with tangible and clear provisions as to maternity leave and other entitlements. There 
is however a landmark decision on issues of dismissal and maternity leave. The 
matter comes under the fold of gender discrimination. In the case of Beatrice A/P AT 




issue was the dismissal of an air stewardess employed with the Malaysian Airlines 
System174 when she got pregnant. The case basically comes under the guarantee of 
non-gender discrimination under article 8 of the Federal Constitution. The Federal 
Court however did not allow the claimant the leave to appeal from the Court of 
Appeal and upheld the decision of the the Court of Appeal that the dismissal was 
proper and lawful under labour laws. The main contention was the provision of the 
collective agreement which stated that a female employee would have to resign if she 
got pregnant.  
 
The Federal Court stated that article 8 specifically allows equal protection under the 
law, and since a collective agreement is not law but a contract of service, article 8 
protection cannot be extended to the collective agreement. The court went on the 
basis of the Aristotelian classification doctrine, that though equality is cardinal, 
different class of people have to be treated differently at times to actually ensure as 
to the equality which is being afforded. This argument is straight forwardly 
understood when observe tax law, where the rich are taxed more than the poor in 
percentage wise cannot be stated as being discriminatory, as both fall within different 
classes of people and to create equality and social justice, such objective 
differentiation is actually necessary. 175  The decision may be stated as being 
conservative in that the court was not prepared to read in a new interpretation into 
article 8.  
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The next area of discussion is social security and welfare of employees under the 
Employment Act 1955. The more pertinent provision however would be the 
Employees’ Social Security Act 1969 and Employee Social Security General Rules 
1971. These acts govern the benefits which a worker receives under the Social 
Security Organisation.176 Section 2(5) and the first schedule of the act states a person 
who come under a compulsory contribution to SOCSO is a person earning less than 
RM3000. SOCSO enables the protection of workers from injuries and disabilities 
suffered during work hours and when commuting to and from work. Apart from such 
protection, the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1994 provides protection from 
unsafe and unhealthy work sites or environment. Over and above this, an employee 
in the private sector is afforded a savings scheme under the Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1951. The researcher's interest however is not how the protection is 
afforded, but on the sufficiency of a liberal interpretation to the provisions of such 
acts. It is to be noted that these acts in and by themselves relate strictly to the concept 
of social justice in the work environment, and should by right benefit the employee 
in all its aspects. 
 
As an example reference can be made to the case of Liang Jee Kheng v Yik Kee 
Restaurant Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 CLJ 750. The issue in this case was whether the 
Plaintiff employee was able to claim damages from the defendant employer under 
section 31 of the act. In order for the plaintiff to be eligible to make claims of 
damages from SOCSO, he must have been an ‘insured person’. The court making 
reference to section 2(11) of the Act gave a liberal and activist interpretation on the 
term ‘insured person’. The court held that even when a person is not as yet registered 
                                                     




with SOCSO, he is deemed to be an insured person if contributions are payable 
under the Act so long he belonged to an industry which is covered by SOCSO. The 
plaintiff therefore was only able to make a claim under SOCSO, and not under any 
other law. Section 31 of the Act reads as follows, “An insured person or his 
dependant shall not be entitled to receive or recover from the employer of the insured 
person, or from any other person who is the servant of the employer, any 
compensation or damages under any other law for the time being in force in respect 
of an employment injury sustained as an employee under the act”.  
 
The previous section 2(11) on the definition of the insured person read as follows, 
“insured person means a person who is or was an employee in respect of whom 
contributions are or were payable under this Act and who is, by reason thereof, 
entitled to any benefits provided by this Act”. The new amended provision in 1987 
read as follows, “insured person means a person who is or was an employee in 
respect of whom contributions are, were or could be payable under this act, 
notwithstanding that such industry or employee was not so registered, so long as the 
industry was one to which this act applies”. Therefore, the new provision of section 
2(11) is wider in that an insured person includes one who not only was or were to 
have contributed to SOCSO, but also, could have contributed to SOCSO. Since the 
plaintiff could have made a contribution to SOCSO, he was deemed to be an insured 
person even where contributions are yet to be paid or had been paid two days after 
the injury under the new section 2(11), and cannot make a claim under any other law 





In summary the case was one where the plaintiff should have made his claim under 
SOCSO for his injuries and not under any other law (in this case under common law 
negligence of the employer), as section 31 of the act precludes him from doing so if 
he is deemed to be an insured person under SOCSO. This contention had been 
affirmed by the Federal Court in the case of Che Noh bin Yacob v Seng Hin Rubber 
(M) Sdn. Bhd. [1982] 1 MLJ 80. The case shows that the court may have taken a 
judicially conservative approach in interpreting section 31 of the Act. The issue of a 
person being insured to enable claims from SOCSO should not preclude other claims 
made under the law of tort if there is a presence of negligence, as SOCSO deals with 
accidents and not issues of employer negligence.  
 
The final issue which we will discuss in brief under this part is in relation to pensions 
and retirement under the Employment Act 1955. The general understanding of 
pension schemes in Malaysia depends on whether a person is employed in the public 
or the private sector. Those who are employed under the government pension scheme 
are civil servants which preclude private sector employees.177 The pension scheme for 
the civil servants is governed by the Pensions Act 1980 which provides for the 
administration of pensions, gratuities and other benefits. On the other hand, the 
private sector employees come under the governance of a pension scheme which is 
administered under the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991. The latter is however 
contributory in nature in that both the employer and employee contribute to the fund. 
Generally, this area of law does not have many disputes, except when benefits are 
directed not directly at the employee but his dependants. Under the EPF scheme, 
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problems usually arise when employers fail to make contributions to the EPF fund on 
a monthly basis, or contributions are made late even after deductions have been made 
to the employee’s monthly salary. Another problem is failure to make nominations. 
Under section 45(3) of the Act, where the employer fails to pay contributions within 
the time frame prescribed, he shall be liable to pay dividend on the accrued sum. 
Section 45(4) of the Act further states that the employer who contravenes subsection 
(3) shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or to a fine not 
exceeding ten thousand ringgit. Section 48(3) of the Act also strictly provides that if 
deduction have been made by the employer to the salary of the employees, and yet 
he/she fails to pay such deductions to the fund shall be guilty of an offence, and be 
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six years or a fine of not more than 
twenty thousand ringgit. Rule 3 of the Rule of the Employees Provident Fund 1991 
states clearly that contributions must be made by the employer no later than 21 days 
from the last day of the preceding month. Any payment made later by the employer 
shall be deemed to be an offence. 
 
For an example, in the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v 
Adorna RMIT Sdn Bhd & 9 Ors [2003] 1 LNS 482, the court held that the directors 
of the company were jointly and severally liable for failure to make EPF 
contributions. The court stated that, “... the relevant section relied on by the Plaintiff 
is sufficient to include the directors' liability which is joint and several, in the event 
the company, namely the 1st defendant in this case, failed to pay the EPF dues. This 
is a unique section which is peculiar to this act. It is a sensible section which ensures 




savings are protected. Directors are the alter ego of a company.178 It is therefore not 
appropriate for a director to attempt to escape culpability by pleading that he is a 
sleeping partner or director, or a silent director or a non-active director”. Here the 
court seems to have given a strict reading of section 46 of the Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1991, to make the company’s directors liable for the non-contribution. This 
is an example to a strict activist interpretation of a legislative provision by the court, 
a style which is prevalent in the United States of America as seen earlier on 
comparative jurisdictions. 
 
5.2.4 Industrial Relations Act 1967 and its Interpretation by the Courts 
The main aim of the legislation is to ensure an amicable dispute resolution between 
the employer and employee. Only after there is a failure of negotiations between the 
employer and the employee, is reference made under the act to the Industrial Court, 
more specifically, to the DGIR.  Section 2 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 
defines a ‘workman’ as a person who is employed by the employer which includes 
an apprentice under a contract of employment. Dispute resolutions are referred to the 
industrial court under section 20 of the Act. In the case of Hong Leong Equipment 
Sdn. Bhd.  v Liew Fook Chuan  & Other Appeals [1997] 1  CLJ 665, it was stated by 
his Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA 179  that the aim of section 20 of the act is to 
strengthen the workman's position over and above the protection which was provided 
under common law. It provides a security of tenure for the workman and a right to 
claim upon dismissal on an equal platform. The dismissal by the employer must also 
be with just cause and excuse. 
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Under section 20, any workman who has been dismissed without just cause and 
excuse is able to make representations in writing to the DGIR to be reinstated to his 
former employment. Much of the approach taken by the courts in relation to this Act 
has been closer to judicial activism compared to other acts in its category, as 
discussed earlier in this Thesis. For example, in the case of Dr. A. Dutt v Assunta 
Hospital [I981]1 MLJ 304, his Lordship Chan Ming Tatt FCJ,180 on the interpretation 
of a ‘workman’ opined that, it is a question for the Industrial court to decide it as a 
question both of fact and law.  This indicated an allowance of a liberal activist 
interpretation of the act by his Lordship. Also, a similar interpretation as to contract 
for service and contract of service under Employment Act 1955 seems to have been 
adopted by the courts. Therefore, a person who is hired on the basis of contract for 
service does not come within the definition of workman under this act.  
 
In the case of Hoh Kiang Ngan v Mahkamah Persukutuan Malaysia & Anor [I995] 3 
MLJ  369 his Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA seems to have applied the ‘control test’ 
to determine whether a workman is under a contract of service or contract for 
service. It is important to view the issue of the degree of control that the employer 
has over the employee, and not the permanent or impermanent nature of the 
employment.  
 
The next important area is on deciphering what precisely is the interpretation given 
to the phrase ‘without just cause and excuse’. The meaning of this phrase is 
especially a privilege for the workman and not the employer, which means, the 
employer’s opinion on what is just cause and excuse is quite irrelevant. The issue of 
                                                     




what is just cause and excuse in the circumstances of each case is left to be 
determined by the courts, rather than the parties based on the facts presented to the 
courts. This indicates somewhat a slant towards judicial activism, as the courts are 
allowed to apply a liberal interpretation to the phrase, especially in relation to the 
protection of the rights of the workman in a social justice environment. In the case of 
Goh Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd [I981] 2 MLJ 129, Raja Azlan Shah, CJ181 
stated that in the event the employer wishes to offer explanation as to the reason for 
dismissal, the courts will decide ultimately whether those reasons are made out or 
not, to vitiate on the issue of whether there was just cause and excuse. 
 
The other issue which is connected before the issue of just cause and excuse can be 
determined, is the issue of dismissal. The categories of dismissals under the act are 
divided into direct dismissals and indirect dismissals. Direct dismissals are where 
there are issues such as misconduct and poor performance, and indirect dismissals 
involve issues related to constructiveness - which means the employee has been 
treated in such a manner, where he considers it as an action by the employer which 
allows himself to consider that he has been constructively dismissed. 
 
One peculiarity of section 20 of the act is that a workman who claims to have been 
dismissed directly of constructively without just cause and excuse, apart from 
claiming back wages, must also include in his claim that he wishes to be reinstated to 
his former position. In Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. Bhd.  v Liew Fook  Chuan  & 
Other Appeals [1997] 1  CLJ 665 , it was stated by the courts that the remedy of 
reinstatement is primary to the workman's representation to the DGIR, and he has no 
                                                     




right to claim damages or compensation except for back wages. Where a workman 
rejects this remedy unreasonably, it would be deemed that the workman would have 
put an end to the dispute. In the case of Holiday Inn, Kuching v Lee Chai Siok, 
Elizabeth [1992] 1 MLJ 230 it was further stated that, the industrial courts will cease 
to have jurisdiction where the workman fails to state reinstatement as a remedy in his 
representation, as then, he will not be able to bring himself within the definition of 
section 20(1) and (3) of the Act. However, this does not mean that where 
reinstatement is stated as a remedy, it would be inevitably ordered by the courts. 
There are circumstances where the courts will grant damages and compensation in 
lieu of reinstatement. Therefore, the issue of stating reinstatement as a remedy by the 
worker in his representation is more an issue of formality, and that the court can 
vitiate this and allow claims for damages and compensation where the circumstances 
of the case no longer makes reinstatement a possible option for the workman. In Dr. 
A. Dutt v Assunta Hospital [I981]1 MLJ 304, it was stated clearly by the court that, 
“However there may exist circumstances and reasons why reinstatement should not 
be ordered”.  
 
In the case of The Borneo Post Sdn. Bhd.  v Margaret Wong [2001] 8 CLJ 758, the 
High Court stated that the requirement to state reinstatement in the workman's 
representation is merely procedural and is not fatal. In this case it was stated that: 
As I said earlier, whether or not reinstatement must be expressly prayed for in the statement of 
case is a point of procedure. The omission in the statement of case to state it as a specific relief 
does not affect the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to hear and determine the case on the 
merits: see S.29 (d) of Act 177. The Industrial Court derives its jurisdiction from the order of 
reference by the minister made under S.30 (3) of Act 177 and which such court must exercise. 





The decision may indicate a judicially active attitude taken by the judge, by not only 
looking at the procedural requirement of section 20, but also the requirement of the 
merits of the case. 
The representation by the worker must also be made within 60 days of his dismissal 
as provided under section 20(1A) of the Act. Where there is a dismissal, the time 
period where the 60 days run is from the expiry of the notice of dismissal. This 
requirement is mandatory and cannot be vitiated as confirmed in the case of Fung 
Keong Rubber Manufacturing (M) Sdn. Bhd. v Lee Eng Kiat & Ors [I981] 1 MLJ 
238. However, this may not be a very satisfactory provision, and may need some 
form of readjustment and the creation of a more flexible time frame. 
 
Any reference made by the workman to the DGIR would be referred to the Minister 
of Human Resource under section 20(3) of the act, and he has the sole discretion 
whether to allow the representation to the Industrial court for an award. This is where 
another form of action by the worker can be taken where the minister exercises his 
discretion in an improper manner, the workman may have recourse to an action 
under judicial review. A wrongful manner in which a minister may exercise his 
discretion has been stated in the case of Minister of Labour, Malaysia v Lie Seng Fat 
[I990] 2 MLJ 9, where it was held that where a minister has misdirected himself in 
law or have taken into account irrelevant considerations or rejected relevant matters, 
then the non-reference to the Industrial Court may be disputed by the workman. 
Further, in Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. Bhd.  v Liew Fook  Chuan  & Other Appeals 
[1997] 1  CLJ 665, two principals were set down on the issue of the exercise of the 
minister's discretion. Firstly, the exercise of the discretion must be in light of whether 




Industrial Court, and secondly, whether the representation sought by the workman by 
its nature is frivolous and vexatious. Even with this guidance, the court was careful 
to state that the finality of whether the decision to refer or not by the minister is to be 
determined on the “...objective assessment of the facts and material that was placed 
before the Minister”. This shows that despite laying down strict principles of 
interpretation for section 20 of the act, the court realised that the fluid nature of 
judicial review required some form of liberal interpretation, one which is judicially 
active. 
 
The saving grace is that, where the workman in any circumstances fails to obtain 
representation or award from the Industrial Court, he may under section 20(4) of the 
Act make a claim under civil courts, based on the general principles of the breach of 
contract. But it must be noted carefully that where a representation is made to the 
industrial court and the workman loses the case, he is barred from taking any other 
actions in any other courts. Apart from this, an award granted by the Industrial Court 
which is not favourable to the workman may be referred to the High Court under a 
question of law under section 33A of the Act and may also take a judicial review 
proceeding under Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012. 
 
For the former, this is a limited right to appeal where the matter referred must be one 
which deals with a question of law, and it must be made within 30 (section 33A(3) of 
the act) days of the award being given by the Industrial Court. The High Court then 
has the right to either confirm, vary, substitute or quashed the award of the Industrial 
Court as it deems fit. For the latter, this judicial review action must be distinguished 




to refer the matter to the industrial court. Here, the judicial review action relates to an 
award having been made after the matter had been referred to the Industrial Court. 
This is where the application is made by way of a certiorari to the High Court to 
quash the decision of the Industrial Court. This latter process is distinguished from 
the former in that the latter does not operate as an appeal but the former does. Here 
the High Court has the right to go into the decision making process of the Industrial 
Court to quash the decision or order a re-hearing. Table 1 on the next page shows the 
inclination towards activism or conservatism. 
 
Table 5.1 
Brief Analysis of Important Decisions As Above Discussed 
 
No Case name and citation Subject matter Law/Statute Inclination 
towards 
1 Said Dharmalingam v 
Malayan Breweries (Malaya) 
Sdn Bhd [1997]  




2 Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong 
Sen Yen [1996] 1 AMR 49 




3 William Jacks & Co. (M) 
Sdn. Bhd. v. S Balasingam 
[1997] 3 CLJ 235  




4.  Pengkalen Holdings Bhd v 
James Lim Hee Meng [2000] 








5 K C Mathews v Kumpulan 
Guthrie Sdn Bhd [1981] CLJ 








6 Lina Joy v Majlis Agama 
Islam Wilayah Persekutuan 
& Ors [2007] 4 MLJ 585  
Minimum wage List 1, Item 15 of 
the 9
th
 Schedule to 
the Malaysian 
Constitution - now 





specific law under 
Minimum Wages 
Order 2012  
7 Beatrice A/P AT Fernandez v 
Sistem Penerbangan 
Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 
MLJ 681 
Maternity benefits Article 8 Federal 
Constitution  
Conservatism 
8 Che Noh bin Yacob v Seng 
Hin Rubber (M) Sdn. Bhd. 
[1982] 1 MLJ 80 
SOCSO Employees’ Social 






9 Lembaga Kumpulan Wang 
Simpanan Pekerja v Adorna 
RMIT Sdn Bhd & 9 Ors 
[2003] 1 LNS 482 
Employees 
Provident Fund 





10 Dr. A. Dutt v Assunta 






Relations Act 1967 
Activism 
11 Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. 
Bhd.  v  Liew Fook  Chuan  
& Other Appeals [1997] 1  
CLJ 665 
Just cause and 
excuse on dismissal 




Relations Act 1967 
Conservatism 
12 Fung Keong Rubber 
Manufacturing (M)  Sdn. 
Bhd. v Lee Eng Kiat & Ors 
[I981] 1 MLJ 238 
Time frame for 
reference to 








Table 5.1 shows the inclination to judicial activism or conservatism in important 
decisions on various areas of labour and industrial matters. It can be observed that 
the inclination of most judgement are towards conservatism. However there are 
decisions which are seen to be inclined towards activism. The decisions which are 




understanding of judicial activism. These decisions are based more on a strict 
interpretation of the statutory provisions which already basically provide for what to 
be done and the judges applied the law as they are. Thus here, the legislative 
activism allowed judges to be judicially active and not that their decisions were 
based on actual activism in departing from statutory laws. It must be noted and 
distinguished between actual activism and activism prompted by statutory 
provisions.182 
 
From Table 5.1 it can also be construed that the decisions which favour conservatism 
is much more pronounced compared to to decisions which are based on activism. 
There are certain decisions also where the matter is unsettled.  
 
5.3 Procedures in Bringing Cases to Courts 
Procedures have always played an important part in the development of labour or any 
judicial matter brought and decided by the courts. These procedures are instituted as 
mechanical devices for the efficient administration of the justice system. However, 
some measure of flexibility would be important, as rigid procedures may tend to 
stifle justice. Thus, procedures may be followed through active interpretation by the 
courts. 
 
5.3.1 The Jurisdiction in Labour and Industrial Disputes – Current 
Application 
The focus of this heading would be to understand in detail the manner in which 
labour and industrial matters are brought to the labour, industrial or civil courts. This 
                                                     




process involves the analytical understanding of the Employment Act 1955, the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 and also the Civil Procedure Rules laid down under the 
Rules of Court 2012. The main aim is to understand whether the procedures provided 
for are strictly rigid or are there any allowance to the courts for some form of 
liberalism which would point to judicial activism. This part would be specifically 
divided into three areas of labour matter which calls for different procedures - the 
labour courts, industrial courts and civil courts.  
 
The feature which needs to be understood is the different jurisdiction of the different 
courts in labour and industrial disputes. The basic difference between the labour and 
industrial court is the subject matter which they deal with. The Industrial Court 
basically deals with individual disputes which arise from and employer-employee 
relationship, the disputes with trade unions and rights and obligation laid down under 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The Labour Court on the other hand deals with the 
recovery of wages and damages, and other employment benefits under the 
Employment Act 1955. The Industrial Court is a statutory tribunal unlike the Labour 
Court which is a quasi-judicial body.183 Matters brought to the labour court are tried 
by the labour officer under the labour department. Matters brought to the industrial 
court on the other hand are references to the Ministry of Human Resource, and is 
tried by the chairman of the Industrial Court.  
 
Further, under section 3(2) of the Subordinate Courts Act 1948, the Labour Court 
does not come within the definition of subordinate courts. Therefore, the Labour 
                                                     





Court in a strict sense is not a court at all, but a dispute resolution inquiry office in 
relation to labour matters which fall under the Employment Act 1955. This matter 
was confirmed in the case of Astral Amalgamated Tin Bhd and Another Appeal v 
Abdul Wahab Bin Kopon and Ors and Another Appeal [2004] 2 MLJ 193. Thus, any 
discussion on judicial activism in the presumably labour court needs to be dealt with 
cautiously, as strictly speaking, it does not exercise strict judicial functions. Any 
appeal to the High Court which is deemed to be taken on the decision of the labour 
office will come under the procedure laid down in Order 55 rule 13 of the Rules of 
Court 2012, being appeals from tribunals and administrative bodies.  This is further 
confirmed by section 77 of the Employment Act 1955. The advantage which ensues 
in segregating the labour office from categories of subordinate courts is that it is not 
bound by the monetary limits imposed on subordinate courts, and therefore no matter 
what the amount claimed in the Labour Court is, as long as the aggrieved party’s 
financial interest is affected, it is appealable to the High Court. 
 
The Industrial Court is a dispute resolution tribunal. Its power is laid down under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 and is therefore a statutory tribunal. In the case of 
Hotel Malaya Sdn. Bhd. & Anor. v. National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant 
Workers & Anor. [1982] 1 CLJ640, Raja Azlan Shah, CJ, described that the 
Industrial Court serves a quasi-judicial function by investigating facts and applying 
law in a social justice environment. From this, we may derive the notion that some 
form of judicial activism may be observed in the decisions delivered by the industrial 
courts. Strictly speaking, there is no right of appeal from the decision of the 




be referred to the high court on a question of law by the aggrieved party by way of 
certiorari in judicial review proceedings.184 
 
The labour and industrial courts are essentially tribunals and their jurisdictional 
power is that of a quasi-judicial nature. Thus, the labour and industrial courts are not 
bound by the rigid contractual rules under the civil courts and are guided more on the 
basis of equity and good conscience. This view is further confirmed by section 30(5) 
of the Industrial Relations Act 1950 wherein it is stated that “The court shall act 
according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without 
regard to technicalities and legal form”. Any room for judicial activism would most 
probably be found in the decisions of the industrial courts and any reference on a 
question of law made from it to the civil courts. In the case of Chartered Bank, 
Kuching v Kuching Bank Employees Union [1965-1967] MLLR 287, it was stated by 
the then Industrial Arbitration Tribunal that  “Dismissal is a managerial function with 
the bona fide exercise of which a tribunal will not interfere; where, however, the 
dismissal is challenged, it is well settled that the tribunal could always intervene if it 
is shown that there has been want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, 
a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the decision to dismiss is 
baseless or perverse”.185  
 
The labour and industrial courts have also been touted as being courts of equity 
where social justice jurisprudence permeates its decisions allowing room for judicial 
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activism which may be difficult to be inculcated in the civil courts. However, in the 
case of Dr. A. Dutt v. Assunta Hospital [1981] 1 MLJ 304, his Lordship Hashim 
Yeop A. Sani CJ stated that: 
 The present section 30(6) was the previous section 27(6) in the original Industrial Relations 
Act, 1967. In my opinion section 30(6) contains too general a wording or too broad a language 
to enable the Industrial Court to override statutory provisions although the language is broad 
enough to enable the Industrial Court to modify the common law if such modifications are 
within the limits of subsection (5) of section 30 of the Act, which directs that the Industrial 
Court shall act according to equity and good conscience. In my view, the Industrial Court 
while obliged and empowered to proceed according to equity and good conscience is not a 
court of equity in the technical sense. It cannot therefore usurp or duplicate the functions of the 
common law courts, in this country, the civil courts established under the Constitution and the 
Courts of Judicature Act, 1964. 
 
The quote above gives an indication that the Industrial Court is not supposed to usurp 
the statutory limit which is given to it in the name of equity. Therefore, though in a 
sense the labour and industrial courts are given freedom to determine matters on 
merits, equity and good conscience, it is still bound to the statutory limits laid down 
either under the Employment Act 1955 or the Industrial Relations Act 1967.  
 
5.3.2 Labour Court 
Under this heading the researcher will be looking briefly at the process on how 
actions are begun in the labour court and its jurisdiction. The basic jurisdiction of the 
labour court is that it deals with the recovery of wages and moneys and employment 
benefits due to the worker under the Employment Act 1955. However, it is to be 
noted that the Labour Court (office) is more a tribunal (not a statutory one) and the 
decisions of the labour officer is not reported unlike labour cases in the Industrial 
Court and High court and the appellate courts. Its proceedings are deemed to be 
quasi-judicial and is administered by the Director General of Labour. Under section 
69 of the Employment Act 1955, the Director General of Labour has the authority to 




to wages, moneys and other employment benefits. These disputes may arise under 
any of the terms in a contract of service between and employer and employee, under 
the provision of the Employment Act 1955, or any other legislation in pursuance of 
it, or under the provisions of the Wages Council Act 1947. The Director General 
under his inquiry has the power to make an order in the prescribed form for payment 
of any amount which is deemed fit and just to be paid by the employer, which 
payment is also liable to an 8% interest per annum.186 The procedure employed is as 
follows:187 
1. The complainant (employee) may in writing or in person make a complaint and 
the remedy sought to the Director General. 
2. The complainant will be examined on oath or affirmation by the Director 
General as soon as possible and record statements in a case book. 
3. The Director General may make inquiry to satisfy him as to the complaint being 
made and summon person(s) in the prescribed form against whom such 
complaint is made. 
4. The summons that is issued by the Director General must contain notice of the 
contents of the complaint and the name of the complainant and the attendance 
requirement as to date, time and place. The person so summoned may bring 
witnesses and also apply to the Director General for other witnesses to be 
summoned. 
5. The complainant also may bring witnesses on his behalf and also issue 
summonses for witnesses to appear on behalf of the complainant. 
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6. Any person(s) whose financial interest will be affected by the Director General's 
decision will be notified upon the completion of the enquiry to give evidence 
which is deemed proper in relation to their interests. 
7. The witnesses shall give evidence on oath or by affirmation on the instructions 
of the Director General. 
8. If in any circumstances the person complained against or the witnesses fail to 
attend the hearing on the date, time and place appointed by the Director General, 
then the matter may be decided in their absence even where it may have a 
prejudicial effect. 
9. The decision of the Director General shall be embodied in an order in a 
prescribed form. 
10. The order of the Director General where there is non-compliance by parties shall 
be sent forthwith to the Registrar of the Sessions Court or a First-Class 
Magistrates' court and thereafter the order is deemed to have the force of a 
judgement of these courts. 
These are the basic procedures to be complied with in an action in the labour court. 
There is also a right to appeal from the decision of the Director General to the high 
court. It is also to be noted that where no actions have been instituted in a labour 
court, parties may have enforced their contractual rights in the civil courts. 
 
5.3.3 Industrial Court  
Under this heading the researcher will briefly look at the procedure and jurisdiction 
of the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court is a statutory tribunal set up under the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967 and deals with industrial disputes between the 




the industrial court is specific to instances where there have been unjust dismissals of 
the workman. The industrial court is presided over by a President who is appointed 
by the Yang di Pertuan Agong with additional panels representing the parties to the 
dispute appointed by the Human Resource Minister. An employee is usually 
represented by the trade union who may appoint an advocate and solicitor to conduct 
the matter. The employer may represent himself or act through his authorised 
agent(s) who may appoint an advocate and solicitor to conduct the matter on their 
behalf.188 
 
On preliminary issues upon an application for representation which has been referred 
to by the Minister to the Industrial Court; the court may do the following. The 
industrial court may deal with joinder or non-joinder of parties. It may summon any 
party deemed necessary and is connected to the proceedings, take evidence on oath 
or affirmation, to hear and determine the matter and to do all things for the expedient 
disposal of the matter.189 
 
Matters in the industrial court as a principle must be resolved as quickly as possible 
as this is a matter which relates to social justice, preferably the dispute should be 
resolved within 30 days. The Industrial Court considers matters of fact in the dispute 
and if there is any instance, a matter of law has risen, then that question of law shall 
be referred to the High Court to be decided in which it will be treated as an appeal. 
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However, it is a bar for any party to appeal to the High Court against the factual 
decision of the industrial court as its decision is considered final and conclusive.190  
 
The Industrial Court deals mainly with disputes which are connected to recognition, 
trade and dismissals. In any form of collective bargaining, the trade union must be 
recognised by the employer. The employer within 21 days upon being served a 
notice must either accord recognition or not, or apply to the Director General of 
Industrial Relations to ensure the viability of the trade union or the members in it, 
which matter may then be referred by the Director General of Industrial Dispute to 
the Director General of Trade Union on the viability of the trade union and its 
members.191 
 
On issues related to dismissals, the Industrial Court may hear a matter where an 
employee regardless of him being a union member, has been dismissed without just 
cause and excuse. The employee must make a representation to the Director General 
of Industrial Relations in writing within 60 days from the date of his dismissal. If 
there is no chance of a settlement, then the matter will be referred to the minister 
who has the discretion to refer it to the Industrial Court for adjudication.192 
 
Finally, the Industrial Court deals with matters which are related to trade disputes. 
This is where the employer, employee and the trade union are unable to settle matters 
under the collective agreement. The matter will then be referred to by the DGIR to 
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the minister, which matter may then be referred to the Industrial Court for 
adjudication.193 
 
From the above it can be garnered that the decision of the arbitration by the 
Industrial Court is basically final. However, this issue is not as straightforward as it 
seems. The decision of the Minister on any issue is open to the process of judicial 
review. This is where judicial activism could be said to be most visible. The 
Malaysian judiciary has adopted a pro-active and interventionist approach in judicial 
review. In the case of R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court [1977] 1 MLJ 145, 
the Federal Court stated that the extent of the power of review is applicable both to 
the substance and process of the Industrial Court, and that the civil courts themselves 
has the right to replace the decision of the Industrial Court, instead of remitting the 
matter back for a rehearing.194 
 
5.3.4 Civil Courts 
Labour and industrial disputes, as seen above are appealable to the High Court and 
the apex courts. For labour matters decided in the Labour Court, a question of law 
where it arises, can be referred by the DGIR to the High Court for a decision.  An 
order which is given by the DGIR in the labour court is also appealable to the high 
court. For industrial court matters, a decision of the court has a limited right of 
appeal to the High Court, and this relates to matters which arise on a question of law. 
This right is provided for under section 33A of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. 
The appeal must be made within thirty days of the decision/award of the Industrial 
                                                     
193  Sharifah Suhana Syed Ahmad and Mary George, 40. 




Court being handed down. The High Court may confirm, vary, substitute or quash 
the award as deemed necessary. 
 
Apart from the limited right to appeal the decision/award of the Industrial Court, 
there is also a right to an action in judicial review to quash the decision of the 
Industrial Court. This is not, strictly speaking, a right to appeal, but the right of the 
high court in its supervisory jurisdiction to question the way in which a 
decision/award was reached by the industrial court being is a statutory body. An 
application for judicial review is initiated under Order 53 of the Rules of Court 2012. 
Under Order 53 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012, an application for judicial review 
must be made within 40 days of the decision being handed down by the Industrial 
Court. In the case of Harpeus Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v. National Union of 
Commercial Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 419, it was stated by the then Supreme Court 
that judicial review is not an appeal but a review of how the decision was made, and 
the court would not inquire into the fact whether the decision on its merits was fair 
and reasonable. However, this decision has been to a large extent modified by the 
judicially active decision in the case of R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court 
[1977] 1 MLJ 145. In this case it was clarified that not only has the high court the 
jurisdiction to rectify procedural errors of the Industrial Court; it also has the right to 
remedy the substance and merit of the decision/award of the Industrial Court. Table 2 
below shows the comparative analysis. 
 
Table 5.2 
Comparative Analysis of the Procedures in the Labour, Industrial and Civil Courts 
 
Procedure Rigid (Conservatism) Flexible (Activism) 
Labour Court  The nature of the Labour Court 




activism as it is considered as a 
quasi-judicial process. 
Industrial Court The nature of the Industrial 
Court procedure is quite rigid as 
its decisions are deemed to be 
final and cannot be appealed to 
the High Court. 
 
Civil Courts The nature of the procedure of 
the High Court on right to 
appeal from the Industrial Court 
is limited to the issue of 
reference and not decisions by 
the Industrial Court on merits. 
 
Table 5.2 shows a brief analysis of the jurisdiction of the labour, industrial and civil 
courts on labour and industrial matters. It can be stated that whereas there is a great 
amount of flexibility in labour courts, the procedures and right to appeal in the 
industrial courts and civil courts is quite rigid. Thus, it can be considered that the the 
procedures under the industrial courts and civil courts can be deemed to be 
conservative. The basic contention by the researcher is that there is no right to appeal 
from the Industrial Court to the High Court on a question of fact (merits) except a 
question of law which usually is related to the refusal of reference to the Industrial 
Court by the Minister of Human Resource. 
 
5.4 Adjudicative Principles in Industrial Disputes 
The discussion below is aimed at understanding how the adjudicative principles in 
the Malaysian industrial and labour courts and laws have developed in relation to 
both case laws and statutes. This part specifically shows the existence of the second 
Problem Statement, to answer the second Research Question as well to achieve the 
second Research Objective. In brief, it is to show how the Malaysian judiciary is 





A detailed analysis of case laws is presented on Malaysian labour and industrial law 
in the industrial courts, high courts, the court of appeal and the federal court. This 
was to observe factually, based on court decisions, that the Malaysian courts are 
inclined towards judicial conservatism rather than activism. The researcher believes 
that at this juncture the reader is familiar with the concepts of judicial activism, 
conservatism, their application in various countries, court jurisdictions, procedures 
and the jurisprudence of social justice in this area of law.  
The basic idea that judicial activism is a cardinal principle in Malaysia is based on 
our adoption of a written constitution in 1957. Any laws that are legislated by the 
Malaysian Parliament are subject to the articles of the Malaysian Federal 
Constitution.195 The Federal Court in Malaysia acts as a constitutional court in having 
the right to strike down any legislation which offends the articles of the Malaysia 
Federal Constitution.196  This becomes more incumbent under labour and industrial 
laws which deal with socio-economic proclivities and social justice. Evidently, 
judicial activism is related to judicial independence. However, judicial independence 
does not mean a free will to make any laws which the judges and judiciary deem fit, 
but only those which call for greater attention to the attainment of justice. As Karpal 
Singh stated: 
Judges should exercise judicial activism. Public expectation demands it. The primary function 
of the Judiciary is not only to punish wrongdoers and to decide disputes between private 
individuals and the individual against the State but also to interpret the law abreast of the 
times for social and common good. Judges must have moral fibre to be effectively the 
guardians of our liberty and fundamental rights.197  
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From the above, it can be inferred that laws are not a stagnant phenomenon, and that 
there is a need to develop them in line with the growth of social justice elements. 
This can be done best through judicial pronouncements, where laws are actually 
applied through the process of judicial interpretation. Not all areas of labour and 
industrial laws in Malaysia are mired in the controversy of conservatism and 
activism, only the lacuna areas were discussed on how matters have developed in 
judicial  decisions  in labour and industrial disputes. The most prominent and issue is  
of dismissal of a worker, whether the dismissal was done fairly and in good faith. 
Below are awards of non-dismissal cases (2005-2012), awards of dismissal cases and 
(2005-2012) and of cases referred to the Industrial Court (2005-2012).198 
 
Table 5.3 
An Overall Basis That There Is an Inconsistent Trend With Up and Down Movements 




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Non-Compliance of Award 60 136 109 124 113 131 107 84 
Non-Compliance of Collective 
Agreement 
60 66 30 40 34 27 27 21 
Interpretation of Award / Collective 
Agreement 
16 10 6 4 5 8 4 8 
Variation of Award / Collective 
Agreement 
7 1 7 2 3 3 5 3 
Amendment to Collective Agreement 
(By Court Order) 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Collective Agreement (Terms and 
Conditions) 
46 37 61 39 37 47 36 34 
                                                     






Victimization 0 0 1 0 0 20 4 5 
Trade Disputes 0 0 38 15 13 21 27 27 
Total 202 259 228 232 195 239 210 182 
 
Types Of Dismissal 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Constructive 22 42 97 126 140 135 91 96 
Misconduct 2144 2051 1200 878 613 608 639 540 
Retrenchment 16 32 422 155 114 67 90 62 
Others 0 0 402 573 328 479 640 735 





2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total number of cases carried 
forward 
4143 3723 4566 4612 3342 2627 2552 2251 
Total number of cases referred 1859 2990 2346 665 647 1437 1346 1918 
Total number of awards handed 
down 
2403 2332 2599 2170 1485 1640 1838 1764 
Total number of cases pending 3723 4566 4612 3342 2627 2552 2251 2559 
Total number of cases disposed 2209 2233 2367 1980 1390 1528 1670 1615 
 
The above table shows on an overall basis that there is an inconsistent trend with up 
and down movements from 2005 to 2012 in relations to dismissals and their types. 
The table is produced to give an indication of matters which are disputed upon non-
dismissals, dismissals and cases referred to the Industrial Court. It does not however 
show the causes for the above. The statistics is produced to indicate the trend of 




they are brought and dismissals take place. The statistics however is not a reflection 
of the outcome of the decisions in industrial courts based on judicial activism or 
conservatism.  
 
The adjudicative process in an industrial dispute starts with an employee who has 
been dismissed, making a representation under section 20 of the Industrial Relations 
Act 1967 to the locality at which the dispute arose or where he resides. There are a 
few stages through which the adjudicative process needs to pass through. At the 
initial stage, the DGIR and the parties would resort to the conciliatory process. 
Where the dispute is irreconcilable, the DGIR would make a report to the Minister of 
Human Resource. The Minister would then decide whether the matter should be 
referred to the Industrial Court. Once reference is made, the adjudication of the 
dispute begins in the Industrial Court. His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA in the case 
of Kathiravelu Ganesan & Anor v Kojasa Holdings Bhd [1997] 3 CLJ 777, briefly 
outlined the intended adjudicative processes. It can be briefly summarised as follows: 
First, the DGIR is only concerned with the amicable settlement of the dispute at the 
conciliatory level and this can be initiated upon a complaint being made by the 
employee. Then the DGIR is to merely make a report to the Minister, where there 
can be two outcomes, one the dismissal is referred to the industrial court or where the 
DGIR exceeded his power, then his action is liable to be quashed by a certiorari 
application. If the choice of the Minister is to refer the matter to the Industrial Court, 
then the Minister before embarking on the positive allowance to make a reference 
must consider whether the representations made by the employee is not something 
which is frivolous or vexatious. The decision of the minister whether to refer the 




the process of judicial review by the High Court. Finally, observing the above 
processes, it can be observed that the employee in an industrial dispute does not have 
direct access to the Industrial Court which is available to him in the civil courts. Thus 
the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court starts with a reference made by the minister 
with regard the dispute, and not upon the representation being initially made by the 
employee. 
The main area of focus would be on cases where the dismissal was based on 
constructive, misconduct or retrenchment under industrial disputes. Therefore, the 
discussion henceforth will be based on these three important areas where an analysis 
of case patterns will be done to observe whether the judiciary in these cases have 
been inclined towards judicial activism or conservatism. This is something which has 
been rarely undertaken by Malaysian authors on labour and industrial laws. Even if 
there are or were any discussion of write ups on judicial activism, it has always been 
on a general basis and related more to criminal matters rather than labour and 
industrial matters. Section 13(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 among other 
things states under subsection (e), that under a collective agreement, a trade union of 
workmen 199  may not include any matters which relates to the dismissal or 
reinstatement of the workmen in the agreement. This, on an initial analysis itself 
gives an indication that under the collective agreement, the employer determines 
most of the core terms of the employment, which creates an imbalance in the 
contractual bargaining power. This makes it more incumbent that protection is 
afforded to the workmen by the industrial and civil courts, as that would be their only 
recourse on a contract of service which is deemed to be biased in support of the 
capitalist employers. The adjudicative principle for industrial disputes was laid down 
                                                     




in the case of Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. Bhd. v Liew Fook Chuan & Other 
Appeals [I997] 1 CLJ 665, by Gopal Sri Ram JCA, that the workmen is to be 
elevated under the Industrial Relations Act 1967 from a weak and subordinate 
position to that of a stronger position under common law. Further, that it is the will 
of the legislature that the relationship between the employer and employee be not 
merely consensual, where dismissal may be ordered ordinarily, but be altered to 
favour the workman. With this in mind, the Act therefore only allows dismissals 
where it is with ‘just cause and excuse’.  
 
With the advent of section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, the workmen not 
only may resort to common law protection, but also to statutory protections which 
not only allow claim for damages for dismissal, but also reinstatement. On the 
adjudication of what amounts to just cause and excuse, it should be seen from the 
workman's perspective and not the employer, wherein the burden of proof lies on the 
employer to justify dismissals. This principle was aptly stated by Raja Azlan Shah CJ 
in the case of  Gooh Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd [1981] 2 MLJ 129. It is the 
court’s duty to determine whether the dismissal was with or without just cause and 
excuse. The burden is on the employer to prove that it was with just cause and 
excuse and not the employee to show that it was without just cause and excuse. If in 
any case the employer fails to prove this important statutory element, by 
interpretation and necessary implication, the dismissal would be without just cause 
and excuse. However, this right of the employee also comes with a proviso, where 
under the same section, the employee must also pray in his reference that he wishes 
to be reinstated to his former employment. This may at time cause problems, for 




to be offered compensation. This is where the courts have diverse views and take on 
the issue. This contention arose in the case of Holiday Inn, Kuching v Lee Chai Siok 
Elizabeth [1983] 2 MLJ 49. The claimant in this case who earlier made a prayer for 
reinstatement, decided to change the nature of her prayer and claimed compensation 
in lieu of reinstatement, as she was by then gainfully employed elsewhere. It would 
be quite illogical for reinstatement to be prayed for, as, if it was successful, she 
would be put in a position of dilemma. The High Court stated that the primary 
remedy in a section 20 representation is reinstatement, and where that ceases to be 
prayed for, it would automatically leave the court without jurisdiction in the said 
dispute, and can no longer adjudicate the matter. This in itself shows a very 
conservative interpretation of section 20, where a more judicially active approach 
would have safeguarded the rights of the employee better. 
 
The above case however needs to be contrasted with the case of The Borneo Post 
Sdn. Bhd. v. Margaret Wong Kee Sieng [2001] 8 CLJ 758. The court took the view 
that despite the fact that reinstatement was not prayed for by the claimant, the court 
did not cease to have the jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The judge here 
distinguished between matters of procedure and matters of merits. The spill over 
effects of this divisive view can also be observed in cases under the industrial courts. 
For example, in the case of Mara Shipyard and Engineering (Terengganu) Sdn. Bhd. 
v Hussain Ab Rahman [2003] 3 ILR 177, the Industrial Court took the view that 
reinstatement is a necessary prayer in the claimant’s representation, without which 
the court ceases to have jurisdiction in hearing the matter. On the other hand, in the 
case of Academia Sdn. Bhd. v Devarajan VSD Panicker [2003] 3 ILR 279, the 




case of Malayan Banking Bhd. v Mohd Bahari bin Mohd Jamli @ Mohd Jamal 
[2003] 4 MLJ 432. In this case the claimant’s prayer for reinstatement became 
redundant as he cannot be reinstated based on the provisions of section 56 of the 
Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989, which prohibited the employment of a 
bankrupt, which resulted in the position where the court could only grant 
compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The Court of Appeal distinguished this case 
from the case of Holiday Inn where in the latter the prayer for reinstatement was 
abandoned, whereas in the former the prayer for reinstatement subsisted, albeit 
redundant. The decision is strange to say the least. It is humbly submitted that in the 
case of Holiday Inn, the prayer was not abandoned but had to be abandoned as the 
claimant can’t be expected to choose one of two employment choices in the case that 
her claim for reinstatement was successful. The fact that she was employed 
elsewhere automatically made her claim for reinstatement redundant, as much as it 
was made redundant in the Malayan Banking case. This, the researcher feels is the 
Court of Appeal being conservative, though it could have taken a judicially active 
position in safeguarding the interest of the employee. The Court of Appeal’s decision 
would have meant that once dismissed, an employee may not take up a position of 
employment elsewhere until the outcome of the court decision, which may leave the 
employee without a means of subsistence, an affront to social justice. This cannot 
possibly be the intention of the legislature when couching the Industrial Relations 
Act 1967. Thus, a judicially active interpretation would have given a different 






It is also an important adjudicative process that the employee acts promptly in taking 
an action for his dismissal. In such cases, it is prudent that the reference is made by 
the employee within 60 days of his dismissal. The provision for the time frame has a 
sound basis, so as not to allow actions to be taken years after they have occurred. In 
this sense the requirement has been made mandatory under section 20(1A) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. The DGIR will not entertain any representations made 
after this time frame. The provision is deemed to be so strict that even a day’s delay 
will cause the DGIR to cease from having jurisdiction to hear the matter. However, 
this may be debated to be something which goes against equity and good conscience 
as embodied under section 30(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, which 
concerns itself more to matters relating to merits rather than procedural 
technicalities.200 Such a stringent rule may require some form of flexibility to allow 
matters being referred outside the given time frame, provided that the employee has 
reasonable grounds which would satisfy the court in making a departure from the 
stated rule. This would be in line with the provisions of other jurisdictions - for 
example, the United Kingdom. Under section 112 of the English Employment Rights 
Act 1996, reference may still be made to the industrial tribunal after the expiry of 
three months, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that it was not 
reasonably practicable for the employee to have made the representations within the 
given time frame.201 
 
Finally, a brief note on the minister's discretion under section 20(3) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967 in referring an industrial dispute to the industrial court. The 
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discretion which the minister exercises is subjective to him or more so his office, and 
this may only be disputed by questioning the administrative process through judicial 
review on how a decision to refer or not was reached. Although there is no statutory 
duty for the minister to give reasons for his decision, under common law principles, 
reasons must be given as this involves the livelihood of the employee. This was held 
to be so in the case of Hong Leong Equipment Sdn. Bhd. v Liew Fook Chuan & 
Other Appeals [I997] 1 CLJ 665. 
The researcher has gleaned and given information on the formative idea of judicial 
activism and its contradistinction with judicial conservatism in earlier parts of this 
thesis and some case laws and statutory examples, of how the judgements in the 
industrial and civil courts may go either the way of activism or conservatism. 
However, it is the humble view and opinion of the researcher that the judgements 
show an inclination toward judicial conservatism rather than activism. The researcher 
finds it strange that although labour and industrial matters relate largely to concepts 
of social justice, welfare and fairness, it has not been vehemently debated on whether 
the protection of the labour force in Malaysia requires a judiciary which prescribes to 
activism rather than conservatism.  
 
Given that it is difficult at times for judges to depart from stare decisis; judicial 
activism may at times become a thorny issue. Thus it is a trite principle that lower 
courts follow the decisions of higher courts. In Malaysia, the highest court is today 
known as the Federal Court, which, in limited circumstances is allowed to depart 
from its own stare decisis. Rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995 states in 
clear terms that “nothing in the rules limit or affects the inherent powers of the court 




labour and industrial causes are infused with human rights and social justice 
elements, the departure from stare decisis would become more justified compared to 
other areas of law.  
 
The researcher refer to one of the most significant case which changed the view of 
the applicability of judicial activism in Malaysian industrial law, which relates to the 
principles of judicial review. The case is R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of 
Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145. In this case the appellant's employment with 
the Malaysian Co-operative Consumer Society Ltd was terminated on 20 April 1988. 
This termination of the appellant was based on the then economic situation which 
called for retrenchment of certain employees. However it was the claim of the 
appellant that the economic reason for retrenchment was a mala fide exercise of the 
employer’s powers to hide the fact of the victimisation of the appellant. The 
Industrial Court refused to take issues of mala fide and misconduct into account as 
the termination was based on retrenchment, and found that the appellant's dismissal 
was with just cause and excuse. Being dissatisfied, the appellant applied to the High 
Court for an order of certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court, which 
application was rejected by the High Court.  Against this, the matter was 
subsequently appealed by the appellant, which reached the Federal court. The 
Federal court by a majority decision allowed the appellant's appeal by setting aside 
the judgement of the High Court and quashing the decision of the Industrial court. 
Instead of the matter being remitted to the Industrial Court for a re-hearing, counsel 
for the appellant submitted to the Federal Court for a determination of consequential 





However, it is to be noted that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court has always been 
one of supervisory, meaning, in matters in relation to judicial review it may only 
review the decision making process by the High Court and not the power by which 
the decision was made. In other words, the Federal Court would not go into the 
merits of the case by retrying the matter and giving their own decision, which is not 
the jurisdiction of an appellate court but the lower courts. In this instance, it would be 
the remission of the matter to be re-heard by the Industrial Court whose decision was 
quashed by the Federal court. The Federal Court made a bold move when by a 
majority decision it stated in unequivocal terms that it had the power to make 
consequential orders, which means to decide the case at hand on its merit rather than 
remitting it back for a re-hearing in the Industrial court. The stance taken by the 
Federal Court here is a departure on its jurisdictional powers, and can be considered 
as coming within judicial activism.  
 
The justification provided by the Federal Court to decide the case on its substance 
and merits and offer consequential reliefs202 is one which is rooted in the original 
precedent on grounds for judicial review, set out by Lord Diplock in the case of 
Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 
374. His Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ (as he then was) stated in clear terms that 
though the ground of procedural impropriety calls for a review of a process by which 
a decision is reached, the other two grounds of illegality and irrationality allows the 
Federal Court to make a decision based on substance and merits. This is deemed to 
be an infusion of a new way of applying statutory interpretation. His Lordship stated 
that: 
                                                     




It is often said that Judicial Review is concerned not with the decision but the decision-making 
process. (See, eg. Chief Constable of North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155) This 
proposition at full face value may convey the impression that the jurisdiction of the courts in 
judicial review proceedings is confined to cases where the aggrieved party has not received 
fair treatment by the authority to which he has been subjected. Put differently, in the words of 
Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions & Ors v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 
AC 374 where the impugned decision is flawed on the ground of procedural impropriety. 
 
But, Lord Diplock’s other grounds for impugning a decision susceptible to judicial review 
make it abundantly clear that such a decision is also open to challenge on grounds of 
‘illegality’ and ‘irrationality’ and, in practice, this permits the courts to scrutinize such 
decision not only for process, but also for substance.  
 
The above seems to harp at the fact that, instead of making a decision based on 
process only, a court may in judicial review proceedings consider the substance and 
decide the case on its merits. In this case, a justification was given by his Lordship, 
that since the court had decided the case not based on process but also substance, it 
then had the right to substitute the decision of the Industrial Court and give a finding 
that there was a dismissal of the worker without just cause and excuse. Such a 
decision would bode well for those who contend that judicial activism should be a 
principle applied by the courts when the necessity arises for them to determined 
matters to ensure that justice is served in a social justice environment. The decision 
of R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 is 
considered to be a land mark decision on judicial creativity and activism which has 
conferred powers on the courts to not only look at precedents, but an active 
interpretation of such precedents, and enhance the perimeters of industrial and 
administrative laws. 
 
This interpretation however was not favoured by the dissenting judge, Wan Yahya 
FCJ.203 It was in the opinion of his Lordship that the quashing of the Industrial Court 
decision on the issue of there being just cause and excuse does not on the face of it 
                                                     




turn the decision now to one where there was no just cause and excuse, and that the 
Federal Court is not entitled to substitute the latter in favour of the appellant. This, 
according to his Lordship, is apparent from the jurisdiction provided to the Industrial 
Court under the Industrial Relations Act 1967. From this it was surmised that, the 
right action would have been to remit the matter back to the Industrial Court for a re-
hearing.  
However, the majority decision also relied on para 1 of section 25 of the Courts of 
Judicature Act 1964 which was referred to by his Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ204 
The section states that powers of the High Court include “Power to issue to any 
person or authority directions, orders or writs, including writs of the nature of habeas 
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any others, for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by Part II of the Constitution, or any of them or 
for any purpose”. The main phrase was “the rights conferred by Part II of the 
Constitution”. His Lordship contended that when the Federal Court concluded that 
the dismissal of the appellant was without just cause and excuse, it was in effect 
applying the social justice concept of the protection of the appellant’s fundamental 
rights to livelihood as guaranteed under the Federal Constitution. 
 
This meant that the judiciary not only deals with judicial development in a robotic 
fashion, but also with judicial intervention when the necessity arises, or where there 
is a lacuna in the law. Reliance was held on section 25 of the Courts of Judicature 
Act 1964 above, which is in pari materia with article 226 of the Indian Constitution. 
Based on the application of article 226 by the Indian Supreme Court, his Lordship 
Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ stated that public law remedies under the article is not limited, 
                                                     




as in United Kingdom, and has a wider application where in certain circumstances, 
the authority's actions may be reviewed not only based on process, but also merits, 
and formulate a relief which would be proper in the circumstances of the case. This 
is simple common sense, as the Malaysian Federal court is considered as a 
constitutional court with powers to invalidate statutes or reinterpret them in line with 
the Federal Constitution. 
This case would be the high light of the practice of judicial activism in industrial 
causes in Malaysia. However it cannot be concluded that this is indeed a sure 
position taken by the Malaysian courts. Even the decision in this case came with a 
proviso when his Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ stated that: 
Needless to say, if, as appears to be case, this wider power is enjoyed by our courts, the 
decision whether to exercise it, and if so, in what manner, are matters which call for the utmost 
care and circumspection, strict regard being had to the subject matter, the nature of the 
impugned decision and other relevant discretionary factors. A flexible test whose content will 
be governed by all the circumstances of the particular case will have to be applied ... having 
regard to the rapidly developing law in the applications for judicial review, whenever legally 
permissible, we must demonstrate a willingness to mould the remedies available to suit the 
justice of the case.  
 
 
To this end, though it may be stated that the decision fares well with judges who are 
bent on judicial activism, it also must be threaded cautiously. The decision is one 
where judicial intervention was deemed to be necessary, where the cause of justice 
was to be established. However, judicial activism deals exactly with matters related 
to social justice, and most incidents of judicial intervention have always been based 
on this criterion, and not on some judicial flight of sudden urge at interpreting 
legislations.  The decision has been touted as a leap in determining administrative 





Evidently, even before the case of R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of 
Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 there were glimpses of a pattern evolving in 
relation to the allowance of judicial activism in certain areas. This was to be the 
doctrine of ‘substantive fairness’ as a new head of judicial review under industrial 
matters. In the case of Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & 
Anor [1996] 2 AMR 1617, this  doctrine  was  fully elaborated. This is a case where a  
headmaster of a national school was dismissed and sought a declaration that the 
decision taken by the Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan205 to dismiss him was 
unlawful. The Court of Appeal held that the action taken by the SPP was 
disproportionate to what was done by the headmaster. The court interpreted articles 
8(1) and 5(1) of the Federal Constitution from two angles.  The first approach is that 
of ‘procedural fairness’, and the second approach is that of ‘substantive fairness’. 
The former may be determined easily based on whether certain standard procedures 
for dismissal were followed. However, the latter is flexible and may only be decided 
on a case to case basis, and therefore, must satisfy the issue of whether there was 
substantive fairness in the cause to dismiss a workman. Here, what the Court of 
Appeal essentially did was not only to question the decision making process, but the 
decision itself. This is apparent when the court not only focused on the procedural 
merits of the decision, but went further to replace the decision of the SPP to dismiss 
the headmaster to one where he should have been reduce in his rank as a teacher. The 
decision though showing a glimpse of judicial activism did not last long, as it was 
overruled in the case of  Ng Hock Cheng v Pengarah Am Penjara  [1998] 1 MLJ 
153.  
 
                                                     




However, such unstable decisions are as a result of the influence of the decisions of 
the English courts which have been conservative in the scope of the applicability of 
judicial review. The often relied on English case to limit the courts’ jurisdiction 
under judicial review is the case of Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans [1982] 1 
WLR 1155. In this case the late Lord Brightman in the House of Lords stated that 
judicial review is concerned with the decision making process and not the decision 
itself, therefore distinguishing matters which are strictly procedural, which may be 
reviewed, and matters which are substantive, which may not be reviewed. In 
Malaysia, this trend continued in the pronouncement of such cases as Tanjung Jaga 
Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour and Manpower [1987] 1 MLJ 125 and Hotel 
Equatorial (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Hotel, Bar and Restaurant Workers 
[1984] 1 MLJ 363. In the latter case, George Seah FJ made it clear that decisions 
from inferior tribunals to the High Court in its review jurisdiction must not act as an 
appellate court, as it has no jurisdiction to hear the matter on merits but only on 
whether a proper procedure under law had been followed by the lower courts. Also, 
in the case of Harpers Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v National Union of Commercial 
Workers [1991] 1 MLJ 417, it was stated by his Lordship Jemuri Serjan SCJ206 that 
the duty of the high court is not to decide review matters on its merits, but on the 
procedure by which the decision was reached. 
 
However the turning point for this group of cases was the case of R Ramachandran v 
The Industrial Court [1997] 1 MLJ 145.  As stated above, the decision not only 
allowed review based on issues of procedure, but also the merits of the case, and it 
went as far as giving jurisdiction to the higher courts in substituting the decisions 
                                                     




made by a tribunal. It is with this view that the social justice aspect of industrial 
relations was established. In R Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & 
Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145, the court made it a point that a strict adherence to the 
entrenched principles of judicial review may cause a stumbling block to the 
Industrial Court which needs to observe the principles of equity and social justice. 
This social justice theme has been a thread which runs through most decisions which 
relates to judicial activism in other jurisdictions such as the United States of America 
and India, as well as the European Union. 
 
This view was further echoed in the case of  Harris Solid State (M) Sdn Bhd v Bruno 
Gentil s/o Periera [1996] 3 MLJ 489. His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated that: 
S 30(5) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 imposes a duty upon the Industrial Court to 
have regard to the substantial merits of a case rather than to technicalities. It also requires 
the Industrial Court to decide a case in accordance with equity and good conscience. 
Parliament has imposed these solemn duties upon the Industrial Court in order to give 
effect to the policy of a democratically elected government to dispense social justice to the 
nation’s work-force. It is therefore our bounden duty to ensure that the industrial court 
applies the Act in a manner that best suits the declared policy of the elected government. 
Where, as in the present case, there has been an obvious failure to do so, it is for us, the 
judicial arbiters, to set matters right. 
When the proved or admitted facts of a case are such that, when objectively viewed, they 
would lead a reasonable tribunal to conclude that the exercise of managerial powers — 
such as the closure of a business — was for a collateral purpose, aimed at depriving a 
workman of his fundamental right to earn a livelihood, then, any termination of 
employment in consequence of such exercise may be struck down as constituting unfair 
labour practice. 
 
The contention here was basically that the function of the Industrial court is one that 
demands the determining of social justice issues, and a decision which calls for such 
an interpretation if not done, would not serve the very purpose which was instituted 
in the Industrial Relations Act 1967. However, as with all allowance, there may be 
instances where such powers of judicial activism may be open to abuse. The court 




powers when it is unnecessary. This worry was echoed in the English case of Chief 
Constable of North Wales v Evans [1982] IWLR 1155. However, on the other hand, 
this had stifled the ability of the higher courts to ensure that the decision is reached 
with fair reference to principles of equity and social justice. Therefore, there is a 
requirement of a delicate balancing exercise between the rigid adherence to 
procedures and issues of merit when the courts are adjudicating. This however has 
never been an issue, for example, for the Indian Supreme Court, as it derives its 
ability to decide matters on merits based on article 226 of the Indian Constitution. 
The English courts on the other hand does not have any such parallel provisions, as 
there is no such thing as a codified constitution in the United Kingdom at the 
backdrop of Parliamentary Supremacy. In Malaysia however, there is a codified 
constitution. 
 
Therefore, even if there is a tendency to abuse, this does not merit the court not to 
approach subject matters related to employee employer relations from a flexible 
perspective of judicial activism. The balance however was achieved in the case of R 
Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145  when 
the Federal Court, though allowing the expansion of powers to review to the courts, 
cautioned that such powers should be used sparingly and only when there is an 
absolute necessity, in line with the provisions under part II of the Federal 
Constitution of Malaysia.  It is to be noted that labour and industrial laws are 
considered as specialised subjects, its jurisprudence calls for a requirement that a 




peace and harmony. 207   Thus some form of judicial activism is quite welcome, 
especially in the area of judicial review of decisions of the Industrial Court. 
 
Not only in this area (judicial review of industrial matters) can it be found that there 
is a growing consensus on the judge’s inclination to be more judicially active, there 
are many other areas of labour and industrial matters which have made inroads on 
the adoption of judicial activism by the judiciary. The pattern of development in 
judicial review and activism has been made clear by the case of R Ramachandran v 
The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145 . However such a 
pattern of judgement in a single area may not justify the assertion that judges in 
labour and industrial matters have become more judicially active. 
 
The researcher focused on a few well known areas apart from judicial review in 
labour and industrial matters to observe whether such a phenomena is also present in 
these other areas. The first area of focus is domestic inquiry, as this would be the 
initial stage or pre-dismissal of an employee. A domestic inquiry can be defined as 
an internal hearing by the employer to determine whether there has been any 
misconduct or guilt on the part of the employee which would warrant a dismissal. 
This definition is in line with section 14(1) of the Employment Act 1955. The Act 
states that an employer may dismiss, downgrade or give lesser punishment to an 
employee if it can be proven that an employee has committed a misconduct which is 
inconsistent with the express or implied conditions of his employment. However, this 
definition is too broad and an employer may read into the contract of employment 
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additional or modified terms and conditions based on the employment environment. 
The section only provides for a ‘due inquiry’ before dismissal, which does not seem 
to connote a mandatory requirement. The section does not however lay down a 
procedure as to how such an inquiry is to be conducted. Nevertheless, one principle 
which comes through as a thread in industrial court and appellate court decisions is 
that, there must be a proper observance of the rules of natural justice in the conduct 
of a domestic inquiry, which if not followed, may vitiate the dismissal. 
 
The term ‘after due inquiry’ in section 14(1) was considered in the Federal Court in 
the case of Said Dharmalingam v Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 
CLJ 646. The court stated that the ‘due inquiry’ provision is a statutory requirement, 
and that a dismissal in breach of such an inquiry would be prima facie void. The 
court went further and stated that when the Industrial court or the High Court 
considers the question whether the employee has been dismissed without just cause 
and excuse, the need to examine the decision not only for substance but process as 
well, becomes pertinent. The court echoed the idea of procedural fairness and made a 
domestic inquiry a mandatory requirement. The decision may be stated as being 
judicially active, as it impresses the notion of natural justice into domestic inquiry 
procedures. 
 
However, the decision above must be contrasted with the decision of the Federal 
court in the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen [1996] 1 AMR 49. In this 
earlier case, the court reached a different decision, in that domestic inquiries were not 
considered mandatory, and that any procedural defects in such an inquiry was 




distinguishing and reconciling factor between the two cases perhaps can be explained 
in that, in the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen [1996] 1 AMR 49, the 
Industrial Court wrongly struck down the dismissal of the employee without having 
considered the merit of the matter as was required under section 20 of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967.  
 
It must be noted that the above case laws are limited to those employers who come 
within the governance of the Employment Act 1955. Where the employer does not 
come within the governance of the Employment Act 1955, the situation is quite 
flexible and quite in favour of the employer. In the Federal Court case of Ong Yuen 
Hock v Syarikat Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ, it was held that even 
where a domestic inquiry was defective, it is open to the employer to prove to the 
Industrial court that the dismissal was with just cause and excuse, based on merits. 
Thus it could be stated that, judicial activism in this area is a matter goes on a case to 
case basis and cannot be verified, as the courts have at times been judicially active by 
applying the principles of natural justice, and at times applied conservative 
pronouncements favouring the employer. 
 
The indication given by the case laws brings forth the idea that improvement in this 
area of law can be further enhanced if a balanced form of judicial activism is applied. 
His Lordship Md Azmi FCJ,208 made it clear in the case of Ong Yuen Hock v Syarikat 
Hong Leong Assurance Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 MLJ that, the non-holding of a domestic 
inquiry is not a fatal flaw in the requirement set under section 14 (2) (c) and (d) of 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967, as the employee has with him the opportunity of 
                                                     




being heard by another forum - the Industrial court. As a matter of fact, the Industrial 
court was considered to be a much more impartial and better forum for the employee 
to take advantage of where he considers himself to have been unfairly dismissed. 
Since the industrial court is considered more a tribunal body rather than a court of 
justice, it has more flexibility compared to civil courts, which require strict 
adherence in courts of procedures which may stifle judicial activism. 
 
The next area that the researcher will look at is the issue of unfairness and 
constructive dismissals. The researcher will look at unfair dismissals first. It is not an 
easy task for the industrial court to determine when a worker has been unfairly 
dismissed, and what would the proper amount of compensation be to rectify the 
situation. Professor Anantaraman states that under common law, a worker has a right 
to claim compensation and the employer on the other hand would have the right to 
the mitigation of such compensation.209 The idea is that unfair dismissals must not 
only be judged based on the employee’s right but also that of the employer. The 
demands of justice require that the principle of audi alteram partem be applied in 
any case which is to be decided by the courts. This would be more so with the nature 
of the Industrial Court as it serves the demands of social justice. However, since the 
Industrial court is an administrative court, its decision is reviewable within the 
parametres of judicial review, and appealable based on law and facts to the higher 
courts of justice.  
 
The idea which has been embedded in court decisions is that the employee has the 
right to be informed of the reasons for his dismissal. This was affirmed in the case of 
                                                     




Goon Kwee Phoy v J & P Coats (M) Bhd [1998] 2 MLJ 129. The court was clear 
that, where there was a ‘termination simpliciter’ or termination based on the 
employment contract, where not grounded on reasons which are just, would entitle 
the employee to a reinstatement or compensation in lieu of reinstatement.  
 
The matter of contention is whether courts lower in the hierarchy may depart from 
the stare decisis of the higher courts when the occasion requires that to be done. 
Departing from stare decisis is what judicially active judges do, when there is a need 
for them to uphold the moral fabric of justice. However, for the Federal court, it may 
always depart from its own decisions. This power of the Federal court is pronounced 
under rule 137 of the Rules of the Federal Court 1995, which states that the provision 
does not limit the inherent powers of the court to hear any application or give any 
order to ensure that no injustice is caused. The rules themselves than make it clear 
that the process of judicial activism itself is allowable when there are requirements to 
uphold justice. 
 
The crux of the matter has always been the interpretation of section 20(1) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. The interpretation of section 20(1) is quite enigmatic 
according to Professor V Anantaraman. 210  He makes a comparison between the 
Malaysian provision under section 20(1) and the provision under section 54(1) 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 in the United Kingdom. The 
peculiarity of the Malaysian provision is that it does not in reality create a cause of 
action but only provides a remedy for an already existing cause of action, which is 
                                                     





the employee’s right not to be unfairly dismissed. This means there is no cause of 
action for the employee to take when there is an unfair dismissal; only a remedy is 
available, where the court deems that there has been an unfair dismissal without just 
cause and excuse. The United Kingdom’s provision on the other hand specifically 
provides for a cause of action right for the employee by the use of the phrase “… 
every employee shall have the right not to be unfairly dismissed by the employer”. It 
must be further noted that the right of cause of action is not stated specifically under 
section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967; it is nevertheless entrenched under 
Article 5(1) of the Malaysian Federal Constitution.  
 
The phrase ‘unfair dismissal’ and ‘without just cause and excuse’ has been a cause 
for interpretation by the courts. The idea is to locate whether the pattern of the 
interpretations have any embedded judicial activism in them. The interpretation 
basically can be summarised into two categories, one which is literal and the other 
which is purposive.211 The literal approach is one where there is a presumption that 
the state of the law is already known to the court - as per the late Lord Blackburn in 
the case of H Young & Co v Mayor and Corp of Royal Leamington SPA [1882–83] 8 
APP Cas 517. The purposive approach on the other hand employs the idea that where 
the interpretation of a statutory provision gives an absurd meaning and causes 
injustice, then it is the duty of the judges to ensure that they read the provision and 
do what Parliament would have done in their stead - as per the late Lord Denning in 
Northern v Barnet Council 1 WLR 220.  
 
                                                     




The issue that has always been a contention on this premise of judicial interpretation 
in Malaysia on industrial matters is the idea of compensation in lieu of reinstatement 
of the employee, a remedy not pronounced anywhere under section 20(1) of the 
Industrial Relations Act 1967. In the case of Lim Phin Khiang v Kho Su Ming [1996] 
1 MLJ 1, the Federal Court made it amply clear that where the court employs the 
literal interpretation to section 20(1) and it results in injustice, then the approach 
taken should be abandoned  and a purposive approach should be adopted. This was 
reaffirmed by his Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr in the same case, where the court would 
not be inclined to follow a path of interpretation which would lead it to great 
inconvenience. The hints of judicial activism are rightly embedded in the statements 
in this case. The desired direction which section 20(1) would then have to take is one 
which is purposive (judicially active) as opposed to literal. Therefore, the strict 
applications of contractual rules should be flexed when it comes to the principle of 
unfair dismissals, and an application of substantive fairness in dealing with the 
dismissal of an employee should be adopted.  
 
The idea of the courts applying judicial activism in this area of the law has been 
discussed in detail by Vanitha Sundra Karean in her article in the Malayan Law 
Journal, entitled The Constitutional Right to Livelihood as a Developing Field in 
Malaysian Labour Jurisprudence.212 The article details the issue of unfair dismissal 
and the relational constitutionality of the issue. Based on the article and its ensuing 
case laws, a strong case can be made out on the fact that judicial activism is an 
essential part of the issue of unfair dismissals. The pertinent case relating to the 
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Federal Constitution which was discussed in this article was the case of Esso 
Production Malaysia Inc v Aladdin bin Mohd Hashim [2000] 3 MLJ 270. The issue 
in the case was the disallowance by the Industrial Court for a request for 
adjournment by the employee when there was no legal representation after the 
withdrawal of his counsel from the case. His Lordship Gopal Sri Ram JCA stated 
that, though the High Court and the Court of Appeal had upheld the contention by 
the employee that the Industrial Court had not correctly exercised its discretion in the 
matter of adjournment, the issue was not related to article 5(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. His Lordship was of the view that this case was a matter of exercise of 
discretion by the court, and not a matter to be dealt with under article 5(1), which 
stated that “no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with the law”. However, the idea that one be without legal representation 
in a cause of action can surely be interpreted as something which deprives life and 
liberty. It seems like his Lordship was willing to apply a judicially active 
interpretation of unfair dismissal relating to procedural fairness based on common 
law judicial review, but not through a constitutional provision providing the same. 
Furthermore, if article 5(1) is read together with article 8(1) (equality provision) of 
the Federal Constitution, the net result would be that the courts are actually entitled 
to use these provisions to give a judicially active reading to labour and industrial 
statutes, that they should come within the ambit of these articles and not separated 
from them. Vanitha Sundra Karean makes it clear when she states the following 
based on the case of  Barat Estates Sdn Bhd & Anor v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam 
& Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 107 - a case dealing with a continuing employment contract of 
the employee and employer from one owner of business to a new owner:  
Clearly art 5(1) Federal Constitution applies in these circumstances as no person ought to be 




statute law, common law and the Federal Constitution. The relevant provisions in the EA seek 
to ensure that the appropriate notice is given upon change in ownership of business. The 
termination of the contract of employment in those circumstances may be viewed as a 
deprivation of livelihood as far as the opportunity to earn an income from the particular 
employer is concerned. This explains the statutory need for the appropriate notice or indemnity 
in lieu of notice to be given. 
However, case law provides that in matters of employment, the right to livelihood in art 5(1) 
FC should be read together with art 8(1) FC. Article 8(1) FC houses the equality doctrine and 
the courts have held that the equality doctrine encompasses principles of procedural and 
substantive fairness. There were no issues of procedure within this case. However, the facts do 
concern the principle of substantive fairness. 
Principles of substantive fairness within administrative law, which by analogy apply to 
labour law, include, among other categories, the failure to take into consideration relevant 
facts or taking into consideration irrelevant facts.213 
 
The statement above may be construed as giving the apex courts in Malaysia the 
power to interpret legislation in line with the Federal Constitution. The Federal court 
therefore acts as a constitutional court with the ability to ensure that social justice in 
labour and industrial matters take precedence, over and above ordinary 
interpretations. Thus, even in matters of unfair dismissal, it can be seen that a pattern 
towards judicial activism was developing. Even then, this may not be as liberal as the 
actions by judges in the Indian Supreme Court, who cent percent follow the strict 
interpretation of the right to life provision under the Indian Constitution. 
 
The final area of discussion would be the idea of constructive dismissal. According 
to Professor V Anantaraman, 214  referring to section 55(2)(c) of the Employment 
Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 of the United Kingdom, constructive dismissal 
is defined as where the employee terminates the contract of employment in 
circumstances where he is entitled to terminate the said contract by reason of the 
employer’s conduct. The key term here is what amounts to an employer’s ‘conduct’ 
which would warrant the employee in justifying his actions in terminating the 
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contract of employment constructively. In the English case of Western Excavating 
(ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] ICLR 221, it was stated that if the breach by the employer 
goes to the root of the contract of service, and that he considers himself no longer 
bound by it, the employee may treat himself as having been constructively dismissed 
by the conduct of the employer. This doctrine of constructive dismissal was given 
expression in two Malaysian Industrial court cases. First the case of  Lee Kim v Tai 
Lee Chan Plywood Agency (Award No 119 of 1980), where it was stated that,  
“Constructive dismissal denotes conduct by an employer amounting to a breach of 
contract such as entitles the workmen himself to terminate the contract summarily” 
and second, the case of  Ignatius Dev Anand v Pustaka Titiwangsa (M) Sdn Bhd 
(Award No 240 of 1980), “A unilateral alteration of the contract of employment by 
the employer, at least in an important aspect, gives the workman the right to 
terminate the contract without notice, and so may amount to constructive dismissal”. 
The two cases denote that the doctrine has been well accepted in Malaysia.  
 
It must be noted that section 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is not in pari 
materia with section 55(2)(c) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 
1978 of the United Kingdom, and is silent on the issue of constructive dismissal.  
Even when such a doctrine has been upheld by the Malaysian Industrial Court, it was 
rejected by the High Court in the case of Wong Chee Hong v Cathay Organisation 
(M) Sdn. Bhd. [1988] 1 MLJ 92 by Harun J,215 where it was stated that constructive 
dismissal did not come within the purview of section 20(1). It can be noted however 
that when the case went up to the Supreme Court,216 his Lordship Salleh Abas LP 
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stated that constructive dismissal can be brought within the fold of section 20(1) as 
the term ‘dismissal’ can be interpreted based on common law principles. This hints 
on some form of judicial activism by injecting common law principles into statutory 
provisions even where the provision clearly does not mention anything related to 
constructive dismissals. Recognising common law principles in determining statutory 
provisions has been the hallmark of judicial liberty which may lead to judicial 
activism. His Lordship Salleh Abbas LP stated in the case that: 
Thus it is clear that even in England, “constructive dismissal” does not mean that an employee 
can automatically terminate the contract when his employer acts or behaves unreasonably 
towards him. Indeed if it were so, it is dangerous and can lead to abuse and unsettled 
industrial relations. Such a proposition was rejected by the Court of Appeal. What is left of the 
expression is now no more than an employee’s right under the common law, which we have 
stated earlier, and goes no further. Alternative expressions with the same meaning, such as 
“implied dismissal” or even “circumstantial dismissal”, may well be coined and used. But all 
these could not go beyond the common law test.  
 
The statement itself makes clear the position taken by the courts, that the definition 
to be given to constructive dismissal is one based on common law rather than the 
statutory meaning given and interpreted under section 20(1) of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1967. However the current law as stated by Professor V 
Anantaraman,217 in the United Kingdom, has gone through some changes as the test 
applied today is based more on a contractual breach where: 
1. Whether the employer had breached the contract of service. 
2. Whether the term of the contract breached was fundamental; and 
3. Whether the workman left his employment in response to the breach within a 
reasonable time. 
 
                                                     





Therefore, the test departs from the original test laid down in the English case of 
Western Excavating. The essential reason would be the fundamental breach of the 
core term of the employment contract, and not on the unreasonableness of the 
employer’s misconduct. This change in the test from unreasonable conduct 
(unreasonable test) of the employer to the breach of the root term of the contract 
(contract test) was accepted in the case of Holiday Inn, Kuching v Lee Chai Siok 
Elisabeth[1992] 1 MLJ 243. However, it is difficult to see how the unreasonable test 
can be avoided when trying to construe the implied terms of the contract of 
employment, as opposed to the express terms which are basically straight forward. 
When implied terms are construed indirectly through the unreasonable test, judicial 
activism starts playing an integral part in the interpretive duty of judges. The 
pertinent issue now is whether the judgement pattern is limited to the contract test on 
express terms of the contract of employment, or do they show a pattern which 
includes the application of the unreasonable test over implied terms of the contract of 
employment. If the latter is more prominent, then it can be opined that this area of 
labour and industrial law may have been infused with seeds of judicial activism. 
 
This area of labour and industrial law is ripe for judicial activism as it requires 
extended judicial interpretation for its applicability. How far that extension can be 
applied is a matter to be mooted based on case laws. The main thread running 
through most cases however is the idea that there is a breach of the ‘root term’ of the 
contract of employment by the employer in an implied or express manner, which 






This then leads to the idea as to who requires proving constructive dismissal or no 
constructive dismissal. The application of burden of proof in constructive dismissal 
cases departs from what requires to be established under the normal circumstances of 
wrongful dismissals, in that, there is only a requirement to establish no just cause and 
excuse by the employee when the matter of dismissal is not in dispute. In the case of 
Malayan Banking Bhd v Association of Bank Officers, Peninsular Malaysia [1988] 3 
MLJ 204, his Lordship Abdoolcader SCJ stated that: 
A line of cases has recently emerged which asserts a judicial power to review decisions upon 
the ground that they lack rationally probative basis in fact. The first case was Reg v Deputy 
Industrial Injuries Commissioner, ex p Moore in which Diplock LJ stated (at p 488) that 
natural justice requires decision-makers to base their decisions ‘upon material which tends 
logically to show the existence or non-existence of facts relevant to the issues to be determined, 
or to show the likelihood or unlikelihood of the occurrence of some future event which would 
be relevant. It means that (the decision-maker) must not spin a coin or consult an astrologer…’ 
Ex p Moore has been approved in Australia in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic v Pochi (at 
pp 688-690 per Deane J).  
 
The above statement means that even in a situation where the employee has been 
treated unjustly, he has the burden to prove with material facts which logically tends 
to show the fact that constructive dismissal existed. However, this burden may be 
discharged on the standard of balance of probability. Even then, imposing such a 
burden may go against the very principle of social justice, as it is the employee 
whose livelihood is at stake and not the employer. 
 
The above areas of discussion may give an indication of patterns emerging in the 
decision making process for labour and industrial matters which can be considered 
liberal.  Ultimately the concern here is always the idea of achieving social justice for 
the employee based on best practices by the employer and protective decision 
making by the courts, which must allow the rights of the worker to take precedence 




limb of judicial review which is readily available for case laws which fall under 
labour and industrial matters. Before closing this Chapter and moving towards a 
discussion on reforming labour and industrial matters, it would be good to re-visit the 
role natural justice plays in the idea of judicial activism under labour and industrial 
matters.  
Natural justice in the employment arena relates to the right to livelihood entrenched 
in most constitutions of the world. In Malaysia, under article 5 of the Federal 
Constitution, it can be said that right to life and personal liberty includes the right to 
livelihood. This right is touted as natural law rights even before they were entrenched 
in written constitutions under the idea of natural justice and procedural fairness.218 
The principles of natural justice is best portrayed under the ideas of audi alteram 
partem and nemo judex in causa sua. That is, a right to be heard and one must not be 
a judge in his own cause respectively. In labour and industrial matters, it becomes 
poignant that decisions are not only reached based on the rigid pattern of statutes and 
common law precedents, but it must be imbued by the judicial activism of natural 
justice. This matter was discussed earlier in this chapter under the case of R 
Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145. 
 
Under industrial laws, judicial review is the questioning of an administrative decision 
and not merely the merits of the case. So the matter under an industrial dispute not 
only goes to the process, but also to the substance by which the decision was made 
by the courts. The starting point in any industrial dispute in Malaysia would be 
section 20(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The section deals with the 
                                                     




discretion to be exercised by the Human Resource Minister in referring an industrial 
dispute to the industrial court. However, the problem has always lied in section 33B 
of the Act and not section 20(3) where it is stated that “......... an award, decision or 
order of the court under this Act (including the decision of the court whether to grant 
or not to grant an application under section 33A (1)) shall be final and conclusive, 
and shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in 
question in any court”. The issue is whether such an ouster clause is to be given a 
literal reading, or one which infuses judicial activism. In the case of Inchape 
Malaysia Holdings v. RB Gray [1985] 2 MLJ 297 it was stated by M.P. Jain that a 
literal reading of the clause would simply convey an authority on the large number of 
administrative and quasi-judicial authorities the unfettered power without control, 
and would reduce the significance of the supervisory role of the High Court.  
 
Therefore, the industrial court in Malaysia is not under an absolute protection from 
actions under judicial review as their very authority is statutorily derived.219 In the 
same article by Guru Dhillon, he also quotes the case of Sabah Banking Employees 
Union v Sabah Commercial Banks Association [1989] 2 MLJ 286, where Abdul 
Hamid J220 stated that, it is the court’s fundamental constitutional and common law 
role to guarantee that the process of administrative decisions are duly fair. Thus, 
section 33B itself is subject to section 33A of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, 
where there is a limited right to appeal under a question of law to the high court from 
the decision made by the industrial court, which has the power to confirm, vary, 
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substitute, or quash the award as deemed necessary. Guru Dhillon Further quotes the 
case of Hotel Equatorial (M) Sdn Bhd v. National Union of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant 
Workers [1984] 1 MLJ 363, where it was stated by his Lordship George Seah FJ, that 
the discretion afforded to the Industrial Court is one which is not unfettered but one 
which is limited, and therefore is subject to appeal.  
 
Not only are the decisions of the industrial court subject to appeal under a liberal 
interpretation by the high court, the decisions are also subject to judicial review 
under Order 53 rule 2 of the Rules of Court 2012 under a certiorari application to 
quash the decision of the industrial court by an aggrieved party.221 According to Guru 
Dhillon, since judicial review is not considered as an appeal process, the High Court 
here has the supervisory right to examine the decision making process, by which it 
may quash the decision of the industrial court and order a re-hearing or substitute the 
decision with its own. However, the only problem envisaged is that the high court is 
limited in its consideration of due process and not merits, which fall under the 
purview of the natural justice limb. In this, there are two case laws which discuss 
whether a matter under review is only limited to process or also include merits. In the 
case of Harpeus Trading (M) Sdn Bhd v. National Union of Commercial Workers 
[1991] 1 MLJ 419, his Lordship Jemuri Serjan SCJ (as he then was) stated that the 
High Court has no jurisdiction to consider the matter under review on its merits to 
see whether it was fair and reasonable, as this is an exclusive power given under 
appeal to higher appellate courts. However, such a contention has been overruled by 
the case of Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan v. Transport Workers Union 
[1995] 2 MLJ 317. The finality of the matter was decided in the case of R 
                                                     




Ramachandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 145. As 
seen in the earlier discussion of this case in this chapter, the Federal Court stated that 
the High Court has the jurisdiction to repair any unjust results which was reached by 
the Industrial Court even where it has to decide the matter on its merits.  This meant 
that, under a judicial review process for industrial disputes, the court now not only 
has the right to attend to the rectification of procedural defects, but also to remedy a 
matter on its substance and merits. In other words, the high court actually has an 
appellate power under the current interpretation of the judicial review process for 
industrial court decisions, to decide matters on merit. This decision in itself lends 
credence that the Malaysian courts have departed from their counterpart courts in the 
United Kingdom in this regard. This is a good inclination on the part of the 
Malaysian courts which has shown a more judicially active mind-set rather than one 
which is conservative. One reason why the Malaysian courts have departed from the 
old conservative paradigm is the fact of the provision of article 5 of the Federal 
Constitution, in comparison to the idea of parliamentary supremacy in the United 
Kingdom, where rights are protected more under common law principles. The 
Malaysian courts can with pride announce that they have indeed joined the likes of 
the United States or Indian supreme courts, at least in the area of industrial relations, 
and all this is made possible by the fact that Malaysia has a written codified 
constitution, which embodies the idea that natural justice and the corollary judicial 
activism takes precedence over conservative common law interpretations based on 
the idea of Parliamentary supremacy. However, this is only confined to limited areas 
as been highlighted in this chapter, there are many detailed areas of industrial and 








The above analysis of case laws and statutory provisions gives a strong indication 
that the Malaysian labour and industrial laws lack judicial activism. The indication of 
some judicial activism in certain cases is based on the strength of the statutory 
provisions which the judges utilised and it is not strictly judicial activism. Judicial 
activism strictly is judges using theirs and society’s moral principles and the 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this final Chapter, the focus is on how industrial and labour laws in Malaysia can 
be better perfected to reflect protection through statutory provisions and also the 
allowance to the judiciary to play a more active role in interpreting and applying 
such statutory provisions. From the findings above in Chapters 4 and 5, it can be 
stated that there is a lack of enhanced statutory protection and also active judicial 
activism (limited to certain areas only) to protect the rights of the common labourer 
in Malaysia. The focus of both industrial, labour and employment related statutes 
seems to give an unfair advantage to the employer rather than the employee. It is 
readily admitted through the above findings that there are burst of decisions at times 
protecting the rights of the employee, however these are too limited to create an 
actual impact on a high degree of protection to the common labourer. The 
recommendations herein are in no way exhaustive, and can be further improved 
through other suggestions.  These recommendations relate to identifying the third 







6.2 Summary of Findings and Recommendations  
6.2.1 Domestic Inquiry 
As discussed in earlier chapters, domestic inquiry is basically the first stages of the 
labour and industrial dispute process. This is a first stage process, pre-dismissal, 
where the employer would have to conduct investigations into the misconduct of the 
employee which if proven, would warrant a dismissal. As observed under section 
14(1) of the Employment Act 1955, the employer has the right to dismiss and 
employee where there has been misconduct on the part of the employee which goes 
to the implied or express conditions of the contract of employment, which would 
warrant a dismissal. The law and its interpretation in this area has already been 
presented and will not be repeated, suffice to say that the case of Said Dharmalingam 
v. Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 can be contrasted with 
the case of Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen [1996] 1 AMR 49, both Federal 
Court decisions, where the latter was conservative and the former judicially active in 
their interpretation on whether the domestic inquiry was a mandatory requirement to 
be held by the employer. 
 
The focus here however is the interpretation of the idea of domestic inquiry by the 
researcher and types of improvements which can be added onto this limb of 
employment law to better protect the employee. Before this can be done, what and 
how exactly domestic inquiry works in the employment arena has to be deciphered. 
First and foremost, it must be clearly stated that a domestic inquiry relates 
specifically to the idea of natural justice.222 Thus the idea of domestic inquiry itself 
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must be approached from the point of view. This idea is embodied in the Latin 
maxim audi alteram partem, a party must be given the right to be heard, and nemo 
judex in causa sua, no man should judge a matter in his own cause. The problem 
here has always been the argument that, even if domestic inquiry is not afforded as a 
preliminary procedure for dismissal to the employer, the employee still has with him 
the labour and industrial courts where he has a right to be heard. This argument, it 
seems, defeats the purpose of natural justice in the first place. It is opined that the 
employee would be better served under natural justice if he is allowed to state his 
case to the employer before he is whimsically dismissed, as this involves the 
livelihood of the employee and not the employer. Therefore, the element of detriment 
is against the employee and not the employer. To this end, let us analyse section 
14(1) of the Employment Act 1955 to form certain deductions. The heading of the 
section states “Termination of contract for special reasons”. Section 14(1) states, “An 
employer may, on the grounds of misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of the 
express or implied conditions of his service, after due inquiry ... (a)”. The key words 
here are misconduct and due inquiry. This means whereas the employer has the 
burden to prove that the employee has behaved inconsistently with the provisions of 
the contract of employment, the employee is to be offered a chance to defend 
himself. The contentious term has always been the term due inquiry. Should this term 
be interpreted in accordance with natural justice principles, which would echo 
judicial activism or should it be rigidly, conservatively interpreted? However, it can 
be seen from the case of Said Dharmalingam v. Malayan Breweries (Malaya) Sdn 
Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 646 as discussed under Findings that such an inquiry is deemed to 
be a statutory right and is considered to be mandatory. Thus, the matter is well settled 




simply result in an injustice to the employer. Therefore, the idea of due inquiry is not 
as has been suggested by some cases such as Milan Auto Sdn Bhd v Wong Sen Yen 
[1996] 1 AMR 49 to be a mere formality, but a mandatory requirement to satisfy the 
demands of procedural fairness under natural justice. 
 
It is also to be noted as discussed above under Findings, the idea of due inquiry is 
also equally applicable to labour matters not covered by section 14(1) of the 
Employment Act 1955. This is evident from earlier discussed cases such as Ong 
Yuen Hock and Dreamland Corporation. Thus, judicial activism in this area is quite 
settled, the courts are more than willing to exercise it. However, section 14(1) of the 
Employment Act 1955 only pertains to the holding of the inquiry and not the 
procedure of the inquiry which in itself may be flawed.  
 
It is surprising that such a mandatory requirement of due inquiry has not been 
appended with a set procedure on how the inquiry should be conducted. It is to be 
noted that the idea of a due inquiry procedure does not in any way attract the 
principle of natural justice, but only the fact that there has to be one, attracts it. It is 
humbly submitted that a specific procedure for domestic inquiry should be included 
in the Employment Act 1955 to make matters clearer as to what is required to be 
done by the employer and the employee as a matter of formality in a domestic 
inquiry to reduce any form of discrepancy in procedure, which may be raised at trial 
proper in the industrial or labour courts later. The procedure for domestic inquiry 
will not only save time, but also the cost which needs to be incurred by the litigant 
employee when the matter goes to court. In other words, whether the employee has 




a dismissal is warranted. This would ensure that disputes which later reach the courts 
have minimal discrepancies in its conformity to procedural conduct of a domestic 
inquiry. 
 
6.2.2 Work Hours, Overtime, Lay-offs and Retrenchment 
This area, as has been seen in discussions above under Findings, again relates to the 
idea of livelihood of the employee. The details of this area are certainly a cause for 
concern. As can be seen from the discussion essentially under section 60A of the 
Employment Act 1955, the hours of work per day may not exceed 8 hours and not 
more than 48 hours a week. However, a worker may be requested to work overtime 
where the nature of the work itself relates to spontaneous emergencies. However, 
such overtime work is regulated under the Employment (Limitation of Overtime 
Work) Regulations 1980. Essentially, regulation 2 states that overtime work for the 
purpose of section 60A(4) of the Employment Act 1955 shall not exceed a total of 
one hundred and four hours in a month. However, as discussed above under Research 
and Findings, the matter of overtime is not a contention, rather the lack of it where 
the employee may be forced to earn less as a cost cutting measure by the employer. It 
has been seen in the case of William Jacks & amp; Co. (M) Sdn. Bhd. v. S 
Balasingam [1997] 3 CLJ 235, that an employer is readily allowed to reduce work 
time as cost cutting measures if it is done bona fide. However, this slants towards 
capitalism. It goes to prove that it is the ultimate profit of the employer which is of 
more concern rather than the welfare of the ordinary workman. It is recommended 
that some changes be made to the way section 60A of the Employment Act 1955 




regulated to the standard 8 hours with an hour’s break. Apart from this the provisions 
are quite satisfactory, and this is evident from the lack of litigation in this area.  
 
The more pressing issue then is the idea that overtime work means more income to 
the employee, and lack of it stifles the income flow. This incidentally relates to the 
next issue of lay-offs and retrenchment. The law governing lay-offs and 
retrenchment is under section 12(3) of the Employment Act 1955. Under the 
provision, an employer may terminate an employee(s) based on the fact that the 
employer wishes to cease or change place of business or where the employee(s) is no 
longer required where the type of work done has ceased or there is a change in the 
place of business of the employer. In short, there must be some form of 
redundancy.223 The law on lay-offs and retrenchment benefits in Malaysia is governed 
by section 60J of the Employment Act 1955. This is further supplemented by the 
Employment (Termination and Lay-Off Benefits) Regulations 1980.  The employer 
has the right not only to reduce overtime and the consequential wages, but to also 
lay-off and retrench a workman and deprive him of his livelihood all in the name of 
economic prudence and efficiency. This was seen in the case of Pengkalen Holdings 
Bhd v James Lim Hee Meng [2000] 2 ILR 252 with a seemingly innocuous 
judgement masquerading as benefits to the employee. Sometimes lay-offs or 
retrenchment may be a facade to dismiss a workman as illustrated in the case of East 
Asiatic Company (M) Bhd v Valen Noel Yap [1987] ILR 363. It can be stated that this 
area of judgement in case laws is inclined towards conservatism instead of activism. 
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It is humbly submitted that section 60J should essentially include matters of security 
of tenure of the employee, which should be worded in the strongest accentuation 
possible. There must be comprehensive provisions dealing with lay-offs and 
retrenchment, and it should not be left too flexibly in the hands of the employer, as 
the employer’s concern is always one which turns to the face of profiteering at the 
expense of the ordinary workman. Section 60J(1) itself makes it clear by the words 
‘...the Minister may...’, indicating layoff, termination and retirement benefits to be 
paid by the employer to the employee are optional rather than mandatory.  
 
Since there is no definition of redundancy under statute, one must fall back on the 
common law interpretation. This is where an employee who deems the retrenchment 
to be not bona fide may bring the matter to the Industrial Court.224 In the case of TWI 
Training and Certification (SE Asia) Sdn Bhd v Jose A Sebastian [1998] 2 ILR 879, 
it was held that under section 13(3) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967, the 
employer has the ultimate prerogative to retrench an employee based on the best 
interest of his business. This decision was a reaffirmation of the Federal Court’s 
decision in the case of Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd vs. National Union of Hotel, Bar & 
Restaurant Workers & Anor [1980] 1 MLJ 109. It is submitted that this is 
unsatisfactory, and it is recommended that lay-offs should be based on socio-
economic circumstances of social justice to the employee, and not the mere fact that 
the employer needs for profiteering. However, if the exercise in retrenchment by the 
employer is bona fide, and done with no ill intentions to dismiss the employee(s), 
rather than for the sole reason of profiteering, then such actions are deemed to be 
                                                     
224 M. Aminuddin , Malaysian Industrial Relations and Employment Law, 4th. edn. (Kuala Lumpur: Mc Graw-Hill 




justifiable. It is ultimately difficult to decide on the bona fide nature of 
retrenchments, as they deal with too fluid of economic circumstances. It is 
recommended that any form of lay-offs or retrenchment should be by the sole reason 
of the employer shutting down his business where he can no longer operate it, then 
based on capitalistic modes of economic benefits. One such issue is the principle of 
LIFO - last in first out. This is where a senior employee is last to be retrenched 
compared to a junior employee.225 The principle of LIFO is determined under the 
Malaysian code of conduct for industrial harmony 1975. However, the Code does not 
have the force of law, and therefore, the principle of LIFO is more a convention 
rather than a rule. It is recommended that the principle of LIFO be codified to make 
it mandatory, as decisions taken under this principle have been conservative rather 
than judicially active, as exemplified by the case of Penang & Seberang Prai Textile 
& Garment Industry Employees Union v Dragon & Phoenix Bhd Penang & Anor 
[1989] 1 CLJ 802, where it was stated that the breach of the above code does not in 
any way invite legal sanctions.  
 
6.2.3 Probation 
There is much less controversy and vagueness in this area of the law. As confirmed 
by the case of   K C Mathews v Kumpulan Guthrie Sdn Bhd [1981] CLJ (Rep) 62; 
[1981] 2 MLJ 320, where a probationer seems to be accorded rights of employment 
equivalent to a full-fledged employee. The laws on misconduct and dismissals 
equally apply to this area, and has been discussed previously, there is however some 
judicial activism when it comes to the idea of confirmation after the probationary 
period. The case of K C Mathews v Kumpulan Guthrie Sdn Bhd [1981] CLJ (Rep) 
                                                     




62; [1981] 2 MLJ 320 states that where there is an incidence of silence on the part of 
the employer after the probationary period, then the probationary period is deemed to 
be extended. In comparison, the case of Paari Perumal v Abdul Majid Hj Nazardin 
& Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 127 states that silence amounts to an implied consent by the 
employer on confirmation of employment. It humbly submitted that the High Court’s 
decision in Paari Perumal v Abdul Majid Hj Nazardin & Ors [2000] 4 CLJ 127 is 
preferable to the decision of the Federal Court in K C Mathews v Kumpulan Guthrie 
Sdn Bhd [1981] CLJ (Rep) 62; [1981] 2 MLJ 320, as it is only logical to imply that 
silence amounts to confirmation, as the employer, given the chance, would simply 
lay quiet (an later imply anything) and will be in the position of advantage compared 
to the workman’s position.  
 
The reason why there are apparently judicially active decisions in this area 
(probation and confirmation) of the law is because the term probation and the rights 
accorded under probation are not well defined under the Employment Act 1955 or 
the Industrial Relations Act 1967. It is humbly submitted that there be provisions 
which state clearly the position of a probationary on what happens in circumstances 
where a person’s probation ends with the employer mulls making a decision and 
keeps silent. 
 
6.2.4 Annual and sick leave 
This area has some elaborate and clear provisions under the Employment Act 1955. 
Thus, there is not much room for judicial activism in courts unless the leave 
provision is one provided under ‘maternity leave’ which will be dealt with separately 




and that there must be sufficient rest days for the employee. Many a times we hear 
that, Malaysians are afraid to take sick or annual leaves as this would reflect badly on 
their performance. Employers at times misuse this psychological element and exploit 
the rights of workers. In reality, under the Employment Act 1955, sick leave 
entitlement is mandatory. Section 60F (1) of the Act makes it clear by the use of the 
words ‘shall ... be entitled ...’. Section 60F(1) (aa) on the other hand gives an 
entitlement of  14 days sick leave for a person employed under 2 years, 18 days for a 
person employed more than two years but under 5, and 22 days where a person has 
been employed for five or more years. Section 60F (1) (bb) on the other hand allows 
60 days sick leave where hospitalisation is required. 
 
However, in practice, most employers will not go beyond the 16 days in the name of 
freedom of contract. There are not many case laws in this area as the matter is 
considered as not going to the root of the contract of service. Most case laws deal 
with the failure to communicate the sick leave by the employee to the employer. In 
the case of Jadewealth Sdn Bhd v Addie Halim Ali [2002] 2 ILR 193, it was stated by 
the court that the dismissal for taking sick leave was unfounded and without just 
cause and excuse, as despite the condition the claimant was in, he made attempts to 
reach his employers by calling them and that was sufficient notice to the employers. 
This may not be a judicially active decision; however, the decision does show 
inclination to protect the employee. It is humbly submitted that the Employment Act 
1955 needs to include provisions where the employee should be excused from 
notification where the possibility of doing so causes hardship and difficulty. It is also 




service, and that employers are well informed that such leaves are mandatory where 
the employee is indeed proven to have been sick.  
 
6.2.5 Wages 
This has been a perennial issue for all workmen for all time. Judicial activism is quite 
important in this area of law. It is to be noted that the minimum wage in Malaysia 
currently as of 2016 under the Minimum Wages Order 2016 is RM1000 for 
peninsular Malaysia and RM920 for Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan. The government of 
Malaysia set this wage threshold upon the recommendations made by the National 
Wage Consultative Council. Wages in Malaysia are basically determined by three 
cardinal factors - the Wages Council Act 1974, collective bargaining (basically the 
contract of service) and the market forces under a laissez faire economy. Again, not 
many case laws can be garnered under this head as many in Malaysia are quite 
passive against their employers on issues of wage. The Wages Council Act 1974 
however was repealed and superseded by a wage policy provision demanded by the 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress. This wage policy was implemented as the 
National Wages Consultative Council Act 2011. The minimum wage earlier took 
effect in January 2014. In 2009, a study226 commissioned by the Human Resource 
Ministry entitled ‘National Employment Returns Report 2009’ stated that, 33.8% of 
the 1.3 million private sector employees earned less than RM700. This is utterly 
disappointing, as according to a study by the World Bank, it clearly showed that in 
Malaysia the wage growth of 2.6% p.a. is not in tandem with the productivity growth 
                                                     





of 6.7% p.a. 227  It is however humbly submitted that with the current economic 
conditions, it is prudent that the minimum wage of Malaysian workers in the private 
sector be increased to a minimum of RM2000. According to a report in the Star 
online news dated 20 January 2015,228 the minimum wage which was requested by the 
Malaysian Trades Union Congress is RM1200, which is way too low. This was 
following the current review of the wage policy by the National Wages Consultative 
Council, which submitted fresh recommendations to the Human Resource Ministry. 
It is humbly submitted that with the current economic situation, a fair amount of 
minimum wage of RM2000 should be an ideal to be achieved and is recommended. 
 
However, most case laws in the labour, industrial and civil courts deal with issues of 
non-payment of wages rather than a concern on the provisions of minimum wages. 
Even then, almost two years back, there was a landmark decision relevant to the 
minimum wages. The case of Kesatuan Kebangsaan Pekerja-Pekerja Hotel, Bar & 
Restoran Semenanjung Malaysia v Crystal Crown Hotel & Resort Sdn Bhd [2014] 3 
ILR 410 stated the significance of the idea of minimum wage for employees. It may 
be said that this judgement is in line with the Minimum Wages Order 2012. In this 
case the court differentiated between a minimum wage which must be paid to the 
hotel employees in contradistinction to the service charge of 10% of which 9% goes 
to the employees and 1% goes to the hotel. Though seemingly judicially active, the 
decision is merely and actually in line with the Minimum Wages Order 2012. 
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However what can be better is a clear guideline under labour laws as to what 
amounts to wages and tips. 
 
Another important issue is payment of wages in its multifarious forms. It is noted 
that there are essential differences between salary (wages), overtime payment, 
bonuses, profit sharing and incentives. Section 2 of the Employment Act 1955 makes 
clear the fact that any payment made to the employee for work done is essentially 
categorised as wages other than bonuses, allowances (special and general), pensions 
paid and gratuities upon retirement. One area of contention is the mode of payment 
of wages. Under section 25A (1) of the Employment Act 1955, payment of wages to 
employees must be paid directly into the employee’s bank account, unless otherwise 
requested. However since section 2 uses the term “in cash payable to employee”, it is 
suggested that it should be amended in line with section 25A (1) in order to avoid 
any future conflicts. 
 
6.2.6 Maternity Benefits 
This area of labour and industrial law has many contentions and issues which 
requires resolutions. This area is governed under sections 37 - 44A of the 
Employment Act 1955. The issue is not so much whether maternity leave is given to 
a female employee, but the issue is more on the idea of gender inequality which 
needs addressing. That female employee should not be discriminated when there is 
an intention of becoming pregnant, or during pregnancy. The landmark decision in 
this area is of course the case of Beatrice A/P AT Fernandez v Sistem Penerbangan 
Malaysia & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 681, a case of dismissal of a female employee (an air 




agreement was as such that upon becoming pregnant, a female air stewardess must 
resign or face dismissal. The issue was whether such a term was at odds with article 
8 of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. However, the Court of Appeal made it clear 
that article 8 entitles protection of equality under any law, and since the collective 
agreement is not law, article 8 cannot be superimposed on it. The Court of Appeal 
also gave the argument that since the airline, MAS was not a public emanation of the 
state, and that article 8 only serves to protect an individual encroached by public law 
functions, it therefore does not deal with disputes which are private in nature. The 
Federal Court on the other hand went on the pedigree basis that, employees’ equality 
should be measured generally on the basis of the class of employment. In other 
words, the female air stewardess’ right to equality should be measured against other 
air stewardess, and not the ground crew and also the specific nature of her job 
function.   
 
This decision is unsatisfactory. It is recommended that Article 8 equality should be 
interpreted in a judicially active manner for the benefit of gender equality. The 
collective agreement was against gender equality and by right should have been 
deemed as an unreasonable requirement of a female employee and is against Article 
8. It is recommended that, for example, that there should be specific laws on the 
discrimination of pregnant women as stated in the European Union Pregnancy 
Directive. 229  This would essentially afford protection for female employees in all 
fields of employment in Malaysia, and the proper interpretation of Article 8 of the 
Malaysian Federal Constitution. The classification doctrine essentially is redundant, 
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and must be more gender specific as stated by S Fredman,230 that the law is going on a 
path that equal categories should be treated equally without regard to gender 
differences. In other words, where there is a specific nature emanating from a given 
gender, then the law must not fail to recognise such differences and suitably provide 
for legal redresses for such matters rather than lumping them into a single general 
category of regulations. This differences argument was also stated by the late Tun 
Salleh Abbas LP in the seminal case of Malaysian Bar & Anor v Government of 
Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 at p 166. His Lordship made it clear by stating: 
The requirement for equal protection of the law does not mean that that all laws passed by a 
legislature must apply equally to all persons and that the laws so passed cannot create 
differences as to the persons whom they apply and the territorial limits within which they are in 




This can be interpreted as allowing some discretion both under statute and common 
law to accommodate some form of visible differences between types or categories of 
employees, and this should also be embodied in constitutional provisions or the 
interpretations of existing constitutional provisions.  
 
The other issue is of course the interpretation of the term reasonable on the collective 
agreement and also the law. In the case of  Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor 
[1981] 1 MLJ 64, it was stated that the term ‘reasonable’ must be viewed from the 
perspective of the socio-economic objectives of legislations, and not, as was in the 
case of Beatrice, from the point of view of the employer based on the collective 
agreement. It is therefore recommended as substantiated above, that the Employment 
Act 1955 and also the Industrial Relations Act 1967 should make specific provisions 
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in this regard, not only on gender specific issues, but also for example, provisions for 
handicap people. 
 
6.2.7 Social Security 
This is an important area on maintaining the social equilibrium of workers on the 
issue of social safety nets in case a workman is unable to continue work. Social 
security comes under the provisions of the Employees Social Security Act 1969. The 
Act is applicable where there are incidences of injuries and incapacities. Another 
provision which deals with workers security is the Workmen’s Compensation Act 
1952, which allows liability to be imposed on a principal (employer) in cases of 
injuries. However, for both acts to apply, there must first of be in subsistence a 
contract of service between the employer and employee. Under section 15 of the 
Employees Social Security Act 1969, it provides for certain benefits for employees 
where there is injury or death which includes occupational diseases. The definition of 
the industry to which the Act applies is also quite wide, that it does not matter 
whether the industry is registered as long as it comes within the purview of the act as 
embodied under section 2(10). The more pertinent issue is where claims made by the 
employee against SOCSO is unsuccessful. The employee in this case may appeal to 
the Social Security Appellate Board as provided for under part V of the Employees 
Social Security Act 1969. The Board has the powers akin to a Sessions Court as 
established by section 87 of the Employees Social Security Act 1969. From two 
judgements of the Board, Mohd. Nordin bin Othman v. Ketua Pengarah Pertubuhan 
Keselamatan Sosial Application No. SS (PP) 71 of 1997 and Fook Thain @ Wong 
Koh Fong v. Ketua Pengarah Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial Application No. SS 




employees. In both cases, the claims were allowed albeit the injury did not occur in 
the workplace but en route to work. 
 
Thus, the social justice element on claims against SOCSO is well established and 
there is not much of a requirement for the courts to take a judicially active 
intervention when dealing with disputes. The only problem which can be observed 
thus far is that an employee is not allowed to make claims on injuries which occurred 
not in the course of employment, which defeats the very purpose of SOCSO as an 
insurance scheme for employees. In the case of Sarojini a/p Rajoo v. Ketua Pengarah, 
Pertubuhan Keselamatan Sosial Permohonan No. SS (KS) 77 Tahun 1995, the claim 
was disallowed as it was deemed that the employee was working on matters not 
within the scope of her designated work which is an exception provided under 
section 24(2) of the Act. This however is not satisfactory. Since SOCSO is 
essentially an insurance scheme for workmen, it should well be applicable to any 
form of injury within and outside the employment time. This is because the idea is to 
enable sustenance of the workmen who is no longer able to work in the current 
employment. It is therefore recommended therefore that section 2(11) of the 
Employees Social Security Act 1969 on the definition of an insured person should be 
interpreted liberally by the courts, in other words in a judicially active manner. 
Section 2(11) of the act states that “insured person” means a person who is or was an 
employee in respect of whom contributions are, were or could be payable under this 
Act, notwithstanding that such industry or employee was not so registered, so long as 
the industry was one to which this act applies.” The fact that section 2(11) uses the 
words “who is or was an employee” and “contributions made” in itself gives rise to 




needs to be compensated. What the section essentially provides for is for 
compensation to be paid for regardless of the fact that the injury occurred during the 
course of employment or not, as long as the person is employed. Thus section 24(2) 
of the act itself is contradictory with section 2(11) of the act. 
 
6.2.8 Retirement, Pension, Gratuities and Benefits 
In Malaysia, after coming into force of the Minimum Retirement Age Act 2012 on 1
st
 
July 2013, the minimum retirement age is now set at 60. The main contention in this 
area has been whether the increase in the retirement age would stifle movement 
upwards of younger employees. In the case of Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia Bhd v 
Kesatuan Kakitangan Executive  Sistem Penerbangan Malaysia [1996] 1 ILR 704, 
which was prior to the Minimum Retirement Act 2012, it was debated that such an 
increase would stifle the growth of young employees, however such a contention can 
be rebutted by some studies 231  which state that there is no concrete evidence to 
establish that this happens. The definition of contract of service under section 3 of 
the Act also is much more broader than the one stated under the Employment Act 
1955, as under this act, there is no limitation on wages earned by the phrase 
“…irrespective of his wages...”, for a person to be eligible for protection under the 
Act. This is a welcome change in the law, as the improvement in health and 
economic conditions would mean a longer life span for people in Malaysia.232 For this 
very reason section 5(1) of the Act disallows an employer to prematurely retire an 
employee, and section 5(2) make it an offence punishable by fine. It is recommended 
                                                     
231 Milligan, Gruber and Wise, “Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: The Relationship to 
Youth Employment, Introduction and Summary,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper  (January, 2009): 
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however that in reality there should not be any age limit to retirement, as long as the 
employee is deemed to be fit, he should be allowed to keep on working unless he 
voluntarily opts to retire.  
 
Pension schemes is only applicable to public servants as stated under section 1(2) of 
the Pensions Act 1980, known basically as defined benefit (DB). On the other hand, 
private employees fall under the Employees Provident Funds (EPF) scheme as well 
as public servants who opt for the scheme as defined under section 2 of the 
Employees Provident Fund Act 1991, known basically as defined contribution (DC). 
These schemes are certainly for the benefit of the employees, and there is not much 
controversy in this area of labour and industrial law. The main issue which usually 
arises is non-payment of contribution by the employers in the private sector on the 
defined contribution. It usually happens that the employee’s contribution deducted 
from his salary and the employer’s contribution fails to be remitted with EPF by the 
employer. Under section 43(2) of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991, the 
employer is required to remit these contributions on the 15
th
 day of every month, or 
commits and offence punishable to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine not 
exceeding RM 10,000 or both. However, it seems like such claims against the 
employer must be made within the limitation allowed. This was based on the non-
obstante clause under section 65(1) of the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991, 
which provides that “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law all 
contributions payable under this Act may, without prejudice to any other remedy, be 
recoverable by the Board summarily as a civil debt.” The meaning of the words 
“notwithstanding” was made clear in the Federal Court case of Perbadanan 




where it meant basically, overriding. This would mean that section 6(1) of the 
Limitation Act 1953 would be applicable to the Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 
that any claim on contribution not made more than 6 years will be time barred.  
 
There are however other decisions which state otherwise.  In both Lembaga 
Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Lim Kek Bee & Anor (unreported) and 
Lembaga Kumpulan Simpanan Wang Pekerja v Manfred Smisek & 5 Ors 1 LNS  
[2009] 1719, it was held by the courts that section 65(1) of the Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1991 actually ousts  section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 from being 
applicable. These two ways of interpreting the non obstante clause has cause some 
problems. Does a person exclude other provisions from being applicable to the 
Employees Provident Fund Act 1991 or include it as an overriding factor against the 
Employees Provident Fund Act 1991? Both interpretation falls on judicial activism, 
the former favourable to the employer, whereas the latter favourable to the employee.  
 
The Supreme Court of India (most of the above decisions made reference to Indian 
authorities on non obstante clause) in the case of  Dominion of India v Shribai A. 
Irani AIR 1954 SC 596 [1955], stated that such clauses ordinarily and through its 
dictionary meaning indicate that they override other provisions, and not that the 
enactment itself is overridden. 233  Thus, though section 65(1) of the Employees 
Provident Fund Act 1991 clearly has a non obstante clause, it is humbly submitted 
that the clause should be read as overriding section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953, 
and not that the Limitation Act 1953 is allowed inroad to set a limit on claimable 
contribution under the Employees Provident Fund. This would have been a more 
                                                     




palatable judicially active interpretation to safeguard social justice under labour and 
industrial matters. It is recommended that section 65(1) of the Employees Provident 
Fund Act 1991 is amended to change the word ‘notwithstanding’ to a clearer word 
such as ‘excluding’, as not to cause confusion in the application of non-obstante 
clauses. 
 
6.3 Future Research 
The research here has established to a large extent that there is a lack of judicial 
activism in the judgements of the courts in Malaysia. It has been highlighted above 
that many areas require a revamping in the statutory laws as well as a more active 
interpretation of labour and industrial laws by the judiciary. 
 
Future research can be undertaken if there are any gaps left from this research. 
However, this research has been undertaken as a jurisprudential study, and therefore 
relates to a philosophical-legal view of labour and industrial laws in Malaysia. Thus, 
any research undertaken in the future would inevitably be one which is related to the 
fluid nature of jurisprudential research and not a statistical quantitative one. This 
research can also be connected to any other social legal research in the future and can 
be used as a reference point to further explore not only the nature of statutory 
provisions and judicial decisions, but to research the reason in detail as to why judges 
in Malaysia have developed a conservative approach towards such judicial decisions. 
This would be a research not on the broad perspective of judicial decisions, but also 







In conclusion, the researcher finds that after discussing many statutes and cases in 
many areas of labour and industrial laws of Malaysia, there is still stifling of judicial 
activism in this area of law and practice. The above recommendations are brief 
statements of what can be done to relevant statutory provisions by amending them or 
the courts through common law which may take a more judicially active role in 
ensuring that the protection of the workmen would be the ultimate goal of labour and 
industrial legislations.  
 
The research also shows that even if there is any evidence of judicial activism in 
labour and industrial matters in Malaysia, this is limited to applying an already active 
legislative provision. Judicial activism in is true sense mean judges making laws 
where there is a gap or lacuna in the legislative provisions where judges don’t need 
to wait for legislative reforms, but take their own initiative in solving the given 
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